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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the capacity of the Argentine, Italian and Romanian Legislatures to hold 
the Executive branch of government accountable for its policy initiatives issued by emergency 
Executive decree, rather than by normal procedure legislative initiatives (NPL).  
The major questions the thesis attempts to answer are: what makes Executives prefer to 
promote their policy views extensively by Decree, rather than NPL, even when the situation is 
not of emergency and necessity? What explains the capacity of Legislatures to hold the 
Executive to account by amending or rejecting the Executive decrees that infringe their primary 
legislative function?  
I argue that the issuing of Executive decrees is a rational policy promotion strategy when the 
Executive faces bargaining problems in the Legislature, while the level of Executive 
accountability to the Legislature in terms of amending and rejecting Decrees is determined by the 
constitutional definition of these acts in favour of either one of the two branches of government. 
Furthermore, when the Decree is constitutionally defined to enable to the Executive to prevail 
over the Legislature, the former will issue them excessively, namely at a rate that is higher than 
that required by the bargaining problems that it confronts in the Legislature.  
The thesis offers an alternative explanation to the assumption that new democracies are ruled 
by Executive decree as an outcome of a specific “dictatorial” culture which perpetuates after the 
collapse of their authoritarian regime. The disciplined comparison of three study cases with three 
different political systems and radically different experiences with democracy explores the role 
of institutional and partisan structures in generating a peculiar style of governance and the 
Legislatures’ capacity to keep it under control. 
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I. INTRODUCTION:  
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE BY EXECUTIVE 
EMERGENCY DECREES 
 
This thesis explores the causes of excessive issuing of emergency Executive decrees and the 
treatment of these acts in the Legislature across political systems. The issue of governance by 
emergency Executive decrees has been explored by the literature on democratic transition and 
consolidation mainly from the perspective of the democratic consolidation of countries emerging 
from authoritarianism and dictatorship (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999; Carey and Shugart, 1998; 
Mainwaring, 1990, 1991, 1992-1993; Jones, 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). An 
excessive number of emergency Executive decrees have been considered an indicator of the 
institutional weakness of Legislatures and the capacity of the Executive branch of government to 
prevail over other State institutions so that it undermines their proper functioning. The particular 
type of Decree that the literature on democratic transition and consolidation focused on is a 
legislative act of the Executive that gains the force of law without the prior assent of the 
legislators (Shugart, 1998: 4), bypassing the Legislature in the process of policy-making, under 
the constitutionally defined pretence of urgency and necessity. Simply formulated, the Executive 
legislates directly, without the assent of the Legislature, under the justification of a situation of 
emergency and necessity, the determination of which is an Executive prerogative. 
This thesis builds on the insights of the 1990s literature on democratic transition and 
consolidation, but attempts to further the understanding of the topic by bringing in perspectives 
from the literature on how political actors and institutions interact in determining policy 
outcomes (Tsebelis, 1995, 2000, 2002; Carey and Shugart, 1998; Strøm, Müller and Bergman, 
2003; Müller and Strøm, 2000).  
The topic of governance by emergency Executive decrees has provoked significant scholarly 
debate on the theoretical claims regarding the nature and/or quality of democracy in those 
countries where the Executive branch of government issues a large number of these acts. A 
legitimate question arises: why should we care about an Executive that issues a large number of 
emergency Decrees even when the policy promoted using this legislative resource does not 
address an emergency? After all, the Executive branch of government is constantly using 
Executive decrees to promote its policy views in many established democracies, in different 
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political systems exhibiting different configurations of Executive-Legislature relations of power 
(Carey and Shugart, 1998).  
Executive decrees as policy-bargaining resources are of many types, depending on their 
constitutional definition. The particular type of Decree on which this thesis focuses (the Decree 
issued under the constitutionally defined pretence of urgency and necessity) is a legislative act 
issued by the Executive, which bypasses the Legislature in the process of policy-making1. As I 
will show later with the case of Argentina, there are countries where the constitutional provisions 
define this type of Executive decree as an outright policy-imposition resource, granting the 
Executive branch of government excessive power when using it, while offering the Legislature a 
diminished power of amending or rejection. 
The Executive decree of urgency and necessity differs from the normal procedure of 
legislation initiated by the Executive (NPL) in one fundamental aspect. The Decree is a de facto 
law, and not a simple legislative proposal: it only need be forwarded to the Legislature in order 
to have legal effect, under the constitutionally defined pretence of necessity and urgency, before 
it enters the legislative debate. The Executive need not consult the Legislature about its policy 
options promoted through this type of Decree, as it need not wait for the outcome of legislative 
deliberations. The Decrees are eventually discussed in the Legislature, but the policy scrutiny 
takes place ex post, after these unilateral policy acts are in place, generating legal effects for a 
specific period, sometimes years.  
In contrast, a piece of legislation initiated by the Executive through normal procedure (NPL) 
is not a law as such, but a simple legislative proposal. It requires debate and approval in the 
Legislature before it can have legal effect, therefore involving a wait for the Executive, policy 
scrutiny in the Legislature and inter-institutional bargaining. 
Precisely this difference explains the scholarly attention given to Executive decrees used in 
constitutionally defined situations of urgency and necessity (Carey and Shugart, 1998). It had 
been claimed that the excessive use of these acts represents the usurpation of the Legislatures’ 
legislative prerogatives, which in turn is considered a serious infringement with the principle of 
separation among the main powers within the State2. The ideals of democracy and democratic 
                                                 
1 Carey and Shugart (1998) provide a detailed categorization of Executive decrees according to their constitutional 
definition and their subsequent policy bargaining power. 
2 The concern refers to the excessive use of decrees, not necessarily to the existence of constitutional provisions 
granting the Executive decree power of any type, including the Decree of urgency and necessity. 
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representation are called into question when the Executive branch of government ends up 
legislating extensively above the Parliament or Congress, taking on functions that are the 
institutional prerogative of other branches of government, through the abusive use of a resource 
(the decree power) constitutionally defined to be used only in exceptional circumstances. 
In some new democracies, the large number of this type of Executive decree had been 
associated with the practices of the previous undemocratic regimes, and therefore considered 
antithetical to the ideal of democratic consolidation (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996; Linz and Stepan, 
1996)3. Some attempts to explain causality have emphasized political culture, claiming that an 
Executive that weakens other State institutions is indicative of a new type of democracy that 
needs theoretical elaboration (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996). The simple notice of a large number of 
Executive decrees had led to the strong theoretical claims that Legislatures are rubberstamps for 
Executive-initiated policy. It had rightly been pointed out that scholars tended to associate 
governance by Executive decree with capricious usurpation and abuse of authority (Carey and 
Shugart, 1998: 1).  
However, I argue that a large volume of Executive decrees does not necessarily entail the 
usurpation of the legislative function of the Legislature, as it does not automatically translate into 
a low Executive accountability to the Legislature. Taking notice of a large number of Executive 
decrees bypassing the Legislature does not preclude a low success-rate of these acts or at least a 
high amending rate. A high amending rate and a low success-rate of Executive decrees translates 
into high Executive accountability to the Legislature even in situations of excessive Decree 
issuing, as I will argue more extensively in the chapter focusing on conceptual definition. 
Furthermore, claiming that Executive rule by emergency Decree is a paramount feature of 
politics in some new democracies (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999) implies that most of the 
legislation in place in these countries is initiated by the Executive branch of government through 
Executive decrees. That is hardly the case, as I will show later. A large volume of Executive 
decrees does not prevent these acts making up a low percentage of total Executive-initiated 
legislation, while the NPL constitutes the majority of Executive legislative initiatives. 
Nevertheless, the literature concerned with the excessive use of Executive decrees is a 
legitimate one. Indeed, the excessive issuing of Executive decrees leads to a policy-making 
                                                 
3 Democratic consolidation is understood to be the capacity of the new democracies to avoid a return to some form 
of authoritarianism. 
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process in which Legislatures tend to be bypassed, lowering the quality of democracy in any 
country, be it a new or an established democracy. Italy experienced a situation where specific 
legislation had been in place for more than a decade without even being debated and passed in its 
Parliament, since the Italian Executive re-issued its own Decrees (only with slight formal 
modifications) every time these Executive acts lapsed in Parliament, after failing a 60 days 
constitutional deadline for decision (Della Sala and Kreppel, 1998; Della Sala, 1988).  
According to the view of the democratic consolidation literature that notes a large number of 
Executive decrees, Italy would be considered a democracy that confronts the same problem as 
new democracies in Latin America and Eastern Europe. However, the empirical evidence that I 
will present later proves that the volume of Executive decrees in Italy is significantly lower than 
the volume of Executive-initiated NPL. Furthermore, the Executive decrees are amended or 
rejected in the Italian Parliament, questioning the assumption that a large volume of issued 
Executive decrees automatically turn the Legislature into a rubber-stamp institution. This is not 
to say that an excessive number of Executive decrees are without any negative consequences for 
the nature and/or quality of any democracy. This thesis only cautions against the strong 
theoretical claims derived by some of the democratic consolidation literature based only on the 
large number of Executive decrees. 
The effects of issuing a large number of Executive decrees are quite deleterious for the 
quality of democracy in countries such as Argentina and Romania. Many of these acts enriched 
the political clientele of the head of the Executive power by offering privileged access to state 
resources through the privatization process (McGuire, 1997); the Executive issued decrees that 
allowed it to increase its powers beyond the constitutional provisions and some “tailor-made” 
decrees had been issued specifically in favour of business interest groups connected to the 
Executive (McGuire, 1999: 252). However, the use of Executive decrees for illegal, corrupt 
purposes in some new democracies had been possible in the context of a malfunctioning Justice 
system. The issue of governing through Executive decrees and the problems encountered by the 
Justice system in many new or established democracies that make possible the use of Executive 
decrees for corrupt purposes are different research topics. 
Given the legitimate scholarly concern with the effects of the Executive-Legislature 
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configuration of power4 on the quality and/or the nature of the new democracies, this thesis 
attempts to further the understanding of the dynamic interaction between the two branches of 
government in different countries, each with its own institutional setting and party system.  
The concern with democratic consolidation or democratic quality is only the larger literature 
context of which this thesis is part. The specific focus on Executive decrees attempts to 
compensate for the shortcomings of existing literature, which does not explain the causes of 
excessive Executive decree issuing, as I will argue more extensively later. 
I compare countries that democratized over the last 25 years (Argentina and Romania), to an 
established democracy (Italy) in order to identify possible similar causal patterns affecting the 
capacity of their respective Legislatures to hold the Executive to account5.  
The study cases cover the whole continuum of political systems, ranging from presidential 
(Argentina), semi-presidential (Romania) to parliamentary (Italy)6. Furthermore, their experience 
with democracy is radically different: Romania had experienced different undemocratic regimes 
since 1938, emerging out of a 42-year long communist dictatorship in 1989. Argentina’s current 
democratic regime has been in place since 1983, preceded by a military government (1976-1983) 
and intermittent democratic governments since 1955. Italy is the only case study that has enjoyed 
an uninterrupted democracy since 1947. 
The selection of case studies highlights that the use of Executive decrees is a characteristic of 
neither of the new democracies across the world, nor specific to presidential regimes, as 
previously claimed (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999). This two-fold diversity in the selection of 
case studies (different political systems and different past experience with democracy) expands 
the theoretical relevance of this thesis from the field of democracy theory to the field of 
institutional studies focusing on policy-making across political systems.  
                                                 
4 By configuration of power, I understand not only the formal, de jure, constitutional arrangement, but also the 
informal, de facto, dynamic of power that ensues from the interaction between the constitutional arrangements and 
the actual political system (party system, electoral system, role of judiciary in arbitrating Executive-Legislature 
disputes). 
5 The theoretical relevance of comparing new and established democracies hinges on their potential differences. 
Differences in nature lead to a classification of democracies according to democratic types in which the new 
democracies belong to different categories than established democracies (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003), 
whereas differences in degree lead to a classification of democracies according to the level of democratic quality in 
which the new democracies belong to the same category as the established democracies, only exhibiting a lower 
democratic quality (Dahl, 1971; Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Schmitter, 2003; Smulovitz and Perruzotti, 2000). 
6 I consider Italy to have a strong parliamentary system, although not one of the Westminster type, given the 
exclusive dependence of the Cabinet on the Parliament and the election of the Italian President by the Parliament 
(Woldendorp, Keman and Budge, 2000). 
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As I will explain more extensively in the literature review chapter, the low explanatory 
power of the democratic transition and consolidation literature from a causal standpoint is the 
outcome of a low conceptual definition of accountability, the lack of concern with measurement 
and operationalization of Executive accountability to the Legislature’s function of Decree issuing 
and treatment, the neglect of the dynamic interaction between institutional structures and 
political actors across time within the same study case and across countries.  
This thesis attempts to overcome all these shortcomings: inspired by the important issue 
raised by the literature on democratic transition and consolidation, but critically regarding its 
excessive theoretical claims based on a large number of Executive decrees, it attempts to perform 
a systematic exploration of a complex interaction between institutions and actors across political 
systems that are fundamentally different in nature, each with its own institutional and partisan 
configurations, each with its own democratic legacies. This endeavour presents significant 
theoretical, conceptual and methodological challenges that I will address in the next chapters. 
This thesis is structured according to the arguments that it raises in relation to other literature 
that explored the same topic. Therefore, the next chapter of the thesis will focus on concept 
formation. 
I will conceptualize accountability in a disciplined manner, arguing that it has a specific 
internal structure that requires a different strategy of conceptualization to the classic ladder of 
abstraction strategy defined by Sartori (1970) and used by the literature on democratic transition 
and consolidation to define accountability. Conceptualizing accountability according to its radial 
structure prevents conceptual stretching. The immediate outcome is the elimination of theoretical 
confusion and allowing for systematic operationalization across political systems.  
In the concept formation chapter I argue that Executive accountability is a legitimate form of 
political accountability, equal to other forms of political accountability, given the presence of 
different types of legislative resources that can be used to hold the Executive to account. The 
process of disciplined conceptualization has important consequences for the operationalization of 
the concept: the choice of indicators has to be appropriate, in order to eliminate the conceptual 
confusion surrounding accountability.  
I will argue that accountability implies “punishment” on the part of the Agent of 
accountability imposed upon the Subject of accountability. The capacity of the Legislature to 
impose some kind of punishment on the Executive, according to its constitutional resources, 
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must be explained. In the particular case of Decrees, the “punishment” dimension of an act of 
Executive accountability is the rejection or amending of the Decree.  
It should be highlighted here that some literature employing the concept of accountability 
(O’Donnell, 1994, 1996) did not dedicate much attention to its definition. The immediate 
consequence had been the choice of an indicator (a large number of Executive decrees) that is 
not relevant for causality. This had immediate and direct consequences on the theoretical claims 
according to which the level of Executive accountability is caused by a culture-specific 
understanding of politics. The incapacity of some of the democratic transition and consolidation 
literature to analyse Executive-Legislature relations of accountability function of Executive 
decree issuing and treatment is primarily caused by a flawed conceptualization of accountability. 
The chapter focusing on conceptual definition will highlight the importance of conceptualization 
for theory and theoretical claims. 
Once I have offered an appropriate conceptualization of accountability and argue for 
appropriate indicators, I will address the difficult task of explaining two important dimensions of 
the phenomenon under observation. The first dimension is the cause of an excessive issuing of 
Decrees. Although this is not a measure of Executive accountability to the Legislature, it is 
instrumental to understanding why Legislatures have different capacities to reject or amend the 
Decrees. I will argue that the excessive issuing of Executive decrees is not a matter of 
democratic or authoritarian political culture, but a matter both of bargaining problems between 
the Executive and the Legislature and the use of Decrees as bargaining resources. However, the 
Executive will issue Decrees excessively (more than necessary given its bargaining problems in 
the Legislature) when the constitutional definition of these acts makes their legislative rejection 
and amending difficult or impossible. 
The second dimension is the success-rate of Executive decrees, namely the legislative 
rejection and amending rates. This is a measure of Executive accountability to the Legislature, as 
I will explain more extensively in the chapter dedicated to the conceptualization of 
accountability. I will argue that the distribution of institutional power between the Legislature 
and the Executive through the definition of the Executive decree of urgency and necessity largely 
determines its success-rate. As a logical consequence, the capacity of rejecting or amending 
Executive decrees (particularly when issued excessively) is not a matter of acquiescence to an 
Executive dictatorial behaviour, but a matter of formal institutional resources that define the 
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legal status of the Executive decrees. More specifically, the capacity of the Legislature to hold 
the Executive to account by rejecting or amending the Decrees is determined by how the 
Constitution defines the legal status of the Decree, how it regulates the conditions on which the 
Executive can issue decrees, how the Decrees can be treated in the Legislature and possible 
Executive veto power on the decision of the Legislature. 
Besides a better conceptualization of accountability, I will argue that the shortcomings of 
some of the democratic transition and consolidation literature can be overcome through sharing 
with other strands of literature that provide a more appropriate theoretical framework for 
understanding the dynamic relation Executive-Legislature across political systems. The concerns 
that drive each strand of literature that I will review largely determine their conceptual definition, 
the subsequent methodological options and consequently their explanatory power.  
I will highlight my own contribution to the literature on transition and democratization, by 
linking it to literature on institutions and actors focusing on how political actors make use of 
their constitutionally allocated resources in order to pursue their policy goals. 
I argue that the literature exploring how legislative coalitions form, function and relate to the 
Executive provides a more appropriate explanation for the issuing of Executive decrees. The 
literature on partisan veto-players (Tsebelis, 1995, 2000, 2002) is particularly instrumental in 
understanding how the bargaining problems influence the tendency of the Executive to issue a 
large volume of Decrees in any kind of political system. The fragmented and polarized 
legislative coalitions (a large number of partisan veto-players that make impossible the policy 
negotiation among partners) lead to legislative deadlock, which translates into Executive 
incapacity to promote legislative initiatives through normal procedure (NPL). The recourse to 
Executive decree becomes a rational policy promotion strategy.  
However, even this literature does not explain why Executives supported by legislative 
coalitions with a low level of fragmentation and polarization (a low number of partisan veto-
players) still choose to issue a large number of Decrees, despite the high success-rate of their 
NPL. I will improve the explanatory power of the partisan veto-players literature by bringing in 
insights from literature that explains negotiation in different coalition configurations (Peleg, 
1981). 
The same literature on veto-players (Tsebelis, 1995, 2000, 2002) provides a particularly 
useful framework for exploring the capacity of Legislatures to amend or reject Executive decrees 
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by mapping-out the distribution of legislative resources between the Executive and the 
Legislature. The capacity of Legislatures to reject or at least amend the Executive decrees with 
their own policy views is determined by their constitutional resources. The Executive 
accountability to the Legislature measured in terms of success and amending rates of Decrees is 
exclusively determined by how political parties disperse the institutional veto-player power 
between the two branches of government through the specific constitutional definition of Decree 
power. The legal status of the Executive decree, the definition of its treatment in Legislature and 
the Executive veto power on the decision of Legislature indicate how political parties set-up 
inter-institutional relations according to their specific interests.   
I will then apply the theoretical and methodological contribution of this thesis to each study 
case. Firstly, I will explain the recourse to Executive decree rather than NPL by describing how 
the political party systems present in each country leads to specific configurations of legislative 
coalitions, which in turn generate specific bargaining  problems the Executive has to confront. 
Here I will provide empirical information on the volume of issued Executive decrees and 
compare it to the volume of Executive-initiated NPL, in order to establish if a country is ruled by 
Executive decree. Most importantly, I will provide empirical information documenting the trends 
of this ratio (issued Decrees/issued NPL) across time in each country case. This will indicate 
with precision if a specific country is indeed ruled by Executive decree or by NPL and will 
reveal the causes behind Decree issuing across time. 
Secondly, I will explain the capacity of Legislatures to hold the Executive to account by 
rejecting and amending the Decrees showing how the constitutional resources of the two 
institutions influence their power in dealing with Decrees in each country. As a reference 
deemed to have theoretical relevance, I will explore the constitutional reforms that took place in 
the three country cases and their effect on both the tendency of the Executive to issue an 
excessive number of Decrees and on the success-rate of the Decree (amending and rejection 
rate). I will compare the indicators of Executive accountability before and after the constitutional 
reform in order to establish any possible effect.  
Thirdly, I will compare the ratio of issued Decrees/issued NPL to the ratio of approved 
Decrees/approved Executive-initiated NPL. The first ratio reveals the policy-making intentions 
of the Executive, more precisely the extent of its need to undermine the legislative function of 
the Legislature through the issuing of Decrees, given the specific bargaining problems that it 
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confronts in the Legislature. The second ratio is, however, the most appropriate one for 
establishing the acquiescence of the Legislature to the Executive tendency to rule unaccountable 
(approved Decrees/approved Executive-initiated NPL). 
The conclusion of the thesis is that the issuing of Executive decrees is the outcome of 
specific bargaining problems the Executive branch of government faces in the Legislature, while 
the success-rate of Decrees is determined by the constitutional definition of this act and its 
treatment in the Legislature. However, the excessive issuing of Decrees is explained by the 
constitutional definition of this legislative resource of the Executive: the stronger the institutional 
veto-player power of the Executive when issuing Decrees, the more excessive the issuing. 
The bargaining problems arise out of the nature of legislative coalitions that form in a 
specific party system, while the constitutional definition of Executive decree power disperses the 
institutional veto-player power in favour of either one of the two branches of government, 
according to how political parties organize the power within the State. 
The theoretical significance of these findings highlights that the qualities of any democracy 
are the result of a specific form of interaction between the formal institutional arrangement of 
power between the Executive and the Legislature set in the Constitution and the legislative rules 
of procedure, on the one hand, and the political party system, on the other hand. The political 
party system determines what type of legislative coalitions form in the Legislature, and more 
specifically, their level of fragmentation and polarization, as well as the influence of party 
leaders on the behaviour of legislators. These two elements in turn determine the capacity of the 
legislators to use the constitutional resources allocated to the Legislature and hold the Executive 
accountable by rejecting or at least amending the Executive decrees that undermine its primary 
function.  
The interaction between the institutional and party systems and its effects on the process of 
policy-making are more relevant to the theoretical claims that can be made about democratic 
institutional functioning than simple observation of recurrent political practices and proposing ad 
hoc definitions and explanations strictly derived from empirical observation. 
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II. THE CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 
“If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, 
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself”. 
 (James Madison, The Federalist No. 51) 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
 
The literature that I will review in this chapter considers political accountability a relevant 
marker of any democracy. Given its importance, a political regime hardly meets the criteria of 
democracy if its rulers cannot be held accountable in the public realm for their political actions 
(Schmitter and Karl, 1991). 
In what follows, I attempt a disciplined exercise in conceptualizing political accountability. 
The literature on democracy and democratic consolidation in newly democratized countries is 
fraught with definitions of political accountability based on specific empirical cases, leading to 
theoretical confusion and drawn-out arguments about what accountability is and what it is not. 
These arguments serve as a theoretical basis for defining the more sensitive concept of 
“democracy”, all revolving around the presence or absence of systemic accountability of the 
political power. A regime cannot be considered a democracy if it lacks formally institutionalized 
and practically functional systems of accountability that would constrain the abuse of political 
power. 
A variety of empirical cases had been used to support one definition of accountability or 
another. The act of defining itself had mostly been an undisciplined one, through what literature 
calls “conceptual stretching” (Sartori, 1970; Collier and Mahon 1993), a process of adding 
conceptual labels to the root concept, only to force it to fit new empirical circumstances. 
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Firstly, I offer a tentative definition of political accountability that eliminates the labels 
specific to conceptual stretching, leaving it until later in this chapter to demonstrate how I came 
to this definition. 
Secondly, I explain the two strategies of conceptualization (the ladder of abstraction model 
and the radial structure model), highlighting their logic, the differences between them and how 
useful the two strategies are when conceptualizing accountability. 
 Thirdly, I argue that literature using political accountability as a core concept of its 
theoretical claims on the nature and/or quality of democracy (or the merits of different political 
systems in sustaining democracy through their inherent capacity to uphold political 
accountability) has subordinated the concept to specific research concerns7. The outcome has 
been an interchangeable use of meanings associated with political accountability that led to low 
methodological discipline and theoretical confusion. I will offer a series of examples of 
conceptual stretching of accountability through labelling, as they had been used in the literature 
on democratic transition and consolidation. These examples will highlight how the search for 
definitions to fit new empirical cases has obscured the fact that the concept of political 
accountability has a radial structure. According to the radial structure conceptualization strategy, 
instances of a concept that belong to the same category do not share all of its defining attributes 
(Collier and Mahon, 1993; Lakoff, 1990). More specifically, different acts of political 
accountability that belong to the same category will not necessarily possess all the theoretically 
relevant attributes that define the category. 
I will also explore the semantic meanings of accountability, in each of its constituting 
dimensions, in order to show that it has a radial structure. Applying the ladder of abstraction 
strategy of conceptualization to a concept with a radial structure leads to the selection of 
inappropriate empirical indicators and therefore to misplaced theoretical claims. The ladder of 
abstraction model is based on a taxonomic hierarchy of categories that share a theoretically 
relevant element. When forced on concepts with a radial structure (in which the categories of 
                                                 
7 The literature that has widely used the concept of political accountability focuses on democracy in general, or on its 
defining features in the newly democratizing countries, in particular. The purpose of the current chapter is not a 
critique of a long and reputed strand of scholarly work dealing with the faulty lines of democracy in the newly 
democratizing countries placing political accountability at the core of its theoretical assumptions (Carey and 
Shugart, 1992; O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003; Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Schmitter, 2003; Smulovitz and 
Perruzotti, 2000; Stark and Bruszt, 1998), but rather a review of how this literature has used an under-defined 
concept to fit its specific research purposes, mainly through conceptual stretching. 
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objects do not share one single constituting element) the ladder of abstraction inevitably leads to 
conceptual stretching through label-adding, which is counter-productive on theoretical grounds. 
I will conceptualize political accountability according to its internal radial structure, 
illustrating how I came to the definition offered in the first section of the chapter. I will do so by 
contrasting the conceptualization of accountability according to the ladder of abstraction model 
to the conceptualization according to the radial structure model. Such an exercise will support 
my argument that conceptualizing accountability using the ladder of abstraction 
conceptualization strategy induces theoretical confusion. 
Finally, I will offer a bounded definition of accountability, making it more amenable to 
empirical measurement by offering indicators that are appropriate to the specific form of 
accountability this thesis explores: Executive accountability to the Legislature. I will define 
Executive accountability in the conceptual framework put forth in the first sections of this 
chapter, showing that political accountability can, and indeed takes place, outside the Principal-
Agent framework (Strøm et al., 2003), such as Congress-President relations in presidential 
systems. I will build on the claim that political accountability takes place as an outcome of an act 
of delegation of power between a Principal and an Agent (Lupia, 2003: 33-35) by showing that 
two different Agents can hold each other accountable when acting for the same Principal, who 
directly entrusted them with power and granted them the necessary legitimacy to make policy on 
its behalf. 
 
 
2. Defining accountability 
 
 
Concepts are not simple elements of a theoretical system. They are also data containers 
possessing analytically discriminating power: the lower the discriminating power, the more 
empirical facts are misgathered, increasing misinformation and misunderstanding (Sartori, 1970). 
Accountability is one of the concepts that generated significant scholarly debate about its 
origin, meanings and structure. Due to its relative novelty, it is considered an under-explored 
concept with an evasive meaning, fuzzy boundaries and confusing internal structure (Schedler, 
1999). The concept had been employed by scholars who selected some of its defining features 
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while completely disregarding others (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 2003; Przeworski, Stokes and 
Manin, 1999). Accountability, as other cognate concepts such as “corporate social 
accountability”, “communitarian responsiveness” and “individual moral responsibility”, has a 
structure that contains ambiguous, even contradictory, elements (Schmitter, 2003: 3-4). To make 
matters worse, accountability is a concept that lies at the heart of one of the most widely used 
definitions of democracy  (Schmitter and Karl, 1991). 
Such observations highlight the importance of defining the elusive concept of accountability 
in a systematic and theoretically relevant fashion, which will avoid giving the concept a “low 
discriminating power” leading to a low capacity to discern among empirical information and 
interpret it (Sartori, 1970: 1039). Turning accountability into an efficient fact-finding container 
appears to be a difficult endeavour from the outset of any scholarly effort to apply it to politics.  
Next, I will offer a definition of accountability that is the outcome of a disciplined exercise in 
conceptualization, based on the radial structure of this concept. I will demonstrate how I came to 
such a definition, stripped of any labels that refer to empirical cases, in the latter sections of this 
chapter. The merit of this type of disciplined conceptualization is that it eliminates labels 
reflecting empirical circumstances. This is the reason it can be applied equally to any field of 
literature dealing with problems of accountability. 
 
Accountability represents the use of legal, societal and/or political resources for 
demanding information and explanation (both prospectively and retrospectively) 
from elected and/or non-elected State officials, to punish the incumbents through 
legal or non-legal sanctions. When using non-legal sanctions, accountability 
implies also the capacity to demand the activation of agents of accountability 
who can impose punishment of a legal nature. 
 
Such a definition is not accompanied by various labels, such as “electoral” accountability, 
“institutional” accountability, “vertical” or “horizontal” accountability. Any action that 
corresponds to the afore-mentioned criteria can be considered an act of accountability, without 
the need for reference to specific circumstances, mechanism of imposition, or stage in the policy-
making process when an act of accountability takes place between the Agent of accountability 
(be it a state institution, a civil society actor or a political party) and the Subject of accountability 
(be it a political institution, an elected or non-elected state official or any other political actor).  
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Next, I will proceed with a general presentation of the two strategies of conceptualization, the 
ladder of abstraction and the radial structure, in order to highlight their respective merits and 
demerits, the differences between them, and which is most useful when defining political 
accountability. 
Sartori’s (1970) ladder of abstraction strategy of conceptualization functions on the principle 
that all instances of a concept contain a unifying element placed at the top of the ladder, at the 
highest level of extension and lowest of intension (see Table 1 below). 
 
Table 1: conceptualization according to the ladder of abstraction model following the logic 
of a unifying element present in all instances of the concept. 
 
Categories of the same 
concept organized 
taxonomic hierarchy 
Number of objects 
contained in each category 
Highest level of abstraction 
(Highest extension/Lowest 
intension) 
 
X 120 
 
High intermediate level of 
abstraction 
 
 
X + A 
 
100 
 
Medium level of abstraction 
 
 
X + A + B 
 
80 
 
Lower intermediate level of 
abstraction 
 
 
X + A + B + C 
 
60 
 
Lowest level of abstraction 
(Lowest extension/Highest 
intension) 
 
 
X + A + B + C + D 
 
20 
 
A brief description of the ladder of abstraction model of conceptualization would start with 
defining the central relationship between the extension (or denotation) and the intension (or 
connotation) of a concept. The first describes the set of objects to which the concept refers, while 
the second defines the set of meanings (attributes) that define the category and determine the 
membership. The researcher can go up and down the ladder of abstraction by adding or 
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subtracting attributes to or from the concept. Subtracting attributes leads to a more general, and 
therefore more inclusive category (high extension, low intension) that applies to a large number 
of corresponding objects. The larger the class of objects, the lesser the differences, but those 
differences that remain are precise (Sartori, 1970: 1041).  
One should emphasize that adding or subtracting attributes is not the same as adding labels, 
specific to conceptual stretching: the same concept, without any additional labels, is defined by a 
variety of elements, which are present or absent in the subcategories of the concept. Adding 
labels within the subcategories in the ladder of abstraction can serve specific research purposes, 
but does not substitute the actual act of going up and down the ladder. 
In a taxonomic hierarchy, the categories occupy positions of subordination to each other: the 
more specific categories (low extension and high intension) are subordinate to the more general 
categories (high extension and low intension), with their accompanying class of objects being 
contained in the class of objects of the super-ordinate category. The super-ordinate categories 
(also called more general) are positioned at the high and more abstract level of the ladder of 
abstraction, while the subordinate categories are positioned at the lower (less abstract) level of 
the ladder of abstraction. The super-ordinate categories contain all the subordinate categories. 
The elements that are chosen when a category is defined are theoretically relevant (X, A, B, etc.) 
and it follows logically that the objects contained in a specific category belong to it because of 
possessing the theoretically relevant elements (although the objects might as well possess a 
multitude of other elements, which are theoretically irrelevant and therefore not mentioned in the 
taxonomy). 
For the purpose of this stage of the chapter, this brief description of the ladder of abstraction 
suffices. I will conceptualize democracy according to the ladder of abstraction model later in this 
chapter, as an exercise meant to highlight why the concept of accountability cannot be defined 
following the same strategy. The difference lies within the structure of the concept: democracy 
can be conceptualized according to the ladder of abstraction strategy given that its internal 
structure presents a single unifying element (X) present in all instances of the concept (free and 
regularly organized elections) (Dahl, 1971; Schmitter and Karl, 1991), while accountability does 
not possess such an element, given its internal radial structure. 
Radial structure concepts help to define categories in which two members will not share all 
of what may be seen as the defining attributes (see Table 2 below). The overall meaning of a 
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category is anchored in a central subcategory, whereas the non-central subcategories do not 
necessarily share defining attributes with each other, but only with the central subcategory 
(Collier and Mahon, 1993: 845; Lakkoff, 1990: 91-115; Schedler, 1999: 17). 
 
Table 2: radial structure concepts ordered according to the relationship between 
central/non-central subcategories. 
 Concept Number of objects in each category 
Highest level of abstraction (?)  
 
A+B 10 instances 
D+G 80 instances 
A+G 60 instances 
B+E 3 instances 
D+F 1 instances 
A+B+C 27 instances 
A+C+G 83 instances 
B+D+F 17 instances 
Central subcategory: 
A+B+C+D+G 40 instances 
Lowest level of abstraction A + B + C + D + E + F + G Hypothetical instance of a radial structure concept 
 
The non-central subcategories are formed when the component elements are taken alone or in 
sets of two or more. The theoretically relevant elements of the non-central categories are 
contained within the central subcategory (Collier and Mahon, 1993: 848-849). 
Furthermore, the central subcategory that contains the largest number of defining features 
(but not necessarily all possible defining features) shares features with the non-central 
subcategories, but these non-central subcategories do not necessarily share features with each 
other. Subcategories D+G and B+F share theoretically relevant elements with the central 
subcategory A+B+C+D, but do not share any element inter se (see Table 2 above). 
The central sub-categories are “central” because they contain the largest number of 
theoretically relevant elements, and their “sub-category” status is justified by the fact that it does 
not contain all imaginable features of a hypothetical instance of the concept (A + B +……+ G as 
shown at the lowest level of abstraction). Following the same logic, the non-central 
subcategories are “non-central” because they contain a smaller number of features than the 
central subcategory. 
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I argue that conceptualizing accountability taking into account the radial structure of this 
concept induces a higher discriminating power, retaining all instances of institutional 
accountability, while introducing new, equally legitimate instances. One example would be the 
exposure of a piece of legislation to extensive policy scrutiny and deliberation by political parties 
in different institutional arenas. Given that political parties represent the link between society and 
politics, this strategy of conceptualization turns accountability from an institutionally embedded 
concept into a socially embedded one, linking politics back to society. I will expand on these 
relevant distinctions between the ladder of abstraction and the radial structure models in the next 
sections of this chapter. 
I will next illustrate how accountability has been subordinated to specific research concerns, 
without any concern for a disciplined act of conceptualization. 
 
 
3. The conceptual stretching of accountability 
 
 
The interest in political accountability has burgeoned since the early 1990s. However, some 
scholarly work dedicated to rigorous definition and categorization, aiming to explore the 
concept’s boundaries and internal structure (Schedler, 1999), emerged only after a decade of 
little conceptual discipline.  
Literature employed the concept of accountability mainly in order to explore already 
established topics in social science, only from a new, different perspective (Schmitter, 2003: 3-
4). Elections have more recently been presented as a mechanism of accountability, while formal 
constitutional relations of power between the Executive and the Legislature are now presented as 
mechanisms of institutional accountability, and so on. For almost a decade, the usage of the term 
could be described as being driven by a “make your own” approach, where all authors using the 
concept of political accountability picked and chose whatever defining element had been deemed 
necessary for the purpose of their research. The theoretical and empirical concerns of different 
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strands of literature had been significantly reflected in the meanings that had been associated 
with accountability8.  
The concept polarized the academic attempts to define it almost to the same extent as the 
concept of democracy, which had elicited significant scholarly attention and disagreement in the 
context of the literature on democratic transition and consolidation. In a seminal article, 
Schmitter and Karl (1991: 74) defined “modern representative democracy” as necessarily 
entailing the capacity to hold the rulers accountable: democracy is “a regime or a system of 
governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, 
acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their representatives”. This 
interpretation of accountability as a qualifier for democracy has not been followed by much 
elaboration on the actual concept, despite the fact that it seemed to provide a vital link between 
the State and the society, between the rulers and the citizens.  
More recently, Schmitter (2003) attempted to develop a model for measuring the level of 
accountability in a given polity, which would be equally applicable to old and new democracies. 
This model switches from the spatial dimension of accountability (at what points in the 
institutional structure linking the State to society does an act of accountability occur) to a 
temporal dimension (at what moment in the process of policy-making actors contend and hold 
each other accountable). From this perspective, accountability among citizens, representatives 
and rulers (most probably those holding Executive positions) should be conceived as ex ante, ex 
post and between the two, when the actual decisions are debated and decided upon, each act of 
accountability having its own mechanism of activation depending on the moment when it occurs 
and the actors that brings together (Schmitter, 2003: 19-20).  
                                                 
8 I intentionally used the phrasing “meanings associated” in order to highlight that actual strategies of 
conceptualizing accountability had been mostly neglected. 
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As I have mentioned earlier, the already established concerns of scholars drive their efforts to 
conceptualize accountability. Schmitter (2003) develops his model of measuring the degree of 
accountability in a polity with the aim of measuring the quality of democracy (QoD): the higher 
the level of accountability, the better the quality of democracy. This new approach to democracy, 
focusing on quality rather than consolidation, indicates that after more or less all new 
democracies survived and some are faring surprisingly well, the need to capture and explain the 
problems they confront switched in the 1980s and early 1990s from concern with the 
consolidation of democracy (CoD), in the late 1990s and early 2000s to concern with the quality 
of democracy (QoD).  
This model offers a definition of accountability and proposes a way of measuring the quality 
of democracy (QoD) as a function of the degree of systemic accountability (DoA) imposed on 
political actors and institutions. Measuring QoD as a function of DoA would lead to categorizing 
democracies across the world according to differences in degree and not in type. 
In other influential articles and driven by his scholarly interest in exploring the functioning of 
the new democracies, O’Donnell (1994, 1996) claimed that political accountability is nothing 
less than the most important marker for the nature of a democratic regime: different types of 
democracies manifest different levels of capacity on the part of political institutions and citizenry 
to hold the rulers accountable. O’Donnell’s concern has been to categorize democracies across 
the world according to differences in type, and not in degree. 
O’Donnell claimed that low accountability of the Executive power is a permanent feature of 
an under-theorized type of democracy, which he called “delegative”, based on political culture 
and plebiscitary politics. The attempts to categorize democracies across the world made a major 
contribution to the understanding of how mechanisms of accountability work, or should work, 
and their shortcomings in the new democracies. These attempts to theorize a new type of 
democracy had been more successful in offering the first serious attempt to conceptualize 
accountability across spatial dimensions (vertical vs.. horizontal accountability, as I will show 
latter), rather than by separating the new democracies (delegative) from established ones (liberal) 
as a function of causally relevant cultural factors.  
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In an illustration of the interchangeable use of the meanings of accountability, Carey and 
Shugart (1992: 34, 44) refer to the concept either as a feature of non-elitist decision-making 
process, or as the “degree and means by which elected policy-makers are responsible to 
citizens”. In the same literature, accountability had been related to retrospective voting, with 
presidential regimes exhibiting a higher level of political accountability given the citizens’ 
opportunity to replace the Executive power when voting (Carey and Shugart, 1992: 49 fn, 90-
91). In this context, accountability had been used together with the voters’ capacity to identify 
possible post-electoral governments, mutual checks and the Presidents’ role as arbiters of politics 
in order to highlight the advantages of a presidential regime over a parliamentary system.  
Therefore, authors with specific research concerns (in the latter case comparing presidential 
to parliamentary systems in terms of their capacity to uphold accountability and sustain 
democracy) subordinate an under-explored concept, whose weakly defined features have been 
used interchangeably, to the purpose of their scholarly work. 
To conclude this section, a few legitimate questions ought to be asked. What is political 
accountability after all? How does political accountability function across time, space and regime 
types? Who are the actors involved in activating the mechanisms of accountability, be they 
institutional or societal? It appears that what is missing for offering a sound answer to these 
questions is a more serious effort to conceptualize accountability. 
I will next offer some examples of conceptual stretching through adding labels to the root 
definition of accountability. I will do so by critically reviewing the scholarly work that dedicated 
some effort towards a disciplined conceptualization of accountability. Despite its obvious 
conceptual shortcomings, this work bettered our understanding of what political accountability is 
and how it functions and I find it useful for this chapter. 
 
3.a. Labelling accountability as vertical and horizontal 
 
Guillermo O’Donnell (1994, 1996) has formulated a seminal distinction, highly instrumental 
in ordering the action of different agents of accountability, between two main types: vertical and 
horizontal. Each of these two labels defines a spatial dimension: accountability between State 
institutions and society (vertical) and accountability among state institutions (horizontal). 
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Vertical accountability (VA) implies that citizens hold elected officials accountable at the 
ballot box. It had been assumed to be the only type of accountability that functions in the new 
democracies. Horizontal accountability (HA) had been defined as taking place across a network 
of autonomous powers that can investigate and eventually punish wrongdoings of other state 
offices. It is presumably weak or outright inexistent in the new democracies, where the Executive 
power undermines the legitimacy and proper functioning of other state institutions in an effort to 
rule without institutional constraints.  
However, this spatial definition of accountability evolved throughout the 1990s. Initially, 
accountability had a low conceptual definition: a procedure through which representatives are 
held responsible for their actions by the public (O’Donnell, 1994). As I have showed, it had been 
defined as running both vertically and horizontally. Two years latter HA had been described (but 
not necessarily conceptualized) somewhat more extensively (O’Donnell, 1996). Formal 
institutions have well-defined and legally established boundaries that delimit the exercise of their 
authority. Any trespassing of these boundaries is punished by other state institutions charged 
with redressing wrongdoings, abuses of power and/or state corruption.  
The network of institutional boundaries and accountabilities [sic] (O’Donnell, 1996: 44) 
plays an important part of the institutionalization of democracy. As long as the 
institutionalization of horizontal accountability was defined as weak, the liberal nature of the 
new democracies was called into question.  
The simple definition of accountability and the mere description of the faulty functioning of 
state institutions of accountability in the new democracies left a plethora of questions 
unanswered: What are the actual causes of institutional weakness and the ensuing low horizontal 
accountability? Which are the institutions of horizontal accountability and how do they relate to 
each other since they are part of an interdependent network? Do actors such as political parties 
play any role in the process of activating horizontal accountability? Is civil society reacting to the 
apparent incapacity of a state institution to uphold it? 
It should be emphasized that this literature did not direct a significant effort into 
conceptualizing accountability beyond the purpose of defining “delegative” democracy 
(O’Donnell, 1994, 1996). This literature made some strong assertions about the significance of a 
low accountability in the new democracies, without coupling them with an equally strong 
conceptual definition.  
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The hasty conceptualization of accountability, mainly in legal/institutional terms, opened the 
door to criticism. An entire process of conceptual stretching ensued, matched in the literature 
only by the well-known conceptual stretching of democracy that aimed to catalogue democracies 
according to types: “delegative”, “illiberal”, “populist”, “corporatist”, “electoral” and many other 
labels (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996; Schmitter and Karl, 1992; Zakaria, 2003; etc.)9.  
The process of conceptual stretching continued in the literature through the constant labelling 
of various instances of accountability, piggy-backing on the critiques of the spatial description of 
accountability and the theoretical assertions about the nature of the new democracies.  
The initial labels (vertical and horizontal), the under-conceptualization of accountability and 
its subordination to specific research concerns are most responsible for the conceptual stretching 
and the scholarly difficulty in coming to terms with the ambiguities of accountability. 
 
3.b. Societal accountability 
 
The first indirectly to admit the conceptual stretching through the adding of labels had been 
O’Donnell himself: “my interest in what I labelled [sic] <<horizontal accountability>> stems 
from its absence” (1999: 29).  
In search for a better definition, horizontal accountability had been assumed to imply “the 
existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually willing and 
able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in 
relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as 
unlawful” (O’Donnell, 1999: 38). The same claim had been put forth once more, that horizontal 
accountability is inexistent in the new democracies, where vertical accountability is the only 
functioning form of accountability. 
These vague definitions of vertical accountability and horizontal accountability, as well as 
the accompanying strong theoretical assertions, have been challenged from different directions 
each with its own label.  
As initially defined by O'Donnell (1994), vertical accountability refers to the society aiming 
to hold the rulers accountable through elections. This spatial metaphor describes the asymmetric 
relationship between unequals: “above” equals resources of power, while “below” equals 
                                                 
9 For a full list of labels attached to the concept of democracy, see Collier and Levitsky (1997). 
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powerlessness (Schedler, 1999: 23). However, it remains mute with regard to the direction in 
which vertical accountability comes into action, from top down or bottom up. In the realm of 
politics, the less powerful actor, the society as agent of accountability, attempts to hold 
accountable the more powerful actor, the Executive power, as subject of accountability, first and 
foremost through elections. 
Given the mentioned disparity in resources available to the weaker actor (society as agent of 
accountability) Przeworski, Stokes and Manin (1999) question the efficiency of elections as a 
mechanism of holding politicians accountable. From this perspective, one cannot know if 
elections enforce prospective or retrospective controls, and therefore it could be reasonably 
inferred that voters cannot force the governments to act responsibly. As long as the voters can 
vote only once every few years, politicians know that most of their decisions will not be 
controlled by the public. Furthermore, shortages of information prevent voters from evaluating 
the government performance and decisions. 
Along the same lines, challenging the alleged efficiency of vertical accountability described 
strictly in electoral terms, some authors pointed at the vibrant civil societies present in some new 
democracies and their successful attempts to hold the rulers accountable through demonstrations 
leading to resignations, impeachment and/or prosecution of elected or non-elected state officials 
(Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000).  
The implication is that vertical accountability is not the only form of accountability that 
functions in the new democracies: the incapacity of state institutions of horizontal accountability 
to hold the rulers accountable is not rooted in an understanding of politics based on a culture of 
strong, providential leaders. There is obviously something wrong with institutions and/or actors 
if the society itself does mobilize against the abuses of state power. 
Societal accountability had been defined as part of vertical accountability, equally important 
to elections (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000: 153). A new label had been added to the concept in 
a spiralling scholarly debate that led to exactly what Sartori (1970) and LaPalombara (1968) 
warned against long ago: the stretching of the concept to fit new empirical circumstances. 
Societal accountability had been later linked to horizontal accountability mechanisms in an 
interaction that challenges the attempts to theorize new democracies simply on the absence of the 
latter (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2003: 310-315): it exposes and denounces wrongdoings of state 
officials that would otherwise go unnoticed and unpunished, imposes symbolic sanctions on 
28 
 
public officials and institutions, establishes parallel “societal watchdog” organizations that 
monitor the performance of specific public agencies and offices and, most importantly, activates 
the institutions of horizontal accountability by incurring reputation costs on elected and non-
elected state officials through social mobilization and media denunciation.  
 
 
3.c. Horizontal balance accountability and mandated horizontal accountability 
 
 
O’Donnell (2003: 34-54) himself admitted later that horizontal accountability institutions are 
of different types and function in different ways, attempting to improve his initial definition of 
accountability. Institutions of accountability may come into play in two directions: one 
attempting to prevent and/or redress unlawful encroachment by one state agency upon the proper 
authority of another, the other punishing unlawful advantages (corruption) that public officials 
obtain for themselves and/or their associates (O’Donnell, 2003: 34).  
According to these two directions, different types of agents of accountability become 
activated, each defined by the same stretching of the concept to fit new empirical instances 
through the addition of new labels to the old, ambiguous horizontal accountability. 
Horizontal balance accountability: the agents of accountability who become activated when 
power encroachments occur are the main state institutions (Executive, Legislative and Judiciary). 
They act towards horizontal balance accountability when any of them transgresses the 
constitutionally ascribed boundaries of others, encroaching on its jurisdiction (O’Donnell, 2003: 
44, italics added). They react by attempting to redress such unlawful transgressions. However, 
horizontal balance accountability institutions have some limitations in imposing accountability 
(O’Donnell, 2003: 45): they respond rather reactively and consequently intermittently, their 
action towards redressing the institutional transgressions generates highly visible and costly 
conflicts among supreme state institutions (these costs are even higher when the conflict occurs 
between state institutions with electoral legitimacy, such as a directly elected President and the 
Legislature), the actors in these conflicts are perceived as being motivated by partisan reasons. 
Mandated horizontal accountability: the second type of agents that act towards redressing or 
punishing abuses of power are the mandated horizontal accountability institutions, such as 
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ombudsmen, accounting offices, controllers, Conseils d’Etat, Fiscalias, Courts of Accounts, etc. 
The establishment of such agents of accountability had been the outcome of the shortcomings in 
the functioning of horizontal balance accountability mentioned above (O’Donnell, 2003: 45). 
Mandated horizontal accountability institutions are proactive and continuous in their activity. 
These bodies are legally assigned to scrutinize, prevent, discourage, and promote the sanctioning 
of, or even directly sanction, the actions or omissions of other state agencies that are presumed 
unlawful (O‘Donnell, 2003: 45).  
The emergence of horizontal balance accountability (in the first place) and mandated 
horizontal accountability mechanisms (in the second place) had been the outcome of the 
shortcomings of elections as a vertical accountability mechanism (O‘Donnell, 2003: 49). 
Even labelled balance and mandate, O'Donnell's conceptual definition of horizontal 
accountability has a strong legal connotation, implying relations among state institutions, aiming 
to redress illegalities, be they trespassing of institutional prerogatives or outright corruption. It 
simply remains mute regarding the representational dimensions of accountability, given that 
some state institutions perform different accountability functions simultaneously. Legislatures 
not only punish the trespassing of the Executive power into their prerogatives when the latter 
takes on legislative functions in the form of issuing laws by Executive decrees, but they also 
expose the policy initiatives of the Executive to greater institutional scrutiny, in the name of the 
popular mandate received at elections. This act of policy scrutiny occurs equally in presidential 
systems, where both the Legislature and the President have direct electoral legitimacy and have 
been entrusted to make public policy, and parliamentary systems, where the Executive is rooted 
in the Legislature. In the latter systems, the Executive exercises its policy-making functions after 
receiving its mandate from the Legislature, but remaining under its close policy control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
3.d. Extended accountability 
 
The incapacity of horizontal accountability (be it balance or mandated) and vertical 
accountability mechanisms (be they electoral or societal) to cover instances of policy-making 
accountability led to the extension of the concept by adding another label: extended 
accountability (Stark and Bruszt, 1998: 188-189).  
Extended accountability captures the representational aspects of the process of policy-
making: it represents “the embeddedness of the decision-making centre into a network of 
autonomous political institutions that limit the arbitrariness of the incumbents” (Stark and 
Bruszt, 1998: 188). In O'Donnell's horizontal definition of accountability, state institutions check 
on each other to prevent power encroachments and illegalities. Extended accountability has 
obvious affinities to O'Donnell's conceptualization, but at the same time it captures the action of 
state institutions that aim not only at keeping other state institutions within the framework of 
legality, but also aim to "expose policies to greater institutional scrutiny" (Stark and Bruszt, 
1998: 189), reducing the arbitrariness of decision-making, and insuring the representation of a 
wide spectrum of societal interests in the process of policy-making, in a timeframe that extends 
beyond and between electoral cycles. Strengthening the connection between State and society in 
the process of policy-making, an act of extended accountability can be exercised not only among 
State institutions, such as Legislatures, Executives or Judiciaries, but also by organized societal 
actors in relation to State institutions. Therefore, Bruszt and Stark (1998) equate accountability 
with actions aiming at forcing elected officials to take into account in the exercise of government 
a broad spectrum of societal interests, basically demanding that they should govern for those 
who elected them, and not for the private interest groups that lobby the government. These 
actions take place through continuous dialogue and interaction between State and society, as well 
as among State institutions. From this particular perspective, a Legislature (or the political 
parties that are present in a Legislature) that exposes the Executive policy to greater institutional 
scrutiny, amending them with its own policy views, exercises extended accountability. 
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3.e. Oblique accountability 
 
 
Along the same reasoning of bringing into the picture non-state actors, Schmitter (1999: 61-
62, fn 4) adds another label to the concept by defining oblique accountability, which describes 
actions of non-state or semi-state actors aiming to hold rulers accountable not just for trespassing 
the prerogatives of other state institutions, but also for their misdeeds. These actors need the 
support of citizens for their oblique accountability actions and they use their peculiar position 
between the State and society to garner that support. It follows quite logically that political 
parties, organizations that are partly state actors, partly societal actors, occupy such an oblique 
position between the State institutions ordered horizontally at the higher State level enjoying 
plenty of power resources, and individuals positioned on the lower societal level, acting in 
scarcity of power resources. One can reasonably argue that there is not much difference between 
oblique accountability and extended accountability as described earlier, in that both define an act 
of accountability taking place not only among state institutions aiming to punish illegalities, but 
also between the State and society via organized actors (such as political parties, or labour 
unions) aiming to influence the process of policy-making from their uniquely oblique position 
between State and society. 
To sum up this subsection, one is left wanting for a clear and exhaustive conceptualization of 
political accountability. It might well turn out that all labels (horizontal balance, mandated 
horizontal, vertical, societal, extended and oblique) added to the concept to fit new empirical 
instances do define a legitimate act of accountability. But which one does its job better and why? 
How is the disciplined researcher supposed to treat combinations of the above labels? Could 
some of these labels define acts of accountability that are more legitimate than others? I argue 
that one cannot find an answer to these questions unless engaging in a disciplined act of 
conceptualizing, by offering not only a proper definition but also a systematic and exhaustive 
categorization of various instances of political accountability, highlighting commonalities and 
differences, as a function of theoretically relevant criteria.  
Given that concept formation should be prior to quantification (Sartori, 1970: 1038), some of 
the attempts to quantify accountability that I reviewed above, either in dichotomous terms 
(O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003) or in more fuzzy terms ordered in a temporal space 
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(Schmitter, 2003) might end up only enhancing the confusion surrounding the under-defined and 
under-explored concept of political accountability.  
When one would expediently attempt to solve his or her own research problems and plunge 
head on into Executive-Legislature relations of accountability, using the above labels as a simple 
check-list, without any taxonomical backing, one would most likely commit the same mistake 
eloquently captured and explained by LaPalombara (1968: 66) and Sartori (1970: 1039): embark 
on an “indiscriminate fishing expedition for data”, with an inadequate fishing net of their own 
making.  
The outcome would probably be a substantial contribution to a “growing potpourri of 
disparate, non-cumulative and – in the aggregate – misleading morass of information” (Sartori, 
1970: 1039) on various instances of accountability.  
A disciplined use of terms and comparisons employing various models of conceptualizing 
(either a classic ladder of abstraction as proposed by Sartori, 1970; or the more recent model of 
radial categories, as proposed by Collier and Mahon, 1993) can turn an imperfect fishing net of 
one’s own make into an efficient fact-finding container, capable of gathering the most relevant 
empirical information, therefore increasing the clarity of scholarly dialogue. This is precisely 
what the chapter is attempting to contribute to, proposing a conceptualization of accountability 
that goes beyond the simple reflex of label adding. In what follows, I only sketch the basic logic 
beyond disciplined conceptualization building on the insights of previous scholarly work 
(Sartori, 1970; Schedler, 1999; Schmitter, 2003, Collier and Mahon, 1993). 
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4. Accountability: semantic meanings 
 
 
Before sifting through empirical information assumed to represent an instance of an act of 
political accountability, the meaning and structure of the actual word “accountability” require 
further exploration. The literature attempted to define the meaning of accountability, explore its 
boundaries and internal structure (Schedler, 1999). This literature eloquently highlighted what 
instances of accountability could legitimately be considered full acts of political accountability, 
under what conditions accountability becomes possible, which are its agents and subjects, if 
accountability necessarily implies legally ascribed powers of oversight and punishment. In what 
follows, I will review the effort to conceptualize political accountability by exploring its 
meanings and structure. I will extensively draw on  Schedler (1999: 13-28).  
A reconstruction of the meaning of accountability highlights two basic connotations. The 
first is answerability, the obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain what they 
are doing.  
The second is enforcement, the capacity of agents of accountability to impose sanctions on 
the subjects of accountability. The answerability dimension of accountability implies a certain 
obligation on the part of accountable actors to answer questions and inquiries coming from those 
who can hold them accountable, be they the public, or various agencies of accountability. They 
have to inform about, give account for, and/or explain their actions and decisions.  
Particularly useful in highlighting this meaningful dimension of the concept, the metaphor 
put forth by Stark and Bruszt (1998: 192-196) captures its semantic ambivalence, evoking both 
narrative accounts and bookkeeping: politicians open accounts with the public, asking voters for 
credit and giving account of their actions in order to continue to benefit from public support: “put 
your credit on my account…credit me, invest in me, authorize me to act on your account”.  
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Also, specialized agencies within the state demand that accountable actors have to inform 
about (in the form of reliable facts) and explain (with valid reasons) their decisions. In this sense, 
the right to receive information on the part of the agent of accountability, and the obligation to 
release it, on the part of the subject of accountability, the right to receive an explanation, and the 
duty to justify one’s conduct, are ways of exercising accountability distinct from, and equally 
important to, the account the politicians give to the electorate. These observations help to 
highlight that accountability is both retrospective and prospective, politicians having to give 
account not only for what they have done, but also for future actions (Schedler, 1999: 15, 27 
footnote 6).  
The enforcement dimension implies the capacity of agents of accountability to impose 
sanctions on the subjects of accountability, the power holders, who have gone beyond their 
constitutionally assigned powers, committed illegalities whilst in office, or failed to perform 
according to initial promises and voter‘s expectations.  
The enforcement dimension complements the answerability dimension of accountability 
(with its two variants, information and explanation). The right to receive information and 
explanation, and the obligation to respond to such demands, purportedly aim at overseeing, 
checking and/or establishing wrongdoings, constituting the ground for a decision regarding 
potential punishment and/or redress. The subjects of accountability have to bear the 
consequences of their actions, including potential sanctions (O’Donnell, 1994: 61). 
The issue of sanctions has elicited significant discussion. Are there any forms of 
accountability which function in the absence of sanctions? Is the capacity to punish an integral 
part of political accountability? In other words, can we speak of a legitimate act of accountability 
in the absence of sanctions? And what can be considered a sanction and what cannot? I adopt the 
position of authors who emphasize that capacity to punish is an integral part of political 
accountability (O’Donnell, 2003; Schmitter, 1999; Maraval, 1999), as long as the perceived 
availability of sanctions constitutes the fundament of credible and effective action on the part of 
the agents of accountability. But as Schedler (1999: 16) rightly points out, the capacity to punish 
goes beyond legal punishment (italic added). In realm of politics, removal from office as 
outcome of public exposure of conduct that is considered inappropriate (although not necessarily 
illegal) constitutes a severe form of punishment.  
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Also, in the realm of institutional accountability a Legislature that alters the acts of the 
Executive power with policy-oriented amendments does not impose punishment of legal nature, 
although it acts according to constitutional provisions. It holds the Executive accountable for its 
policy-making acts in the name of the popular mandate obtained at elections.  
Therefore, I use the concept of accountability as not necessarily requiring legally ascribed 
power to sanction, just as it does not require legalized authority to oversee. Sanctions can be of 
legal nature (such as prosecution of public officials carried out by the specialized agencies within 
the state) or of non-legal nature (such as removal from office or amending of Executive acts in 
the Legislature).  
To summarize, accountability has two major dimensions, each with its own sub-dimensions. 
Answerability implies demanding and receiving information, prospectively or retrospectively, 
but also demanding and receiving explanation, prospectively or retrospectively. Punishment 
implies power to punish that is legally ascribed, leading to sanctions of a legal nature (i.e., 
prosecution as an outcome of legal investigation), but also to sanctions of non-legal nature (i.e., 
amending of Executive policy acts in the Legislature). Furthermore, punishment implies power 
to punish that is not legally ascribed, leading to sanctions of non-legal nature (i.e. voting against 
the incumbents), or demanding the activation of agents that impose punishment of legal nature 
(i.e., civil society oversight and action against malfeasant state officials). 
The agents of accountability are all State institutions and all actors (individuals, civil society 
organizations, labour unions or political parties) that attempt to hold accountable the subjects of 
political accountability (other State institutions, elected or non-elected state officials at national 
or sub-national level). As Schmitter (2003: 5) rightly points out, most acts of accountability 
(although not all of them) play out between organizations.  
Accountability can be missing one of its dimensions and still represent a full instance of the 
concept, as long as the agents of accountability attempt to keep the subjects of accountability 
under control, ultimately through the threat of punishment of a legal or non-legal nature 
(Schedler, 1999: 17). 
It can reasonably be expected that accountability can be imposed in various ways, according 
to the capacity of the agents to enforce punishment. The agents of accountability range from state 
institutions to civil society, and the ways of attempting to impose accountability range from 
electoral to checks and balances, from civil society actions to actions of the agencies of oversight 
36 
 
and control, cutting across the boundaries between the state and society. 
Some agents, such as the agencies of oversight and control, can uphold the law themselves. 
This grants them greater capacity than civil society to control and redress wrongdoing through 
punishment. It should not be neglected however, that civil society actions demanding punishment 
can either activate agencies of oversight and control, or lead to outright resignations, acts that 
represent a punishment in itself in the realm of politics (Schedler, 1999: 16-17).  
Some agents of accountability act only through the imposition of non-legal punishment, such 
as demonstrators successfully demanding the resignation of an elected official. Others, such as 
labour unions, act towards imposing accountability on the Executive power by attempting to 
make it take into account a diversity of societal interests. Still, some agents of accountability, 
such as anti-corruption bodies, employ both dimensions of accountability, being legally able to 
demand information and/or explanation as well as to impose punishment of a legal nature acting 
in accordance with legally ascribed prerogatives, if necessary.  
The radial structure of accountability is based on the different types of punishment that 
agents of accountability can impose on the subjects of accountability (power to punish legally or 
non-legally ascribed, sanctions of legal or non-legal nature), as well as on the different types of 
answerability relations established between the agents and the subjects of accountability 
(prospective or retrospective demands for information and/or explanations). Equally legitimate 
acts of accountability may possess one of these theoretically relevant elements, but not the 
others, while no single elements of those enumerated above is found in all instances of the 
concept.  
As I have mentioned earlier, punishment is the only theoretical element in the absence of 
which one cannot define an act of political accountability. It could be reasonably inferred that 
punishment would play the same role in categorizing accountability as free elections does for 
categorizing democracy: namely, to be the single unifying element that is found in all instances 
of the concept, therefore ordering the categories taxonomically. However, as I have shown, 
punishment is of different types, some of which may be present in one instance of the concept 
but not in others, which will exhibit a different type of punishment.  
Defining accountability as a radial concept avoids conceptual stretching, while providing for 
an effective operational tool. Furthermore, it highlights the important fact that various categories 
of accountability do not constitute diminished subtypes of the concept, but full instances of the 
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concept grouped in non-central subcategories positioned around the central subcategory, in a 
radial structure, as I will show later.  
Collier and Levitsky (1997: 437 - 442) define a diminished subtype as being an incomplete 
form of a concept, one that identifies attributes of the root definition which are missing, 
increasing conceptual differentiation and therefore referring to a different set of cases to the root 
definition. Diminished subtypes are not full instances of the root definition of the concept and 
can only serve to make modest claims about it. In that sense, they are defined only by some of 
the attributes present in the root definition of the concept, while missing others. In the 
diminished subtype strategy of categorization, the full attributes that make for a full instance of 
the concept are found only in the root definition of it. This is not the case with accountability 
defined as a radial concept, as I will show later10. 
I have critically reviewed all these interpretations on the meaning and structure of the 
concept of accountability in order to show that accountability is a concept with a radial structure, 
therefore when one of its dimensions or sub-dimensions is missing it can still be considered a full 
instance of the concept, and not a diminished form of it.  
The disciplined exploration of the meaning and structure of political “accountability”, 
supported by critical reasoning, revealed its defining features and the relationships among them. 
Critiques can certainly still be raised against these findings (Schmitter, 2003: 5): “information 
can be selective and skewed (…), explanations can be deflected to other actors (<<The IMF 
made me to do it>>), sanctions are rarely applied and can simply be ignored (<<Who are you to 
question and threaten my…?>>)”.  
I argue that “the caveats, loose linkages and role reversals” (Schmitter, 2003: 5) present in 
the complicated network of citizens, rulers and various competitive representatives involving 
responsibilities and sanctions do make the product (accountability) almost always contested, but 
should not deter the conscious thinker (C. Wright Mills, 1959: 27, quoted in Sartori, 1970: 1033) 
from a disciplined inquiry into its functioning. 
                                                 
10 For a detailed definition of radial categorization see Lakoff (1990) but also Collier and Mahon (1993). 
 
38 
 
The limitations posed by the complicated network of State-society relations present in a 
variety of acts of political accountability should not transform a conscious thinker into what 
Sartori (1970: 1033) calls an overconscious thinker, one who refuses to discuss heat unless he is 
given a thermometer. Realizing the limitations of not having clear-cut relations of political 
accountability, or simple, linear and self-exhausting acts of accountability (Schedler, 1999) to 
focus on and analyse, the conscious thinker can still say a great deal about the object of his or her 
inquiry by “steering the middle course between crude logical mishandling on the one hand, and 
logical perfectionism (and paralysis) on the other hand” (Sartori, 1970: 1033).  
Information might be selective and skewed, explanations might be, and indeed are deflected 
sometimes to other actors, sanctions are sometimes ignored, but what does this tell us, other than 
that political accountability is as fuzzy and as complicated as many other concepts in social 
science? In this context, the value of the observation that “the product” is contested becomes 
questionable.  
Furthermore, is information always selective and skewed, does it have to be taken for granted 
by those actors holding rulers accountable, does it stay skewed forever or does the plain truth 
eventually emerge, at least with electoral, if not legal consequences for the wrongdoers? Are 
explanations, all explanations, always deflected to other actors? And if so, how credible is the 
deflection? Are all types of sanctions always ignored and rarely applied? 
The admittedly rhetorical nature of these questions points to two further observations. One is 
that the obvious “no” answer to all of them demonstrates how useful it can turn out to be going 
beyond observable empirics, and looking into the actual logic of the mechanisms of 
accountability. The other observation, stemming from the first, is that explaining the logic of 
“recursive cycles of mutual accountability” (Schedler, 1999) suffices for the purpose of scientific 
explanation and supersedes the need to explain the success or failure of every occurrence of an 
act of accountability, for reasons of skewed information, deflection of explanations and 
avoidance of sanctions. Research discipline requires the explanation of what happens and how it 
happens (by which I mean the identification, systematic definition and classification of 
circumstances and causes), in order to reveal the reasons behind non-occurrence, which becomes 
irrelevant in itself. 
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5. Conceptualizing accountability according to its radial structure 
 
 
I will next illustrate how political accountability can be conceptualized according to the 
radial structure model. For comparative purposes, I will also conceptualize “democracy” 
according to Sartori’s (1970) classic ladder of abstraction model. 
 
Table 3: democracy conceptualized according to the ladder of abstraction model: A, B, 
C…..E = theoretically relevant elements that better the quality of a democracy.  
 Democracy Number of objects 
Higher level of abstraction 
(Highest extension/Lowest 
intension) 
Elections (all democracies in 
the world) 120 countries 
High intermediate level of 
abstraction Elections + A 100 countries 
Medium level of abstraction Elections + A + B 80 countries 
Lower intermediate level of 
abstraction Elections + A + B + C 60 countries 
Lower intermediate level of 
abstraction Elections + A + B + C + D 40 countries 
Lowest level of abstraction 
(Lowest extension/Highest 
intension) 
Elections + A + B + C + D + 
E 20 countries 
 
Elections are the most basic element of any type of democracy, present even in those 
possessing a low democratic quality. At the highest level of abstraction in Table 3 above, where 
the intension is lowest (only one defining attribute), the category contains the largest number of 
objects. Hypothetically, Table 3 above shows that 120 countries in the world can be considered 
democracies according to the theoretically relevant minimal criteria of having free, fair and 
regularly organized elections.  
Going down the ladder of abstraction is accompanied by adding elements other than elections 
that define a democracy, increasing its quality, such as various liberal rights, socio-economic 
inclusion, etc. This leads to a higher intension and lower extension, more defining elements, 
harder to meet for a large number of countries, therefore decreasing the number of objects in 
each subordinate category. The super-ordinate categories contain less specific elements and 
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therefore cover more cases, given their greater extension and lower intension. 
I emphasize one defining characteristic of this model once again: the subordinate categories 
are contained within the super-ordinate ones because they possess all of the defining features of 
the next super-ordinate category, plus other features deemed to have theoretical relevance, in a 
process of increasing the intension, becoming increasingly specific and therefore covering less 
and less cases. According to this logic, the 20 countries found at the lowest level of abstraction 
are also found in all the next super-ordinate categories, up to the highest level of abstraction. The 
same goes true for all countries at each subordinate level: they are found in all the next super-
ordinate levels. 
An important observation ought to be made: the categories found along the ladder of 
abstraction are arranged in a taxonomic hierarchy, having clearly defined boundaries, separating 
them from each other, and most importantly, one defining element (elections) possessed by all 
categories and each member, of each category. This common element makes all the objects of 
each category democracies in the first place, while organizing the conceptual categories in a 
taxonomic hierarchy by being present in all instances of a democracy.  
The taxonomic hierarchy, the trade-mark of Sartori’s strategy of conceptualization, is 
characterized by clearly defined boundaries between categories. Also, the common element that 
organizes the hierarchy among categories allows for normative comparisons among them. 
Conceptual stretching through adding labels is different to the exercise of ascending and 
descending the ladder adding or subtracting theoretically relevant elements in order to form 
categories. Conceptual stretching occurs within each category, when authors with specific 
theoretical concerns label categories to fit their research purposes. They stretch the concept to fit 
specific empirical circumstances. A hypothetical example in that sense is Elections+A+B+C 
being labelled “corporatist” democracy if B represents the legalization of labour unions and C 
represents the existence of corporatist arrangements among major economic actors. However, 
not all concepts are amenable to the ladder of abstraction strategy of conceptualizing. I will 
exemplify why accountability cannot be conceptualized according to Sartori’s ladder of 
abstraction and show how the radial model is more appropriate in this particular case. 
I will firstly recapitulate the theoretically relevant elements of accountability. They are 
answerability and punishment. The first implies demanding and receiving information, 
prospectively or retrospectively, demanding and receiving explanation, prospectively or 
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retrospectively. The second implies the existence of power to punish that is legally ascribed 
leading to sanctions of a legal nature (i.e., prosecution as outcome of legal investigation) or 
sanctions of a non-legal nature (i.e., amending of Executive policy acts in the Legislature), as 
well as the power to punish not ascribed legally, leading to sanctions of non-legal nature (i.e., 
voting against the incumbents) or the demanding of activation of agents that impose punishment 
of legal nature (i.e., civil society oversight and action against wrongdoings of state officials). I 
will secondly reorder these elements of accountability in a different way: information 
prospectively (A), information retrospectively (B), explanation prospectively (C), explanation 
retrospectively (D), legally ascribed power to impose sanctions of legal nature (E), legally 
ascribed power to impose sanctions of non-legal nature (F), non-legally ascribed power to 
impose sanctions of non-legal nature (G), non-legally ascribed power to activate the agents that 
can punish legally (H). The presence of all these elements in a single act of political 
accountability would make it an ideal instance of the concept, rarely met in reality, if ever. It 
would place such an ideal act of political accountability at the lowest level of abstraction on 
Sartori’s (1970) ladder model. The largest number possible of defining features would give it a 
high intension and low extension on a classic ladder model. I will next graft the ladder model 
operating with hypothetical instances of accountability with actual, real world instances of 
accountability (see the Table 4 below). 
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Table 4: accountability conceptualized according to the ladder of abstraction model: 
 Accountability Number of objects 
Highest level of 
abstraction 
(?)  
 A+B 10 instances 
Societal Accountability:  
D+G
 
Societal Accountability:  
A+G
80 instances 
Mandated Horizontal Accountability: 
B+E 
60 instances 
Mandated Horizontal Accountability: 
D+F 
3 instances 
A+B+C 1 instance 
Extended Accountability: 
A+C+G
83 instances 
Extended Accountability:  
B+D+F
17 instances 
Electoral Vertical Accountability: 
A+B+C+D+G 
40 instances 
Lowest level of abstraction A + B + C + D + E + F + G Hypothetical instance 
 
The combination of features in bold letters represents actual real world occurrences of 
accountability as described earlier in the chapter, whereas the combination of features in non-
bold letters represents hypothetical occurrences, which might as well not exist in the real world. 
However, these hypothetical occurrences reflect the logic of the classic ladder of abstraction. 
According to Sartori (1970), the less attributes define a category of instances, the more super-
ordinate that category is. According to the same logic exemplified earlier with the concept of 
democracy, the subordinate categories (lower extension and higher intension) should be 
contained within the super-ordinate categories.  
I will next explain the four examples of accountability as shown in Table 4 above. Electoral 
Vertical Accountability implies that voters hold political actors accountable at the ballot box. It 
necessarily requires the demanding of information prospectively and retrospectively (A+B), the 
demanding of explanation both prospectively and retrospectively (C+D), as well as capacity to 
punish the power holders through non-legally ascribed power to impose sanctions of a non-legal 
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nature (G) when casting the ballot11. According to the above classification, the table above shows 
Electoral Vertical Accountability as a combination of A+B+C+D+G. 
Societal Accountability implies individuals or civil society organizations holding accountable 
the political actors or institutions. Societal accountability necessarily requires the demanding of 
information prospectively (A), in the case of civil society lobby groups, or explanation 
retrospectively (D), in the case of civil society human rights watchdogs, as well as the imposition 
of punishment through sanctions of a non-legal nature (G), such as reputation costs or 
demanding the activation of state agents of accountability which can impose punishment of a 
legal nature. It already appears clearly that different acts of societal accountability possess 
different theoretically relevant elements, given the radial structure of the concept of 
accountability. According to the classification in the above table, Societal Accountability is 
shown as a combination of either D+G or A+G. 
Mandated Horizontal Accountability implies institutions that are legally assigned to oversee, 
prevent, discourage, promote the sanctioning of, or even directly sanction, the actions or 
omissions of other state agencies that are presumed unlawful, at national or sub-national levels 
necessarily require the demanding of information retrospectively (B) and the imposition of 
sanctions of legal nature (E), in the case of institutions that can uphold the law themselves, such 
as the Courts of Accounts. However, some the mandated horizontal accountability institutions, 
such as the Ombudsperson, act by demanding explanation retrospectively (D) and administering 
punishment of non-legal nature (F). As with the case of Societal Accountability, different acts of 
Mandated Horizontal Accountability possess different theoretically relevant elements, given the 
radial structure of the concept of accountability. Mandated Horizontal Accountability is shown in 
the table above as either B+E or D+F. 
Extended Accountability implies institutions and civil society actors that expose policies to 
greater institutional scrutiny, reducing the arbitrariness of decision-making, and insuring the 
                                                 
11 As I have already mentioned, Przeworski, Stokes and Manin (1999) raised objections about the capacity of 
elections to impose punishment, as well as the difficulty of establishing if individual voting is prospective (on the 
basis of electoral promises) or retrospective (on the basis of previous government performance). However, the free 
and regularly organized elections had been for a long period of time the only mechanism of accountability in many 
newly established democracies, where the newly founded democratic institutions had been weak and exhibited 
serious malfunctioning even after the collapse of their respective undemocratic regimes. Furthermore, free, fair and 
regularly organized elections are considered minimal criteria of any democracy and constitute the major theoretical 
element of the theory of democratic transition and consolidation (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986; 
Schmitter and Karl, 1991) as well as the more classical work dedicated to the study of democracy (Schumpeter, 
1954; Dahl, 1971). 
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representation of a wide spectrum of societal interests in the process of policy-making. It 
necessarily requires information and explanation prospectively and retrospectively (A, B, C, D), 
as well as punishment of non-legal nature (F). A Legislature that amends the policy acts of the 
Executive exercises an act of Extended Accountability by demanding information and an 
explanation retrospectively (B+D) and imposing punishment of non-legal nature (F) with the aim 
of including a large spectrum of societal interests in a specific policy act. However, an NGO 
promoting the specific interests of a civil society group will hold the Executive accountable for a 
piece of legislation that influences its interests by demanding information and explanation 
prospectively about the intentions of the Executive (A+C), as well as by making use of its non-
legally ascribed power of imposing sanctions of non-legal nature when amending the Executive 
act with its own policy views (G). Therefore, Extended Accountability is shown in the above 
table as either A+C+G or B+D+F. 
It becomes obvious that the ladder of abstraction strategy of conceptualization leads to 
conceptual stretching when attempting to define accountability. Firstly, the super-ordinate 
categories do not contain the instances of accountability in the subordinate categories. Secondly, 
there are no clearly separated categories (as in the case of democracy on the ladder of 
abstraction) given the absence of a single theoretically relevant element shared by all categories. 
Categories of accountability in bold letters become problematic once ordered on a classic ladder 
of abstraction. Thirdly, the central subcategory (Electoral Vertical Accountability) that contains 
the largest number of defining features (but not necessarily all possible defining features), shares 
features with the non-central subcategories, but these non-central subcategories do not 
necessarily share features with each other, as in the case of ladder of abstraction. As it comes out 
quite clearly, the central sub-category is “central” because it contains the largest number of 
defining features of an act of accountability, and its “sub-category” status is justified by the fact 
that it does not contain all possibly imaginable features of a hypothetical act of accountability (A 
+ B +……+ G, as shown at the lowest level of abstraction in the table above). Following the 
same logic, the non-central subcategories are “non-central” because they contain a smaller 
number of features than the central subcategory. The definition of accountability employing the 
ladder of abstraction model inevitably leads to conceptual stretching through labelling. Another 
outcome of the ladder of abstraction strategy is the excessive weight it placed on instances in 
which an act of accountability took place between institutional actors, adding labels to new 
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instances described ad hoc from a large volume of empirical information (O’Donnell, 1994, 
1996, 1999, 2003; Schmitter, 1999; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000; Stark and Bruszt, 1998). In 
some of this literature (O’Donnell, 2003), an almost exclusive emphasis had been placed on 
control and visible punishment of a legal nature. As I have demonstrated, the radial structure of 
the concept of accountability requires a different strategy of conceptualization. I will now present 
the conceptualization of accountability according to the radial structure model, in order to make 
it more obvious why this model is more appropriate than the ladder of abstraction in the case of 
this particular concept (see Table 5 below). 
 
Table 5: accountability conceptualized according to the radial structure model 
 
Ideal act of accountability 
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
D 
 
E 
 
F 
 
G 
 
Societal Accountability 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
D 
 
- 
 
- 
 
G 
 
Societal Accountability 
 
 
A 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
G 
 
Mandated Horizontal 
Accountability 
 
 
- 
 
B 
 
- 
 
- 
 
E 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Mandated Horizontal 
Accountability 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
D 
 
- 
 
F 
 
- 
 
Extended Accountability 
 
 
A 
 
- 
 
C 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
G 
 
Extended Accountability 
 
 
- 
 
B 
 
- 
 
D 
 
- 
 
F 
 
- 
 
Electoral Vertical 
Accountability 
(Central subcategory) 
 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
D 
 
- 
 
- 
 
G 
 
As explained earlier, the radial structure of accountability is based on the different types of 
punishment (legal or non-legal, each with its own mechanism of imposition), on different types 
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of answerability relations established between the agents and the subjects of accountability as 
well as on different types of resources engaged. 
Different combinations of these elements (type of punishment, resources engaged and 
mechanism of imposition) constitute equally legitimate acts of accountability, generating 
categories that do not necessarily share one common constituting element.  
Table 5 above reflects the category types specific to radial structure concepts: all the 
subcategories share elements in common with the central subcategory, although the central 
subcategory itself does not possess all elements that would constitute an ideal act of 
accountability. The subcategories themselves may or may not share elements.  
 
 
6. A bounded definition of accountability and its operationalization 
 
 
As already mentioned, different forms of accountability have recourse to different resources 
and mechanisms of enforcement (Schedler, 1999: 22-23). When various agents hold accountable 
the subjects of accountability, they often cross the borders between the State and society, in an 
interaction that oppose actors who engage different resources. The kind of resources the Agents 
of accountability can make use of in the act of holding the Subjects accountable define their 
position and influence their chance of success.  
I focus my research on a particular form of accountability, namely Executive accountability 
in relation to the Legislature, given the importance of the former in insuring the representation of 
societal interests into the act of policy-making (Woldendorp, Keman and Budge, 2000). Out of 
all the weaknesses of the new democracies, the elimination of Legislatures from the process of 
policy-making is considered the least propitious result for democratic consolidation and most 
favourable for the prevalence of private interests in the process of policy-making.   
Given the afore-mentioned concern with the issue of representation of societal interests and 
its effects on the level of accountability, I place Executive accountability in the framework of 
extended accountability as defined by Stark and Bruszt (1998), presented earlier as a full 
instance of an act of political accountability. 
From the perspective of accountability, the Executive branch of government is the Subject of 
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accountability, while the Legislature is the Agent of accountability, as defined earlier in this 
chapter. The action of the Legislature to hold the Executive to account encompasses both 
dimensions of accountability defined by Schedler (1999, 12-15): answerability and punishment. 
Executive answerability to the Legislature takes place through oversight and investigation: 
the Legislature can demand information from the Executive aiming to oversee and/or investigate 
Executive activity, both prospectively and retrospectively; the Legislature can demand 
explanation from the Executive aiming to oversee and/or investigate the Executive activity, both 
prospectively and retrospectively. 
In the process of oversight and investigation, the Legislature can make use of a variety of 
constitutional resources to hold the Executive to account (Palanza, 2005): written inquiries, 
interpellation of members of the Executive, constitutional obligation of regular visits to the 
Legislature by the head of the Executive, summoning Executive members to appear in legislative 
committees, ex post controls of budget implementation, special committees to investigate aspects 
of the Executive activity. 
The Legislature punishes the Executive through extended accountability actions and/or 
demand for activation of agents of mandated horizontal accountability: the Legislature has the 
legally ascribed power to punish the Executive by imposing sanctions of non-legal nature aiming 
to hold the Executive to account and/or keep the Executive within the limits of legality.  
Some extended Executive accountability resources available to the Legislature in relation to 
the Executive are: the motion of censorship against the Executive (constitutional procedure 
demanding the resignation of the Executive as an outcome of poor performance on a specific 
policy issue), the simple motion against the Executive (constitutional procedure demanding the 
change on a specific issue of policy), or rejecting or amending the legislative proposals of the 
Executive with policy-oriented amendments. 
Some sanctions that are used by the Legislature to hold the Executive to account by keeping 
it within the limits of legality are the impeachment of the head of the Executive, removal from 
office of a member of the Executive as outcome of legislative investigation and/or interpellation, 
without referral to agents of mandated horizontal accountability. 
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The Legislature also has the legally ascribed power of demanding the activation of horizontal 
balance accountability Agents that impose punishment of a legal nature aiming to keep the 
Executive within the framework of legality. Some sanctions that are used by the Legislature in 
order to hold the Executive to account through the activation of horizontal balance accountability 
Agents are: the forwarding Executive acts to the Constitutional Court on grounds of 
unconstitutionality, forwarding resolutions of investigative committees on the actions of the 
Executive members to the Agents of mandated horizontal accountability legally to punish 
wrongdoings, suspending the parliamentary immunity of members of the Executive who are also 
members of the Legislature (in parliamentary or semi-parliamentary systems) and deferring them 
to the Agents of mandated horizontal accountability in charge with further investigation and 
legal punishment. 
I therefore define Executive accountability in relation to the Legislature as being the capacity 
of the latter successfully to use its constitutional resources to demand information and 
explanation from the Executive, both prospectively and retrospectively, while being able and 
willing to use its legally ascribed power to punish the Executive through non-legal sanctions 
aiming to impose extended Executive accountability through policy scrutiny and amendments 
and/or keep the Executive within the limits of legality, either through its own direct non-legal 
punishment or by demanding the activation of Agents of mandated horizontal accountability who 
can impose legal punishment. 
An important issue needs clarification here. This thesis compares three countries that have 
substantially different political systems: Italy has a parliamentary system, Argentina has a federal 
presidential system, while Romania has a semi-parliamentary political system. How is 
accountability conceptualized across political systems? I will attempt to answer this question 
next. 
The contemporary policy-making process involves acts of delegation of policy-making 
authority, all the way from voters to the civil servants, in which “those authorized to make 
political decisions conditionally designate others to make such decisions in their name and 
place” (Strøm et al., 2003: 19). The importance of this observation cannot be overemphasized, 
since it holds true in any political system, presidential or parliamentary. Voters delegate to 
politicians, either legislators or elected Presidents, while legislators delegate to cabinets and 
Presidents delegate to Executive agencies (see Table 6 below).  
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Table 6: chain of delegation of power from Principals to Agents. 
Principal Agent
Voter A member of Parliament and/or a party (depending on the ballot list system) 
Members of Parliament, Parties The government 
Government Cabinet Ministers 
Cabinet Ministers Civil Service 
Civil Service directors Civil Service employees 
* Source: Lupia (2003): 34. 
 
However, any delegation of policy-making authority is accompanied by various mechanisms 
of accountability, through which the Principals hold their Agents accountable, so that the power 
entrusted to them will not be abused. The policy-making process exhibits both components 
(delegation and accountability) in parliamentary systems, while exhibiting only the 
accountability component in presidential systems, as shown in figures a) and b) below based on 
Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2003).  
 
Delegation and accountability under Parliamentary and Presidential Government:  
a) single-chain delegation model of a parliamentary system:    
   
          Civil servants 
          Ministry Head  Civil servants 
Distinct   Representatives  Prime Minister    Civil servants 
median     & Cabinet    Civil servants 
voter            Ministry head  Civil servants 
          Civil servants 
b) multiple-chain delegation model of a US-style presidential system: 
National          Civil servants 
Median   President   Secretary    Civil servants 
Voter          Civil servants 
 
State 
Median   Upper House 
voter 
           
 
          Civil servants 
District      Secretary    Civil servants 
median voter  Lower House       Civil servants 
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In presidential systems, voters elect both the Members of Congress and the Presidents, 
delegating policy-making power and holding both accountable through regularly held free and 
fair elections. However, legislators do not delegate policy-making power to Presidents on a 
constant regular basis, unless circumstances out of the ordinary require it. Even in such 
circumstances, delegation of legislative functions occurs only for clearly defined periods of time 
and on specifically mentioned policy-issues. I will deal more extensively with this apparent 
contradiction (accountability without delegation represented by the dotted arrow in figure (b) 
above) later in this subsection. 
Executive accountability to the Legislature can be understood as an institutional control 
function (the Legislature has the constitutionally granted power to withdraw its support for the 
Executive leading to Cabinet removal in parliamentary systems), but also as a policy-making 
function (the Legislature has the constitutionally granted power to expose the Executive 
legislative proposals to policy scrutiny). Both presidential and parliamentary systems exhibit the 
same functions of accountability: institutional control and policy-making, only with different 
intensities and different mechanisms of imposition.  
In presidential systems, the institutional control function allowing the Legislature to remove 
the Executive is reduced to a substantially diminished form: the impeachment procedure. The 
policy-making function however is correspondingly enhanced, through the increased policy 
scrutiny for the Presidential legislative initiatives sent to the Legislature for consideration and 
approval. 
In parliamentary systems, the institutional control function is substantially stronger, since the 
Parliament has a variety of resources to remove an Executive that is made of its own members 
and is entirely dependent on its support. The policy-control function is correspondingly weaker 
than in presidential regimes, given the origin of the Executive in the Parliament. It is assumed 
that a Parliament supporting an Executive has no incentives to amend the latter’s policies to the 
same extent as Congresses in presidential regimes, since the Parliament itself delegated the 
Executive the implementation of the program of the supporting legislative coalition. That is not 
to say amendment or rejection of Executive policy initiatives are absent from parliamentary 
systems. To the contrary, the Executive is held accountable by Parliament with varying degrees 
of success, according to the legislative resources granted to the latter by the Constitution. 
It had been emphasized that the longer and more linear the chain of accountability, the higher 
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the risk of agency loss on the part of Principals (Lupia, 2003). Agency loss is the difference 
between the actual consequences of delegation and what the consequences would have been had 
the Agent been “perfect”. Here perfect is understood a hypothetical Agent who does what the 
Principal would have done if the Principal had unlimited information and resources to do the job 
herself (Lupia, 2003: 35). Agency loss describes the consequences of delegation from the 
Principal’s perspective.  
However, how can Executive accountability to the Legislature be conceptualized outside the 
Principal – Agent framework? It can be argued that in presidential systems the Congress cannot 
hold the President accountable since it cannot act as a Principal in relation to its Agent given its 
diminished capacity to remove the President.  
I argue that in presidential systems both the President and the Congress are Agents of the 
electorate, who equally entrusted them with policy-making powers. They can try to hold each 
other accountable in the system-specific framework of checks and balances. The policy-making 
function of accountability makes it possible that two agents (Congress and President) can hold 
each other accountable when acting in the name of their common Principal, the electorate. 
Therefore, although the Legislature is not the principal of the Executive in presidential systems, 
it still has a democratic mandate from voters to hold the Executive to account, only in a different 
manner than in the parliamentary systems. 
Executive accountability outside the Principal – Agent framework is made possible by 
political parties, which provide the link between the Executive and the Legislature. They play a 
fundamental function in making delegation and accountability work within or without the 
Principal – Agent framework (Müller and Strøm, 2000). While political parties influence all 
stages of delegation and accountability in a linear chain in parliamentary democracies (see figure 
(a) above), in presidential democracies they link the Executive and the Legislature through the 
mechanism of checks and balances, of overlapping functions, which compensates for the 
substantially diminished institutional control function of accountability by a strengthened policy-
making function of accountability. Therefore, it is expected that a Congress will attempt to 
subject the presidential legislative proposals to closer policy scrutiny than would a Parliament. 
It appears that differences across political systems are epiphenomenal as far as delegation 
and accountability are concerned. Both systems display the same functions of accountability, 
with a difference in degree and the accompanying mechanisms of imposition. Furthermore, 
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political parties perform the accountability function in both presidential and parliamentary 
systems, only in different ways. They structure the Executive-Legislature arena in different 
ways, according to the constraints imposed by the constitutional design, but with the ultimate 
purpose of reaching policy-making decisions (Strøm, 2003: 69).  
 
 
7. Measuring the Executive accountability function of emergency Decrees 
 
 
I will next propose a specific strategy of operationalizing Executive accountability based on 
the general and bounded definitions offered earlier, while introducing the dataset of empirical 
information supporting this thesis. 
I will firstly attempt to establish if the Executive indeed governs by Decree rather than 
simple legislative proposals sent to the Legislature through the normal procedure (NPL). The 
indicator is the volume of Executive decrees compared to the volume of Executive-initiated 
NPL. The ratio between these two legislative instruments will reveal the intentions of the 
Executive in undermining the legislative function of the Legislature. This is a simple 
intermediary measure, which does not reveal any causal factor in itself. It captures a simple 
picture: opting between two policy-promotion strategies in relation to the Legislature (the 
Executive decree and the NPL, each one with its own constitutional definition) the Executive 
will choose the one which provides the most efficient solution for its bargaining problems in the 
Legislature.  
This ratio is instrumental in establishing two relevant aspects of governance through 
Emergency decrees. The first is the volume of Decrees compared to the volume of NPL for the 
whole period under observation in each country case, indicating if a country is indeed ruled by 
Decree or not. The second is the trend of Decree issuing. If the ratio is increasingly in favour of 
Emergency decrees, then this will indicate that this particular legislative resource is preferred by 
the Executive, providing an incentive to explore the causes of such preference. 
Secondly, I establish the rejection and amending rates of Executive decrees in the 
Legislature. The lower the amending and rejection rates, the lower the Executive accountability. 
I will also attempt to identify the factors that influence the capacity of Legislatures to reject and 
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amend the Decrees. This is the only measure of accountability in the thesis, given that it entails 
punishment through rejection and amending of Decrees, as I have already argued. An Executive 
that issues a large volume of Executive decrees (even larger than the volume of NPL) still rules 
accountable to the Legislature as long as these acts are rejected or amended. The need to issue a 
large volume of Decrees has a different cause than the capacity of the Legislature to reject or 
amend the Decrees. From this perspective, a large volume of Decrees accompanied by low 
rejection and amending rates indicates a low level of Executive accountability. 
Thirdly, I compare the ratio of issued Decrees and issued Executive-initiated NPL to the ratio 
of successful Decrees and successful Executive-initiated NPL, revealing the level of the 
Legislature’s acquiescence to the undermining of its legislative function. The ratio of issued 
Decrees/issued NPL reveals the intentions of the Executive to undermine the legislative function 
of the Legislature. The ratio of successful Decrees/successful NPL reveals the capacity of the 
Executive to rule though unaccountable to the Legislature. From this perspective, any difference 
between the two ratios indicates the role of the institutional structure in setting the capacity of 
Legislatures to hold the Executive to account.  
This series of theoretically relevant comparisons is possible due to the dataset of empirical 
information collected during field research missions to Bucharest (September 2006 – November 
2006), Rome (November 2006 – January 2007) and Buenos Aires (March 2007 – May 2007), at 
the Libraries of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies and the Italian Chamber of Deputies, as well 
as at the Information Department of the Argentine Congress (Dirección de Información 
Parlamentaria, or DIP). The information from the databases of the Legislatures of the three 
country cases is available in electronic format. The Italian case study is based on information 
available in the database of the Chamber of Deputies at www.camera.it, of the Senate at 
www.senato.it and the Parliament as an institution at www.parlamento.it. The Romanian case 
study is based on information available in the database of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies at 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/legis_acte_parlam. Both in the case of Italy and Romania, I had to 
combine the primary empirical information with information from secondary sources, given the 
difficulties of obtaining the whole set of relevant information that would allow for theoretically 
relevant comparisons.  
The Italian databases contain information regarding the legislative production of the 
Executive for each Executive coalition since 1983. The legislative production of the Executive 
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during the period of 1947-1983 is not included in the database. The information on this period is 
found only in a small compiled book in the Library of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, edited by 
the printing office of the Chamber: Le legislature repubblicane nelle statistiche parlamentari (my 
own translation: Legislative statistics of the Republic’s Legislatures). The book also contains 
information on the amending rate of DL and NPL. However, the information on NPL is 
organized only for each Parliament, while the information on DL is organized for each Executive 
(Cabinet), preventing a correlation between the volume and success-rate of the two types of 
legislative proposals for each Executive coalition. As I will explain more extensively later, this 
shortcoming in the empirical information has implications for the operationalization of Executive 
accountability to the Legislature. 
The empirical information for the Romanian study case does not contain information 
regarding the Executive-initiated NPL for one unit of analysis (Cabinet) between 1992 and 1996. 
The available empirical information shows only the number of successful Executive-initiated 
NPL, but not the total number of issued NPL. This shortcoming is due to the low institutional 
capacity of the Romanian Parliament in the early 1990s as well as to the relocation of the 
institution and its Departments (including the Archive and the Library) to new premises. I will 
explain the consequences of this shortcoming in the country case chapter. 
The empirical information for Argentina was collected during a field research trip to Buenos 
Aires between March and May 2007. It had been provided by the Dirección de Información 
Parlamentaria (DIP) of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies in the form of two separate 
documents, Trabajo Especial 282 of 9 April 2007 and Trabajo Especial 304 of 16 April 2007, as 
outcome of a formal written request. The reason for making a request of the specialized 
Department of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies to provide the information is the complicated 
electronic database on legislation, the different legal status of different acts and the subsequent 
classification of these acts. Despite some inaccuracies (acknowledged by the DIP) due to the 
organization of the congressional legislative database, the information comes close enough to 
previous empirical information from secondary sources to warrant relevant scholarly claims. The 
information had been further checked against detailed lists of DNU and NPL initiated by the 
President and provided by the DIP for each year after 1983 until 2006. The interpretation of the 
empirical information benefited greatly from extensive personal discussions with Prof. Ana-
Maria Mustapic of Torcuato di Tella University, Prof. Delia Fereirra Rubio of Universidad de 
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CEMA and director of the Center for Studies in Applied Public Policies in Buenos Aires and 
Alejandro Bonvechi of Torcuato di Tella University. The Information Department of the 
Argentine Chamber of Deputies responds to written requests only after the researcher requesting 
information produces documentary evidence of being associated with a local university. My 
request had benefited from the support of the legislative research group of Torcuato di Tela 
University.  
This dataset is unique in the sense that no other literature uses information to compare the 
volume of Executive decrees to the volume of NPL in order to establish the extent of governance 
by Emergency decree. Existing literature only took notice of a large number of Executive 
decrees in Argentina and Italy (Rubio Ferreira and Goretti, 1995; Rubio Ferreira and Goretti, 
2000; Di Porto, 2006). The case of Argentina also attracts constant media attention, but all 
arguments are built around information documenting the number of Emergency decrees12. As I 
have already mentioned, this is not an indicator for measuring the tendency of the Executive to 
bypass the Legislature and can help to make only modest theoretical claims about this trend.  
The literature exploring Executive-Legislature relations in Romania focused on how 
legislative coalitions have functioned (Radu, 2000) or the impact of reformist parties on the 
political and economic reforms in the aftermath of communism (Pavel and Huiu, 2003). 
Even the most extensive work dedicated to the study of governance by Emergency decrees 
and the effects on democratic consolidation and/or quality (Carey and Shugart, 1998) is built on 
the assumption that the large number of such Decrees is enough in itself to warrant theoretical 
claims. The immediate consequence is an operationalization of accountability that does not focus 
on other legislative resources (therefore preventing a disciplined comparison among different 
Executive legislative resources that might be instrumental in establishing causality) or the 
rejection and amending rates of Decrees in Legislature (therefore preventing an accurate measure 
of the level of Executive accountability). 
I have collected and interpreted information regarding the volume of issued Decrees and 
NPL sent to both legislative chambers in all three study cases. The influence of the legislative 
chambers is different across country cases: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have equal 
                                                 
12 Laura Capriata, ‘Kirchner firma por año más decretos que Menem’, La Nación, 14 de junio 2006 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/814460; Laura Capriata, ‘Kirchner firmó un decreto cada cinco días de gestión’, La 
Nación, Lunes 13 de junio de 2005 http://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/nota.asp?nota_id=712521; Laura Capriata, 
‘También este año, Kirchner firmó más decretos que leyes’, La Nación, Lunes 3 de julio de 2006 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/820121  
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weight in Romania and Italy, while one chamber has advantages over the other in Argentina (the 
chamber where a piece of legislation is initiated by either the President or an individual legislator 
has stronger power over the final decision on that particular piece of legislation). This 
methodological choice will allow for tentative conclusions regarding governance by Decree and 
the level of Executive accountability across political systems.  
Choosing to compare the volume and treatment of legislation initiated by Executive only in 
Senate would have overlooked a large volume of legislation in Italy and Romania, where the 
Executive sends its proposals firstly to the Chamber of Deputies. Choosing to compare the 
volume and treatment of legislation initiated by the Executive only in the Chamber of Deputies 
would have failed to accounted for an important volume of legislation in the case of Argentina, 
where the President sends policy proposals firstly to the chamber where it has a stronger majority 
given its formal advantages in the case of disagreements between the two chambers of the 
Congress. 
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III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH PUZZLES AND PROBLEMS 
OF COMPARATIBILITY ACROSS POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
 
In this chapter, I will present the research puzzles based on empirical information from 
the three study cases, as well as problems of comparability across political systems. The 
empirical information this thesis is based on highlights the shortcomings of existing literature 
focusing on emergency Executive decrees and its theoretical assumptions. As I have briefly 
mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, some literature attempted to explain the issuing of 
Decrees through political culture, while other literature explored the role of institutions and 
political parties as causal factors.  
The democratic transition and consolidation literature explaining causality through political 
culture (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999) assumes governance by emergency decree is a paramount 
feature of a new type of democracy. That is hardly the case, as empirical information in Table 1 
below indicates.  
 
Table 1: Volume of Decrees and NPL according to the success-rate of NPL across country 
cases. 
Country cases I. Decrees issued II.NPL issued 
Italy 1947 – 2006 18% (2,879) 82% (13,278) 
Argentina 1983 - 2006 23% (699)  77%  (2,331) 
Romania 1992 – 2007 48% (1,874) 52% (2,023) (aprox.) 
 
None of the study cases is ruled by emergency Executive decree, despite the high number of 
these acts. The emergency decree constitutes a low volume of total Executive-initiated 
legislation in Italy and Argentina (18% and 23% respectively), while the Romanian case study 
exhibits a significantly higher volume (48%), offering a relevant contrasting case that can be 
instrumental in revealing causality. Despite the high number of emergency Decrees, the volume 
of Decrees in the total body of Executive-initiated legislation is low in Italy, relatively low in 
Argentina and high in Romania compared to the other study cases. 
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The same literature assumes that governance by emergency Executive decree is a constant 
practice of a new type of democracy, labelled “delegative”, as I will explain more extensively in 
the next chapter of literature review. However, empirical information from Argentina and 
Romania contradicts this assumption. This literature cannot explain the low number of Executive 
decrees issued by one of the least democratic Executives that governed Romania between 1992 
and 1996, at a time when the country hardly qualified as a democracy, save for the reasonably 
free and regularly organized elections, as shown in Table 2 below.  
 
Table 2: Comparison of OUG and NPL issuing for two Romanian Executives with different 
democratic credentials. 
 
It also cannot explain why an Executive with impeccable democratic credentials, as the one 
that governed Romania between 1996 and 2000 (headed by three Prime Ministers), which 
initiated the first far reaching political and economic reforms, issued the largest volume of 
Decrees in the post-communist history of the country, far surpassing the less democratic one that 
preceded it, as Table 2 above indicates. 
The same culturalist perspective on the topic cannot explain why President Raul Alfonsin of 
Argentina (1983 – 1989) issued significantly less Executive decrees than all other Argentine 
Presidents that succeeded him (as shown in Table 3 below), although all of them had enjoyed the 
same constitutional Decree power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive 
 
I. OUG issued II. NPL issued III. NPL Success 
VACAROIU 
19.11.1992 - 
11.12.1996 
Aprox. 5% (19) 95% aprox. (Info not available) (369) 
CIORBEA 
VASILE 
ISARESCU 
1996-2000 
61% (668) 39% (435) 85% (369) 
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Table 3: Issuing of emergency Executive decrees (DNU) and NPL in Argentina since 1983. 
Presidency I. DNU issued II. NPL issued 
Alfonsin 1983-1989 2% (11) 98% (590) 
Menem 1989-1999 18% (248) 82%  (1170) 
De la Rua 1999-2001 24% (52) 76%  (166) 
Saá 1 week Dec. 2001 60% (6) 40% (4) 
Duhalde 2002-2003 54% (151) 46%  (127) 
Kirchner 2003-2006 46% (231) 54%  (274) 
Total 1983-2006 23% (699) 77%  (2331) 
 
Table 3 above also reveals that the issuing of emergency Executive decrees in Argentina 
exhibits a fluctuating trend, growing from 2% of the total Executive-initiated legislation under 
President Alfonsin, to 18% under President Menem, 24% under President de la Rua, reaching a 
peak of 60% during the economic crash of 2001-2002 under President Saá, and then decreasing 
to 54% under President Duhalde and 46% under president Kirchner. This fluctuation is puzzling 
in a country where the issuing of emergency Executive decrees is allegedly supported by a 
culture-specific understanding of politics. The maximum that the culturalist perspective on the 
topic can explain here is that President Alfonsin is more democratic than the other Presidents of 
Argentina, while the fluctuation in the level of issuing remains unexplained from a causal 
standpoint. 
The literature explaining the issuing of emergency Executive decrees through bargaining 
problems caused by legislative fragmentation and polarization (Mainwaring, 1990, 1991, 1992-
1993; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997) requires the exploration of the success-rate of Executive-
initiated NPL and its correlation to the tendency of the Executive to issue emergency Decrees 
given its manifest bargaining problems: the lower the success-rate of former, the higher the 
issuing of the latter.  
According to the expectations of this literature, Romania should exhibit the lowest volume of 
Decree issuing (given the high 94% NPL success-rate), while Argentina should exhibit the 
highest (given the low 62% NPL success-rate). That is hardly the case as Table 4 below indicates 
so the assumptions of the existing literature need further improvement. 
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Table 4: NPL success-rate and volume of Decree issuing across country cases. 
Country cases I. Decrees issued II.NPL issued III.NPL success-rate 
Italy 1947 – 2006 18% (2,879) 82% (13,278) 83% (11,068) 
Argentina 1983 - 
2006 23% (699)  77%  (2,331) 62% (1,435) 
Romania 1992 – 
2007 48% (1,874) 52% (2,023) (aprox.) 94% (1,893) 
 
Another empirical puzzle from Italy and Romania contradicts the assumption that a large 
volume of Decree issuing is caused by the low success-rate of Executive-initiated NPL, given the 
specific bargaining problems the Executive faces in the Legislature. Table 5 below presents 
information on the legislative production of three Cabinets, two from Italy and one from 
Romania, which issued a large volume of emergency Executive decrees despite the high NPL 
success-rate. 
 
Table 5: Italian and Romanian Cabinets with a high NPL success-rate that still issue a 
large volume of emergency Executive decrees. 
Cabinets  I. Decrees issued II.NPL issued III.NPL success-rate 
BERLUSCONI II 
BERLUSCONI III 
(2001 – 2006) 
 
37% (187) 
 
63% (324) 
 
97% (317) 
 
56% (42) 
 
44% (34) 
 
97% (33) 
NASTASE 
(2000 – 2004) 
 
47% (680) 
 
53% (767) 
 
95% (725) 
 
As Column III in Table 5 above indicates, almost all Executive-initiated NPL had been 
approved in the Legislature for these three units of analysis. Despite their manifest capacity to 
pass their legislative proposals, these three Cabinets issued a high volume of their legislative 
production through emergency Executive decrees, as shown in Column I of Table 5 above. 
According to the assumptions of the democratic transition and consolidation literature that 
explains Decree issuing through political culture, these three Executives qualify as outright 
“dictatorial”, given that they bypassed the Legislature, undermining its legislative function 
through the issuing of a large volume of emergency Decrees, although they did not confront 
significant legislative opposition to their initiatives promoted through NPL. 
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I will explain the structure and functioning of these three Cabinets in the respective country 
chapters. For the time being, it suffices to note that the Berlusconi Cabinets in Italy and the 
Nastase Cabinet in Romania are based on solid parliamentary majorities, exhibiting a low degree 
of fragmentation and polarization when compared to other Cabinets in these two countries. I will 
show later how this type of coalition structure influences its legislative behaviour making the 
issuing of emergency Decrees a rational cost-efficient policy promotion strategy. 
I will next present two empirical puzzles that have not been explored in any literature before. 
Both of these puzzles imply the “punishment” dimension of accountability (success-rate of 
Decrees), as I have argued in the previous chapter focusing on conceptual definition. The neglect 
of this dimension of accountability has prevented existing literature from making stronger causal 
claims that would explain all the already presented puzzles. The first puzzle compares the 
success-rate of Decrees to the success-rate of Executive-initiated NPL in Argentina. As Table 6 
below indicates, the difference between the success-rates of these two legislative resources of the 
Executive is striking. 
 
Table 6: comparative success-rate of emergency Decrees and presidential NPL in 
Argentina between 1982 and 2006. 
Presidency I. DNU issued II.DNU success III. NPL issued IV. NPL success
Alfonsin 1983-1989 (11) 100% (11) 98% (590) 68% (401) 
Menem 1989-1999 (248) 99% (246) 82%  (1170) 59% (693) 
De la Rúa 1999-2001 (52) 94% (49) 76%  (166) 69% (114) 
Saá 1 week Dec. 
2001 
(6) 100% (6) 40% (4) 0% (0) 
Duhalde 2002-2003 (151) 99% (150) 46%  (127) 57% (72) 
Kirchner 2003-2006 (231) 100% (231) 54%  (274) 57% (155) 
Total 1983-2006 (699) 99% (693)  77%  (2331) 62% (1435) 
 
The success-rate of emergency Decrees in Argentina is 99% for the whole period under 
observation (as shown in Column II of Table 6 above), compared to the 62% success-rate of 
presidential NPL (as shown in Column IV of Table 6 above). Equally puzzling is the significant 
difference present for each presidential mandate. This indicates that the Argentine Congress is 
active in rejecting presidential NPL but almost unable to hold the President to account for 
legislation promoted through emergency Decree. The significant difference between the success-
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rate of the two legislative resources of the Argentine President can explain the preference for the 
emergency Decree, as I will more show in more detail in the respective country chapter. 
The second empirical puzzle not explored in the existing literature compares the ratio of 
issued Decrees/issued NPL to the ratio of approved Decrees/approved NPL. The difference 
between these two ratios indicates with precision the role of institutional structures in setting the 
capacity of Legislatures to hold accountable the Executive branch of government for legislation 
promoted through the abusive issuing of emergency Decrees. The first ratio reveals the intentions 
of the Executive, while the second reveals the capacity of the Legislature to hold the Executive 
to account for policy promoted through Decrees. Table 7 below provides a strong incentive to 
further explore the institutional structure present in each country case. It is puzzling to see that 
Italy ends up with a lower volume of approved Decrees than the volume of Decrees issued by its 
Executive, Argentina exhibits a higher volume of approved Decrees than the volume of Decrees 
issued by its Executive, while the difference between the two ratios is almost inexistent in 
Romania. 
 
Table 7: level of legislative acquiescence to the governance through emergency Decree. 
Country cases I. DL issued/NPL issued II. Approved  DL/ Approved NPL 
Italy (1947 – 2006) DL: 18% (2879)  NPL: 82% (13278) 
DL: 13% (1650)  
NPL: 87% (11068) 
Argentina (1983 – 
2006) 
DNU: 23% (699)  
NPL: 77% (2331) 
DNU:33% (693)  
NPL: 67% (1435) 
Romania (1992 – 2007) OUG: 48% (1874)  NPL: 52% (2023) 
OUG: 46% (1636)  
NPL: 54% (1893) 
 
The Argentine case is particularly puzzling: the country ends up being ruled by Decree to a 
higher extent than the initial Executive intentions. I will explain this important finding in the 
country case chapter. 
To sum up, finding an answer to these empirical puzzles is a difficult research endeavour, 
particularly when comparing country cases that have radically different political systems and 
experience with democracy. Argentina has a presidential system, a bicameral system with 
differentiated functions between the two Chambers, a two party system organized federally, with 
a strong influence of provincial party leaders on the legislative behaviour of the Members of 
Congress. Italy has a parliamentary system, a bicameral Parliament with no functional 
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differentiations between the two Chambers, a multi-party system characterized by fragmentation 
and polarization. Romania has a semi-parliamentary system, a bicameral Parliament with no 
functional differentiations between the two Chambers, a partisan establishment characterized by 
fragmentation and polarization and an inchoate party system that changed significantly across the 
years. 
As I have shown with the empirical research puzzles, the emergency Executive decrees are 
issued equally by Executives based on fragmented and polarized legislative coalitions and 
Executives based on solid legislative majorities, with a low degree of fragmentation and 
polarization. What is the lowest common denominator across political systems that allows for 
comparison between different types of legislative coalitions? What is the most appropriate model 
of defining coalitional functioning that would most precisely explain the cause of Decree 
issuing? Furthermore, how can presidential mandates (which are not dependent on legislative 
support) be compared to Cabinet mandates (which can be removed from power at any time by 
the Parliament)? 
Equally important, how can Decrees and Executive-initiated NPL be compared? What are the 
legal features of Decrees and Executive-initiated NPL (the two constitutional resources the 
Executive can use to promote its policy views in relation to the Legislature) that should be 
accounted for when comparing their respective success-rates? The legal characteristics of the two 
legislative resources of the Executive should have theoretical relevance. They should also allow 
for comparison among different political systems, regardless of their country specific 
constitutional definition. 
I will next review the literature that explored the topic from different theoretical perspectives. 
I will also attempt to answer questions regarding the comparability of the three study cases. 
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IV. LITERATURE REVIEW:  
SPECIFIC RESEARCH CONCERNS AND THEORETICAL 
CLAIMS REGARDING EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
This thesis compares newly democratized countries (Argentina and Romania), to an 
established democracy (Italy), but relates the findings to the claims of the literature on 
democratic transition and consolidation regarding the theoretical significance of excessive 
issuing of Executive decrees. This comparison across different political systems requires the 
combination of three main strands of literature, each with its own variations and shortcomings. 
Next, I will briefly describe each of these three literature strands. 
The first is the democratic transition and consolidation literature (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 
1999; Panizza, 2000; Peruzzotti, 2001; Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler, 1998; Jones, 1997). It had 
been the first to sound the alarm over the informal prevalence of the Executive over the 
Legislature in the new democracies, highlighting the resemblance of this phenomenon to the 
practices of the authoritarian regimes whence the new democracies emerged.  
However, authors within this strand of literature have diverging views about the significance 
of the Executive prevalence over the Legislature: some claim that a large number of Executive 
decrees are caused by a specific understanding of politics, which is based on political culture. 
The countries where the Executive branch of government undermines the proper functioning of 
other institutions qualify as democracies, but they belong to a different category than the 
Western liberal democracies (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999). 
 Others authors argue that the very same indicator (large number of Executive decrees) is not 
a marker for a new type of democracy, since extensive Decree issuing has not been a constant 
practice throughout the decades, particularly in Latin America (Panizza, 2000; Peruzzotti, 2001; 
Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler, 1998; Jones, 1997).  
The second strand of literature is part of the transition and democratization tradition, but goes 
further than noticing the peculiar institutional dynamic and/or the high number of Executive 
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decrees, attempting to establish some form of causality (Philip, 2003; Weffort, 1998). This 
literature had been developed mainly within the framework of institutionalism (Elster and 
Holmes, 1992; Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992), placing causal explanatory power on the 
formal configurations of state institutions: the Executive prevails over the Legislature simply 
because it holds significant constitutional powers that enable it to do so. Furthermore, in some 
countries these institutional resources are identical to those in place under the undemocratic 
regimes that preceded the emergence of democracy. 
The explanatory power of this literature is increased by linking institutions to political actors, 
such as party systems and legislative coalitions (Mainwaring, 1990, 1991, 1992-1993; 
Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Stark and Bruszt, 1998). Furthermore, this literature attempts to 
explain causality: Executives who confront bargaining problems in the Legislature will always 
tend to bypass them in order to promote their policy views. In the case of Latin America, 
Presidents who have constitutional powers that enable them to bypass the Congress will make 
use of them if the fragmented and polarized legislative coalitions are not capable of insuring 
stable legislative support for their policy promoted by NPL. This literature refrains from making 
any theoretical assertions about the nature of some new democracies on the simple notice of 
Executive prevalence over the Legislature. Its findings highlight the important role of formal 
political institutions and political parties in influencing the dynamic Executive-Legislature 
relation. Some applications of this literature to specific institutional and partisan settings 
furthered the understanding of the causes that encourage an  Executive to promote its policies by 
an excessive recourse to Decrees (Llanos, 2002; Mustapic and Goretti, 1991; Mustapic and 
Goretti, 1993; Mustapic and Ferreti, 1995; Palanza, 2005).  
The third strand of literature can broadly be summed up as also linking formal institutions 
and political actors, but commanding higher discriminatory power by employing a strong 
conceptual elaboration (Strøm, Müller and Bergman, 2003; Müller and Strøm, 2000). It also 
elaborately explains how the mechanisms of interaction between institutions and political actors 
influence policy outcomes. Although its focus is on European parliamentary systems, its 
conclusions can be applied to presidential systems as well, as I will show later.  
This advantage is due to two factors: the parsimonious conceptual elaboration linking 
accountability to delegation of policy power in the framework of Principal-Agent model (as I 
have explained in the chapter focusing on conceptual definition) and the linkage with a strand of 
66 
 
rational choice institutionalism that explains the behaviour of political actors when deciding on 
policy outcomes (Tsebelis, 1995, 2000, 2002; Deering and Maltzman, 1999). The major concern 
of this literature is the variation of policy outcomes within the same institutional configuration of 
power.  
Within this third strand of literature, but coming from the perspective of the transition and 
democratization literature, Carey and Shugart (1998) apply the logic of interaction between 
institutions and actors in order to explain why Legislatures prefer to grant Decree power to 
Executives when designing the Constitution, although the Decree power can be used by the 
Executive to undermine the legislative function of the Legislature. 
The major difference between the literature on democratic transition and consolidation 
(focusing on the new democracies) and the literature dealing with policy outcomes (focusing on 
the established democracies) is the significance associated with the dynamic relation between the 
Executive and the Legislature. The democratic transition and consolidation literature is 
concerned with how the relation between the Executive and the Legislature affects the 
consolidation of democracy. The literature focusing on consolidated democracies explains how 
the interaction between the Executive and the Legislature affects the policy outcomes. The 
excessive issuing of Executive decrees is treated accordingly.  
The first strand of literature associates the excessive use of decrees with a low level of 
democratic consolidation. Some of this literature (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999) does not 
explore the causes that lead to excessive Decree use or the treatment of Decrees in Legislature. It 
only assumes this practice is based on political culture. A variant of this literature goes further 
than noticing the large number of Decrees and explains causality through the interaction between 
institutional resources and political parties as legislative coalitions, rather than political culture 
(Mainwaring, 1990, 1991, 1992-1993; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Stark and Bruszt, 1998). 
The second strand of literature, which focuses on established democracies, is not concerned 
with Executive decree issuing per se, but explores the process of policy-making in the 
framework of delegation and accountability between the Legislature and the Executive. This is 
an appropriate conceptual framework for exploring the causes of an excessive issuing of 
Decrees. It explains systematically how the constitutionally granted decree power influences the 
Executive-Legislature relations across political systems in a variety of partisan legislative 
configurations.  
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I will next attempt to highlight the respective shortcomings of each one of the above strands 
of literature and show how they furthered our understanding of the dynamic relation between 
Executive and the Legislature. I will finally explain how and why this thesis is driven by the 
concerns of the literature on democratic transition and consolidation, but developed in the 
analytical framework of the literature explaining policy outcomes, as well as all the theoretical 
implications that derive from this positioning in the context of existing literature. 
 
 
2. Democratic transition and consolidation literature: the role of political 
culture 
 
 
The literature dealing with the democratic development of countries emerging from 
authoritarianism took notice of the prevalence of the Executive branch of government over 
Legislature through the issuing of a large number of emergency Executive decrees in some of the 
new democracies, particularly the Latin American ones. 
In this literature, the large number of Decrees is indicative of a manifest institutional 
weakness of the Legislature and a constant attempt of the Executive to undermine its proper 
functioning (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003). This literature is mostly concerned with the 
consolidation of democracy, and not necessarily with the process of policy-making. The 
Executive decrees are considered an indicator of a low Horizontal Balance Accountability 
(HBA) as defined in the previous chapter (O’Donnell, 2003), representing an infringement with 
the principle of power separation within the State, since the Executives invade the institutional 
prerogatives of Legislatures when legislating directly through the use of Decree. 
The most serious shortcoming of this strand of literature is the theoretical conclusion that it 
draws using the concept of accountability through conceptual stretching (as I have argued in the 
chapter focusing on concept formation): the prevalence of the Executive branch of government 
over the Legislature is caused by political culture and is the major feature of a new type of 
democracy in itself, labelled “delegative” (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003).  
This literature attempted to define a new theory of democracy, comprehensive in nature, 
which would systematically explain the functioning of a “delegative” democracy. The backbone 
68 
 
of its argument is that existing democratic theories focus entirely on subtypes of representative 
democracy, while some new democracies have different characteristics than the liberal 
democratic regimes of the Western hemisphere. 
In a “delegative” democracy, whoever wins the elections can govern as he or she sees fit, the 
holder of the Executive office (i.e., presidential office) being the embodiment of the nation. From 
this perspective, the involvement of society in politics is minimal. It is reduced to the act of 
casting the ballot in regularly held elections. Beyond this symbolic act of delegation of power, 
the society is expected to become a passive but cheering audience for the Executive branch of 
government, i.e., Presidents across Latin America. Once in office, the presidential agenda need 
not bear any resemblance to electoral promises. The public allegedly gives a blank cheque to the 
President to bypass democratic institutions, such as Courts and Legislatures, if they attempt to 
constrain the presidential political action.  
This literature implies that voters perceive this state of affairs as normal and adopt it as 
common practice, based on the assumption that the relation between individuals and politics, 
particularly focusing on the President, is characterized by “delegation” of power and authority. 
An important point ought to be emphasized here: according to this literature, the “delegation” of 
power is the only way of conceiving the political life that can be developed by the populace of 
newly democratized country, given its social and political legacies.  
This perspective bears a strong cultural connotation13. The concept of delegative democracy 
is applied to society as a whole, attempting to capture and describe a collective behaviour, 
allegedly generated by political culture, and not by the rational behaviour of individuals who 
make political choices according to their personal interests.  
In order to support its theoretical claims, this literature refers to practices and conceptions 
about the proper exercise of political power in Latin America, which lead in the direction of 
“delegative”, not liberal, representative democracy. These practices and conceptions are 
allegedly based on a culture of hierarchy and providential exercise of authority, where strong and 
populist politicians portray themselves (and are perceived as such by public) as the saviours of 
the country (salvadores de la patria), the only ones capable of solving its problems. Once elected, 
                                                 
13 I will use the concept of political culture as a set of “attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and 
attitudes toward the role of the self in the system.” (Almond and Verba, 1963). This set of attitudes influences the 
ways in which political elites make decisions, as well as the relation of the ordinary citizen to the government and to 
his or her fellow citizens. 
69 
 
the populist leaders of Latin America have always ruled in complete separation from society, in 
an unconstrained manner, as long as the public trusted them with power and authority, while 
considering this leadership style as entirely legitimate. 
This perspective on Latin American politics goes along the same lines as the existing 
literature on the unique authoritarian culture of the region. This culture is allegedly based on 
elitism (people are not born equal and only elites should rule), authoritarianism (an 
overwhelmingly predominant Executive power stemming from a tradition of strong leaders) and 
patrimonialism (a system of mutual obligations and exchange of favours that breeds 
particularism and corruption) (Wiarda and Kline, 1990).  
The Executive power relentlessly attempts to undermine whatever horizontal accountability 
does exist, in its effort to rule unconstrained. The Congress is bypassed with Executive decrees, 
and the Courts of Justice are manipulated for political and personal purposes. The Executive 
weakens other State institutions and is not accountable to any of them; it invades their legal 
authority and diminishes their prestige. Once deprived of real power and responsibility, 
institutions will act in ways that seem to confirm the reasons adduced for this deprivation: 
particularism becomes even more rampant in Congress and political parties, the Courts fail to 
administer justice, and agencies of control are eliminated or reduced to passivity. Legislatures 
cease to translate individual preferences into public policies, while the failure of the Court 
system leads to outright illegalities in the administration of justice (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996). 
The model of “delegative” democracy leaves unanswered a few important questions. What is 
the significance of a large number of Decrees, if not compared to the volume of Executive-
initiated NPL? Can we consider a large volume of issued Decrees that are highly amended or 
rejected in Legislature an indicator of low Executive accountability? What is more appropriate 
for making theoretical claims about the significance of Executive accountability: a large volume 
of issued Decrees that are highly amended and rejected or a significantly lower volume of issued 
Decrees that have a high success-rate and no amendments at all? 
What is needed here is a more meaningful way of interpreting governance by Executive 
decree. In order to establish if a country is indeed ruled by Decree and approximate the policy-
making intentions of the Executive one needs to establish the volume of Executive decrees 
compared to normal procedure legislative initiatives (NPL). It becomes irrelevant if an Executive 
issued a large number of Emergency decrees if it also initiated significantly more legislative 
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proposals through normal procedure (NPL).  
This particular strand of literature on democratic transition and consolidation does capture 
and accurately describe an institutional behaviour emergent in different political systems and in 
countries that have different past experiences with democracy: an attempt of the Executive 
branch of government to prevail over the Legislature in the process of policy-making through 
issuing a large number of Executive decrees under the pretence of extraordinary circumstances.  
 
 
3. A different literature approach: the role of political structure 
 
 
The democratic transition and consolidation literature offers an improved understanding of 
Executives prevailing over the Legislatures, particularly through the use of Executive decrees. 
Mainwaring (1990, 1991, 1992-1993) has identified all the conditions that lead to a tendency of 
the Executive (Latin American Presidents in particular) to bypass the Legislatures (Congresses in 
Latin America).  
The “democratic consolidation” literature, as well as the grand theoretical debate of 
“presidential vs.. parliamentary” regimes and their respective capacity to uphold democracy, 
diverted the scholarly attention from already existing analyses of the institutional and political 
determinants of Executive accountability in relation to the Legislature in new democracies.  
Presidential regimes lead to conflict and instability only in the presence of fragmented 
Legislatures, not necessarily because of their conflict prone nature (Mainwaring 1990, 1991, 
1992-1993). The partisan congressional fragmentation is the outcome of multiparty democracy 
and proportional representation electoral system. Latin American presidents having strong 
constitutional powers will tend to bypass the Congress if faced with fragmented legislative 
coalitions, undisciplined or polarized political parties. The President can prevail over the 
Congress particularly when granted constitutional veto power on the decisions of the Congress. 
The exploration of the Brazilian political system is revealing in this sense (Mainwaring, 1991, 
1992-1993). 
Following the argument elaborated by Mainwaring (1990, 1991, 1992-1993), a number of 
authors improved our understanding of Executive-Legislature relations and the capacity of the 
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latter to hold accountable the former. 
Jones et al. (2000, 2002) explain the low level of Executive accountability in Argentina by 
showing why the Argentine Congress is a weak institution in relation to the President: it has poor 
constitutional resources, while the legislators have low incentives to invest in it as an institution, 
because their careers are under the control of local political party bosses, who are the gatekeepers 
of the closed PR electoral lists. The immediate outcome of this partisan control is short 
congressional careers, which do not provide any incentive to strengthen the Argentine Congress 
in its specific interaction with the President.  
However, this literature provides a static view of Executive-Legislature relations. It does not 
take into account the attempts of the Argentine members of the Congress to change the policies 
of the President. Despite the poor institutional resources and the control of party leaders over 
legislators’ careers, the Argentine Congress does attempt to hold the President to account, albeit 
with varying degrees of success (Llanos, 2001). 
Improving the above explanation, Bruszt (2000: 212-213) shows that across-time variation in 
the level of Executive accountability to the Parliament in the Czech Republic had been 
determined by the polarization of the governing coalition, the bargaining power of the major 
Executive coalition partner, the cohesion of the legislative opposition, institutional design and 
popularity of the incumbent Executive. The Czech Executive headed by Vaclav Klaus ruled in a 
manner more accountable to the Parliament in the first part of the 1990s, than in the second part 
of the decade.  
During his first mandate, Klaus’ party had a small number of seats in the Legislature, giving 
it a low bargaining power in relation to its coalition partners, in a polarized Executive coalition. 
Adding to the incentives to compromise and leading to more Executive accountability, the upper 
house of the Legislature had veto power on legislation, a resource which could be easily used 
against the Executive by the united opposition and/or potentially resentful coalition partners.  
After the separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics, the incumbent Executive was less 
accountable, given its increased popularity due to success in implementing economic reforms, 
the absence of an upper house of the Czech Parliament that would have ensured a diverse 
societal representation, and a very fragmented opposition in the Legislature.  
These examples from a new Eastern European democracy explain the variation in the level of 
Executive accountability to the Legislature as the outcome of a specific interaction between the 
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political parties and the institutional system.  
With a similar approach, scholars working on Latin America (Carey and Shugart, 1998) in 
particular those working on Argentina (Rubbio Fereirra and Goretti, 1998; Mustapic, 2002; 
Llanos, 2001) were the first to focus on the use of Decrees and their treatment in the Legislature 
as a measure of Executive accountability.  
The potential for deadlock between the Executive and the Legislature is high, given the 
divided government (the electoral system leads to problematic configurations of power in the 
Congress, making it very difficult to obtain a majority), the complicated institutional design 
(many veto gates at the level of congressional Committees, the necessity of a quorum to pass 
legislation), the political party system (highly decentralized with a significant control of local 
party leaders over legislators’ careers, frequent internal party realignments, strong ideological 
identity). The Executive tends to overcome the legislative deadlock through excessive issuing of 
Decrees, particularly in times of economic crisis, when swift action is required to bring the 
situation back under control. As soon as the crisis had been overcome, in some countries 
legislators acting in allegiance to strong ideological party identity opposed the Executive when 
its policies ran counter to the partisan policy preferences. 
 
 
4. Accountability across political systems: a model of comparison 
 
 
Comparing countries with different political and partisan systems, as well as with different 
experiences with democracy, poses theoretical and methodological difficulties. I will next review 
that literature that addressed these difficulties. 
In their extensive study of established parliamentary democracies, Strøm, Müller and 
Bergman (2003) developed a conceptual and theoretical framework of accountability that 
surmounts the difficulties of existing literature in systematically capturing and explaining the 
complex interaction between Executive and the Legislature according to the capacity of the latter 
to hold accountable the former. I argue that this theoretical framework can be extended to cover 
presidential regimes as well, through crossbreeding with rational choice models explaining how 
the behaviour of partisan and institutional veto-players influences the interaction between 
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Executive and the Legislature as well as the influence on the process of policy-making (Tsebelis, 
1995, 2000, 2002).  
The combination of different strands of literature is not a novelty. The need to combine 
different approaches in order to overcome shortcomings is emphasized by Heritier (1998: 35) 
and Thelen (1999), while Elster (1979) offers a two-filter model as an analytical tool that links 
rational choice theory and institutional analysis: in the first instance the structural constraints, 
such as political institutions, reduce the universe of possible decision alternatives available to a 
political actor to a "feasible set", while in the second instance the actor chooses one alternative 
from the feasible set. This simple model highlights how state activities and structures offer 
specific elements of rationality for the political agent (Hall, 1997; Heritier, 1998: 35).  
According to the institutional veto-player model, the Executive has available two 
constitutional resources to promote its policy views in Legislature: the Decree issued under the 
pretence of urgency and necessity and legislative proposals forwarded to the Legislature through 
normal procedure (NPL). As I will show later, the Executive will choose the resource which 
offers a higher prospect of success if it confronts bargaining problems in the Legislature. 
 The merits of parliamentary government had been explored from three different perspectives 
motivated by three substantive concerns (Strøm, et al, 2003: 15): regime stability, policy outputs 
and their fit to citizen preferences, as well as the dynamic of the process of governance. Strøm et 
al (2003) can be located within the framework of parliamentary vs. presidential debate as being 
concerned with the dynamic of the process of governance, rather than regime stability or policy 
outputs and their fit to citizens’ preferences. 
The first approach rigidly separates the parliamentary systems from the presidential systems 
as a function of their formal/legal features in order to compare their respective merits in 
upholding the stability of democracy. The second approach maintains the same formal/legal rigid 
distinction, but adds subtypes of presidential and parliamentary systems in order to differentiate 
within each category.  
The third approach however stands out compared with the first two, in that established 
formal/legal distinctions between parliamentary and presidential regimes are less consequential 
than other differences (Strøm, 2003: 15), as I will show. 
The most representative author for the first approach is Juan Linz (1994), who argued that the 
rigidity of the presidential and congressional terms in presidential regimes makes it impossible 
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for citizens (Principals) to change their Agents (President and Congress) even under conditions 
of deadlock, divided government, or any kind of crisis of governability. This situation had been 
considered as having a high potential for democratic breakdown. The merits of parliamentary 
regimes reside in the constitutional provision enabling the Legislature to remove the Executive 
power once it lost the support of the parliamentary majority.  
Various authors writing from this perspective gave credit to either one of the two systems. 
The regime survival rate among proportional representation parliamentary democracies is 
significantly higher than in presidential regimes (Colomer, 2001: 213), while other studies 
argued that presidential regimes provide timely and efficient governance (Shugart and Carey, 
1992; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). 
While the concern with regime stability had its particular relevance for the new democracies, 
the concern with policy outcomes and their fit to citizens’ interests came from advanced 
industrial democracies which perceive the regime instability as a less serious threat (Strøm, 
2003: 16). Scholars writing from this perspective focus on those dimensions that transcend the 
presidential-parliamentary distinction, such as proportional representation and majority 
representation. Powell (2000) shows that proportional representation allows for the formation of 
governments that are closer to the median citizen’s preferences. Within his classification, the US 
presidential regime is classified as “mixed” because of the combined effects of a single member 
plurality electoral system, low party discipline, and separation of powers institutions. 
Lijphart (1995, 1999) argued that what he called “consensus” democracies (parliamentary 
government and proportional representation elections) are almost equal to majority systems 
(presidential systems and parliamentary systems with majority elections) in terms of macro-
economic performance, but clearly outperform the latter in terms representation of minority 
groups or income equality. 
This emphasis on the combination of regime type and political party system represents a step 
forward in crossing the formal/legal boundaries among regime types, while attempting 
comparison. It becomes obvious that some types of presidential regimes are closer to some types 
of parliamentary regimes, a function of specific elements other than formal constitutional 
provisions, such as electoral system, party system, party discipline or coalition types. 
The third major focus in the contemporary debate over presidential and parliamentary 
systems looks at the process of governance and the dynamic of the actual process of policy-
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making, not necessarily at the policy outcomes. The major questions are how decisions are made, 
what factors influence the policy-making negotiation and how these factors affect the level of 
Executive accountability in relation to the Legislature. Strøm et al (2003) develop their model of 
delegation and accountability within this strand of literature.  
Moe and Caldwell (1994) show that parliamentary systems outperform presidential ones with 
regard to policy efficiency, in that legislators have incentives to respond to the demands of 
interest groups. In presidential systems, the demands of the interest groups are dealt with by 
governmental agencies. The interest groups prefer to insulate the government agencies from 
democratic control by lobbying for the overregulation of these agencies, therefore rendering 
them inefficient. In contrast, Westminster-type parliamentary democracies prevent such 
encroachments by efficient action of any new parliamentary majority which can annul the 
existing regulations. Moe and Caldwell (1994) focus only on US-type presidential regimes and 
Westminster-type parliamentary regimes, but this literature does concede that coalitional 
parliamentary systems have strong similarities to presidential ones. This indicates that the 
transgression of boundaries between presidential and parliamentary regimes is a feasible option 
for comparison purposes, as long as they are compared according to the functions they perform 
and the mechanisms of performance. 
Weaver and Rockman (1993) attempt to explain the act of governance and efficiency of 
policy-making process by three major factors: formal constitutional provisions (presidential vs. 
parliamentary), regime and government type (multiparty coalitions versus alternating single-
party government versus dominant-party government), and institutional features such as 
federalism, bicameralism, judicial review and non-institutional features, such as political culture. 
Their conclusion is that, “the effects of specific institutional arrangements are neither uniform, 
nor unidirectional” (Weaver and Rockman, 1993: 454). 
Along the same line of reasoning, Eaton (2000) looks at the effects of veto-players, the 
visibility of policy negotiations, the accountability of individual office holders, interest group 
strategies and delegation to bureaucrats, concluding that the differences between presidential and 
parliamentary regimes “tend to wash out” (Eaton, 2000: 371) when variation within each regime 
type is considered. 
Tsebelis (1995, 2000, 2002) provides the most simple and parsimonious theoretical 
framework allowing for comparison among different political regimes, presidential or 
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parliamentary of any type. He argues that the main explanatory factor determining the dynamic 
of policy-making and the Executive-Legislature relations is the number of veto-players: 
presidential regimes tend to have more veto-players than parliamentary ones, while the formal 
distinction presidential-parliamentary becomes epiphenomenal (Strøm et al., 2003: 18). The 
conclusion is that systems with few and ideologically homogenous veto-players are more 
conducive to policy change, whereas those with more and ideologically heterogeneous veto-
players are more prone to deadlock and tension. 
To sum up, comparing across political systems is a feasible research strategy as long as one 
distances from the traditional debate on the merits of parliamentary vs. presidential regimes. I 
had shown that the initial focus of this debate, namely regime stability, is of no use when 
attempting to evaluate relations of accountability between the Executive and the Legislature in 
the process of policy-making. I had also shown that once the focus of research is on policy 
outputs, it comes closer to the purpose of this thesis, namely comparing across regime types by 
introducing subtypes and diminishing the presidential-parliamentary differences.  
Retaining the regime subtypes, but changing the research focus to the process of policy-
making itself, which implies both institutional structures and political actors, the differences 
between presidential and parliamentary systems become epiphenomenal, thus allowing for 
comparison across regime types as afunction of their respective capacity to uphold the principle 
of accountability in the process of policy-making.  
By briefly reviewing Tsebelis (1995, 2000, 2002), I have already shown the importance of 
finding the lowest common causal denominator across regime types: the number and nature of 
veto-players.  
I will next show that relations of accountability require a similar logic of analysis, placing 
explanatory emphasis on the dynamic interaction between political actors and institutional 
structures. However, what is needed is a theoretical framework that would systematically explain 
the dynamic of accountability relations across political systems.   
I will address this research problem in the next subsection by reviewing the model put forth 
by Strøm et al. (2003), in order to explain relations of accountability in parliamentary regimes. 
As I have already mentioned, I will extend the finding of this particular model to presidential 
regimes following the logic of Tsebelis (1995, 2000, and 2002).  
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5. The influence of partisan and institutional veto-players on the Executive 
accountability 
 
 
As I have explained in the previous chapter focusing on the conceptualization of 
accountability, the Congress has a democratic mandate from voters to hold the President to 
account (although the Congress is not the Principal of the President), only in a different manner 
than in the parliamentary systems. The differences across systems are epiphenomenal as far as 
delegation and accountability are concerned. Both systems display the same functions of 
accountability, with a difference in degree and the accompanying mechanisms of imposition. 
Furthermore, in both presidential and parliamentary systems political parties perform the same 
function, only in different ways. They structure the Executive-Legislature arena in different 
ways, according to the constraints imposed by the constitutional design, but with the ultimate 
purpose of reaching policy decisions (Strøm, 2003: 69).  
Out of two types of Executive accountability (ex ante and ex post), the weakness of the latter 
lies with the political parties (Strøm, 2003: 73). If the partisan legislative coalitions are 
supportive of the Executive, the outcome is low ex post accountability. This relationship is 
stronger in countries with parliamentary systems, since the legislative majority has no incentives 
to undermine its own cabinet. 
However, when the partisan coalitions supporting the Executive are fragmented and 
polarized, indiscipline and coalition bickering can lead to very unstable legislative support. The 
same kind of low Executive accountability emerges equally in strong and supportive coalitions 
(such as a coalition with two ideologically close parties, where one senior partner has strong 
bargaining power over one junior partner) and in weak, fragmented and unstable coalitions (such 
as a coalition with five ideologically polarized parties, where none of the partners has any 
bargaining power over the others).  
Inter-coalitional bargaining logic is highly instrumental in understanding the congressional 
support for the Argentine president Carlos Menem in the mid 1990s, when his own party held 
more than 50% of the seats on the Argentine Congress. The president’s own party had a long 
history of factionalism. Various partisan factions behaved differently and adopted different 
bargaining strategies in exchange for their legislative support, according to strong local party 
leaders’ interests. 
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Political parties appear to be pivotal in influencing the dynamic of delegation and 
accountability. Their ability to capture and disperse the policy agenda is considered an indicator 
of their cohesiveness (Strøm et al., 2003: 651), which is influenced by the institutional system 
and type of party system. The stronger the cohesiveness of the political parties, the stronger their 
capacity to activate the accountability mechanisms (Strøm et al., 2003: 652). Given that citizens 
are directly voting for political parties and entrust them with control the Executive, the stronger 
the disconnection of parties from society, the weaker their cohesiveness and capacity to hold the 
Executive to account. 
Political parties have many facets that contribute to their effectiveness as instruments of 
citizen’s control over the policy-making process and other state institutions, such as the 
Executive. Strøm et al. (2003: 654) built on V.O. Key’s (1964) conception of party features 
(party in the electorate, the party organization, and the party in government) and proposed to 
measure the cohesiveness of the party system by measuring each one of these three features. 
They are considered mutually interdependent aspects of modern political parties. 
Therefore, measuring the cohesiveness of the political party system will also offer an 
accurate measure for the level of accountability: electoral party strength, organizational party 
strength, party in government strength. The lower the scores in these three dimensions, the 
weaker the cohesiveness of political parties, the lower the accountability of the Executive in 
relation to the Legislature. 
One further clarification ought to be made. The third feature, namely party in government, is 
specific of parliamentary democracies. This is explained by the exclusive concern with this type 
of system (Strøm et al., 2003).  
However, I argue that in presidential systems in which the Congress has a high level of 
partisan fragmentation the logic of party government holds equally as in parliamentary 
democracies. The President has to ensure the support of the Congress for his or her policy-
making initiatives: the more homogeneous the congressional coalition supporting the President 
(less parties and lower polarization), the more likely the support for the President’s policy 
initiatives, after eventual policy negotiation. The only major difference is the incapacity of the 
congressional coalitions to remove the President from power. As far as policy decisions are 
concerned, the logic of legislative coalitions in multiparty presidential systems is the same as the 
logic of party government in parliamentary democracies.  
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Thus far I have reviewed the literature dealing with Executive-Legislature relations and 
showed that focusing on how decision-making mechanisms affect inter-branch relations, and 
therefore policy outputs, is more instrumental in evaluating Executive accountability function of 
Executive decrees than any other perspective (regime stability or policy quality). Within this 
strand of literature, I had shown that political parties, electoral systems and formal constitutional 
arrangements are the most decisive factors influencing how the decision-making mechanisms 
function and therefore how the policy decisions are made.  
Furthermore, I had shown how Strøm et al. (2003) soundly explain the dynamic of the 
interaction of these three decisive factors when exploring relations of accountability in 
parliamentary systems. I had complemented their argument by showing that the same interaction 
seems to be present in presidential systems as well. 
One question might legitimately arise: how does this interaction play out in presidential 
systems? Do parties, electoral systems and constitutional arrangements interact differently 
outside a universe of case studies exclusively made of parliamentary democracies? The only 
factor out of all the three identified that is truly different in presidential systems is the third one, 
namely the formal constitutional arrangements defining the inter-institutional relations. The main 
question is then if this difference is influential enough to alter the interaction found in 
parliamentary systems. 
The veto-player model provides a sound answer to the above question, explaining how 
political parties, electoral systems and formal constitutional arrangements interact with each 
other across political systems in determining how decisions are reached (Tsebelis, 1995, 2000, 
2002). The model allows for comparison across political systems in order to account for the 
features that are conducive to policy change. This concern with policy outcomes has a particular 
methodological relevance, as I will show later. Focusing on policy outcomes that exhibit 
variation across political systems but also within the same political system can be highly 
instrumental in establishing causality regardless of the nature of the political system. Although 
this literature explores “the capacity to produce policy change” (Tsebelis, 1995: 289), it might as 
well be renamed capacity to reach policy decisions, as long as mutually agreed decisions among 
political actors are the base of any policy change. 
Veto-players are defined as “individual or collective actors whose agreement (by majority 
rule for collective actors) is required for a change of status quo”. Two veto-player categories are 
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identified: institutional and partisan veto-players (Tsebelis, 1995: 289). Institutions (Congress, 
President) act as veto-players only in presidential regimes, while partisan veto-players are 
present “at least” in parliamentary systems.  
I will supplement these findings by showing that institutional veto-players are also present in 
parliamentary systems (Parliament, Cabinet), only functioning differently than in presidential 
systems, while partisan veto-players follow the same logic of action in multiparty presidential 
systems as in parliamentary systems. As far as partisan veto-players are concerned, Westminster-
type systems, dominant party systems and single party minority governments have only one 
veto-player, while coalitions in parliamentary systems, presidential or federal systems have 
multiple partisan veto-players.  
The main argument is that the potential for reaching decisions decreases with the number of 
veto-players, their lack of congruence (dissimilarity of policy positions among veto-players), the 
cohesion of veto-players (similarity of policy positions among the units of each veto-player). 
The focus of this thesis on Executive accountability in relation to the Legislature’s function 
of issuing and treatment of Executive decrees is highly amenable to the model of institutional 
and partisan veto-players. Executive decrees are policy-making instruments that reflect particular 
inter-branch institutional configurations of power and the capacity of legislative coalitions 
defined in terms of partisan veto-players to use the inter-branch configurations of power in order 
to influence the policy-making process. 
Exploring the interaction among partisan veto-players and their bargaining strategies as part 
of legislative coalitions that support or oppose the policy initiatives of the Executive can provide 
the formal model for understanding why the Executive issues Decrees when confronted with 
weak (fragmented and polarized) legislative coalitions, but also when confronted with strong 
(low number of parties that are ideologically cohesive) legislative coalitions.  
Furthermore, the logic of the institutional veto-player model requires the exploration of the 
constitutional provisions allocated to the Executive and to the Legislature, defining under what 
conditions Decrees can be issued, the decision-making power of the Legislature on the Executive 
decrees and the veto power of the Executive on the decision of the Legislature, explaining the 
level of Executive accountability to the Legislature (amending and rejection rates of Decrees).  
It becomes important to highlight that political parties relate to the Executive from the 
legislative benches only as part of coalitions formed according to ideological proximities and 
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available options based on the number of coalition partners (De Swaan and Mokken, 1980: 199; 
Riker, 1962). The coalitional dynamic determines how the coalition partners will make use of the 
resources granted to the Legislature by the Constitution or set out in the parliamentary rules of 
procedure. I will explain later the legislative coalition types that are theoretically relevant for the 
purpose of this thesis. 
It had been claimed that a low ex post Executive accountability is the outcome of legislative 
coalitions of parties that are supportive of the Executive (Strøm, 2003: 73). This relationship 
holds even stronger in parliamentary regimes, since the parliamentary majorities have no 
incentives to undermine their own cabinet by using specific legislative resources (motions of 
censorship, amending or rejection of Executive legislative initiatives, etc.). 
However, I argue that when the political party coalitions supporting the Executive are 
fragmented and polarized, indiscipline and coalition bickering can lead to very unstable support, 
and legislative deadlock. “Supportive” or “unsupportive” coalitions appear to be a matter of 
inter-coalitional bargaining, and not necessarily of similar political identity to the Executive. 
Political identity convergence between the legislative majority and the Executive can indeed 
facilitate an increased cooperation between the two branches of government but does not 
guarantee it.14 This holds even stronger in multiparty democracies with the PR electoral system, 
either presidential or parliamentary, where the partisan fragmentation rarely leads to stable 
legislative support.  
I place the argument of this thesis within the partisan and institutional veto-player model 
explaining how policy decisions are made. The formal institutional configuration of power (set in 
the Constitution and parliamentary rules of procedure) and the informal partisan configuration of 
power (provided by the types of legislative coalitions generated by specific party systems) 
interact with each other and determine how decisions are reached (Tsebelis, 1995, 2000, 2002).  
In the context of this thesis, partisan veto-players are the political parties that form the 
legislative coalitions supporting the Executive. The behaviour of each coalition partner is 
conditioned by its importance in the coalition and by the coalition structure itself. According to 
the assumptions of the veto-player model, the more fragmented and polarized a legislative 
coalition (high number of veto-players), the more difficult it is to reach a policy decision. 
                                                 
14 The Executive instability in Italy due intra-coalitional bargaining in a fragmented and polarized Legislature is 
thoroughly explored by Mershon (2002) and Cotta and Verzichelli (1996). 
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I argue that governance by Decree is a rational policy promotion strategy of the Executive 
branch of government when the configuration of partisan veto-players in the Legislature leads to 
legislative coalitions that are either incapable of holding the Executive to account (fragmented 
and polarized) or simply unwilling to do so (based on the solid majority of one partner in the 
presence of ideologically close or ideologically disinterested partners). Three types of legislative 
coalitions can be formed according to the partisan veto-player model:  
 
• TYPE 1: “Weak” coalitions exhibiting a high number of veto-players (i.e., fragmented 
and polarized coalitions with many parties that are ideologically distant from each other 
and no major coalition partner).  
o This type of coalition cannot reach negotiated policy decisions, given its structure. 
The immediate outcome is legislative deadlock and the tendency of the Executive 
to overcome it by promoting its policy views by Decrees. 
 
• TYPE 2: “Dictatorial” coalitions exhibiting a low number of veto-players (i.e., low 
fragmentation and polarization with a small number of parties, in which one major 
coalition partner can impose its policy views on the junior partners) (Peleg, 1981).  
o This type of coalition does not have to negotiate policy decisions, given its 
structure. The immediate outcome is a “dictatorial” Executive promoting policy 
by Decree since it has no accountability constraints from the more junior partners 
on negotiation. 
 
• TYPE 3: “Balanced” coalitions exhibiting a moderate number of veto-players (i.e., 
moderate fragmentation and polarization coalitions with an average number of parties 
and a major coalition partner that cannot impose its views upon the junior partners). 
o This type of coalition must negotiate policy decisions and its structure allows it to 
successfully conclude negotiations. The immediate outcome is an Executive 
promoting legislation through normal procedure legislative proposals rather than 
Decrees. 
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In the context of this thesis, the term “institutional veto-players” refers to the policy-powers 
of each one of the two branches of government to propose and control the policy agenda15. The 
branch that can institutionally veto the other’s policy views (and therefore evade any attempt to 
negotiate policy) will prevail in case of divergence.  
The whole debate about strong-weak Presidents (or Executives for that matter) becomes 
irrelevant (Frye, 1999). The only powers of the Executive branch  relevant for the veto-player 
model are the policy-making ones. Presidents considered “strong” because of their non-policy 
powers (controlling the armed forces, dissolving the Legislature in extraordinary circumstances, 
asking for referendums, declaring states of emergency, appointing or dismissing the government, 
etc.), might as well be considered weak in terms of proposing and controlling the policy agenda 
(Tsebelis, 1995: 306).  
I further argue that governance by Decree becomes a successful policy promotion strategy 
(high rate of success and low/inexistent amending rate) when the configuration of institutional 
veto power between the Executive and the Legislature favours the former. The stronger the 
institutional veto power of the Executive, the higher the success-rate and lower the amending 
rate of the Decree. The stronger the institutional veto-player power of the Legislature, the higher 
the amending and rejection rates of Decrees. 
Two legal features determine the configuration of institutional veto power in favour of one or 
the other branch of government across political systems as far as the Decree is concerned (and 
therefore its success and amending rates): 
 
1. its legal status: 
o the Decree can be a special legislative proposal that requires compulsory debate 
and decision in the Legislature (strong institutional veto-power in favour of 
Legislature). 
o the Decree can be a de facto law issued by the Executive that does not require 
debate and decision in the Legislature (strong institutional veto-power in favour 
of the Executive). This situation is encountered when the Constitution does not 
                                                 
15 I introduce this finer-grained distinction between proposing the policy agenda and actually controlling it in order 
to capture the varying degrees of Executive involvement in the legislative process; i.e., the Italian Executive has the 
power to propose any policy issue it deems necessary in its joint meetings with the heads of the parliamentary 
groups when the policy agenda is decided, but the formal configuration of this joint agenda-setting body allows it 
little room for manoeuvre in influencing the final decisions of what stays on the agenda and in what form. 
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clearly specify the legal status of the Decree, combined with a favourable 
interpretation on the part of the Justice system that endorses the constitutional 
limbo.  
2. the conditions under which a Decree can be amended in the Legislature: 
o tacit rejection: the Decree lapses (although it generates legal effects for a limited 
period) if the Legislature does not discuss and decide on it within a 
constitutionally defined deadline (strong institutional veto-power in favour of 
Legislature). 
o tacit approval: the Decree automatically becomes law if not discussed and decided 
on within a constitutionally defined deadline (strong institutional veto-power in 
favour of Executive). 
o the strength of Executive veto on the decision of the Legislature16: 
 the Executive can/cannot veto the decision of the Legislature on a Decree. 
 the Executive veto is easy/difficult to override. 
 
The above legal features that define a Decree combine differently in different institutional 
systems, setting the strength of Executive power when using this constitutional resource (and 
therefore the level of Executive accountability to the Legislature’s function of Decree success 
and amending rates). 
From this perspective, I argue that governance by Decree becomes not only a rational policy 
promotion strategy, but also a successful one, when the configuration of institutional veto power 
between the Executive and the Legislature favours the former. If the formal configuration of 
power grants the Executive total agenda-setting powers allowing it unilaterally to prevail in the 
policy-making process through the use of Decrees17, then the coalition types described above are 
                                                 
16 The strength of the Executive veto on the decision of the Legislature varies from country to country. The 
Executive can veto the decisions of Legislatures in some countries, whereas it cannot in other countries. The veto of 
the Executive in a certain country can be easily overridden by the Legislature, whereas the veto power of the 
Executive in another country is very difficult to override. The capacity of the Legislature to override the Executive 
veto is given by the constitutional requirements regarding the number of votes necessary for such action: some 
Constitutions require a low (easy to assemble) number of legislative votes, other Constitutions require a high 
number of votes (such as 2/3 majorities), very difficult to achieve particularly when the electoral system produces 
highly fragmented Legislatures with a high level of ideological polarization. 
17 This would be a situation where the Constitution defines the Executive decree as not requiring a decision in the 
Legislature to act as a full law and to be treated as such by the Court system of the country, while being extremely 
difficult (or outright impossible) to reject or amend in Legislature. 
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relevant only in explaining the need to issue Decrees, but not in explaining the excessive issuing 
of Decrees (made necessary by the bargaining problems the Executive confronts in Legislature). 
The stronger the institutional veto-player power of the Executive when using Decrees, the more 
likely the Executive will issue Decrees excessively, namely more Decrees than necessary given 
the specific bargaining problems. 
The bargaining problems confronted by Executive in the Legislature lead to different 
legislative strategies of the former and the subsequent choice of resources used to promote its 
policy views. Confronted with a fragmented and polarized Parliament, the Italian Consiglio dei 
Ministri issued an increasingly high number of Decreti Legge (DL) throughout the decades since 
December 1947, given the increasing difficulty of passing legislative proposals through normal 
procedure (NPL). Despite the increasingly high rate of issuing, the Italian DL are frequently 
rejected and amended, given the ample institutional veto-powers the Italian Parliament has in 
relation to the Executive, as far as DL are concerned (it might not be necessarily true for other 
types of Executive-Legislature interactions in Italy). 
The same bargaining problem the Executive faces in the Legislature emerges equally in 
Argentina and Romania, as I will show later. The recourse to Decrees and their subsequent 
treatment in the Legislature sets the level of Executive accountability according to the 
institutional veto-player resources attributed to each branch of government. As I will show later, 
the Argentine and Romanian Executives solve their bargaining problems in relation to the 
Legislatures by using the same agenda-setting resource (the Decree) but with different outcomes 
to the Italian Executive, given their different institutional veto-player powers. 
The branch that has more institutional veto powers on the other’s legislative proposals is 
likely to see its policy views prevailing in case of divergence. This should not preclude the 
possibility of intense policy bargaining between the Executive and the Legislature. 
The veto-player structures (partisan and institutional) provide a good understanding of how 
political parties and formal constitutional arrangements interact with each other across political 
systems in determining how decisions are taken. Mapping out Executive-Legislative relations as 
a function of partisan and institutional veto-players allows for comparison across regimes types, 
while highlighting the importance of the dynamic interaction between institutional and partisan 
policy-making structures for the problems confronted by the new democracies (Tsebelis, 1995). 
The partisan and institutional veto-players model provides the lowest common denominator 
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across political systems, since any legislative coalition can be defined according to its structure 
and its capacity to reach decisions (with or without negotiation), while any formal institutional 
configuration of power can be defined according to how it distributes power resources between 
the Executive and the Legislature through the definition of the Decree and the conditions of its 
legislative treatment. 
In what follows, I will explore the causes of Executive decree issuing and the level of 
Executive accountability to the Legislature’s function of Decree rejection and amending rates in 
each country case. I will also compare country cases in the last section of the next chapter.  
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V. THE EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF COUNTRY 
CASES: EXECUTIVE DECREES AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
ACROSS POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
 
 
Italy: high Decree issuing and high Executive accountability  
 
 
Motto: “Regarding the conditions that can lead to an Executive constantly issuing decrees… There are mainly two 
instances. The first instance is a strong, authoritarian Executive, which defies the opposition. The second instance is 
a weak Executive, which constantly has to confront not only the opposition, but also its own internal dissent, an 
Executive which issues decrees in an attempt to hold together the majority that supports it, or should support it; 
otherwise the internal contradictions would explode”. 
Italian MP Machiavelli, Atti, VI Legislatura, p. 4419, quoted in Cazzola (1975: 13). 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: the first section explores the influence of legislative 
coalitions supporting or opposing the policy initiatives of the Italian Executive on the propensity 
of the latter to issue Decreti Legge (or DL, the Italian name of the Executive Decree exercised 
based on constitutional decree authority). I argue that the internal divisions of the Italian parties, 
as well as the high fragmentation and polarization of the party system, create the need for the 
Executive to overcome the ensuing legislative instability by issuing DL.  
The second section will present the formal legal status of the DL in Italy before and after the 
constitutional reform of 1996 and its effect on the success-rate of the DL. I argue that the 
constitutional definition of the DL strictly in favour of the Parliament turns it into a weak, easy to 
repeal, agenda-setting power of the Italian Executive. The DL is a simple legislative proposal, 
with immediate legal effect under the pretence of exceptional circumstances, which nevertheless 
becomes invalid if the Parliament does not decide on it within a 60 days constitutional deadline 
(rule of tacit rejection).  
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The third section offers some tentative conclusions about the dynamic relation between the 
Italian Parliament and the Executive. I argue that the latter is accountable to the former even 
when excessively issuing DL because the Italian political parties shaped and dispersed the 
institutional veto power in such a way as to ensure firm control on the policy initiatives of the 
Executive, despite being part of a fragmented and polarized party system.  
The words of Italian MP Machiavelli quoted in the opening of this chapter accurately reflect 
the incapacity of the Italian political system to produce legislative coalitions that would ensure 
stability and efficiency in the process of policy-making by reaching decisions after negotiation 
and compromise.  
The vast majority of all Italian coalitions since 1948 until 1993 had been highly fragmented 
and polarized, providing weak legislative support for the Executive, translating into the latter’s 
incapacity to pass legislative initiatives sent to Parliament through normal procedure (NPL) in a 
timely fashion and the ensuing recourse to DL in order to compensate for this incapacity. The 
only less fragmented and less polarized (therefore more stable) coalitions emerge after the 
electoral reform of the 1990s, on the centre-right part of the Italian political spectrum, as I will 
show later. Even these issue a large number of DL, simply because they have the capacity to pass 
any piece of legislation through the Parliament, representing what MP Machiavelli is referring to 
in the above quote as “authoritarian” Executive. Therefore, the Italian political system generates 
either Type 1 (weak) or Type 2 (“dictatorial”) legislative coalitions supporting the Executive, 
according to the classification presented in the literature review. 
The major Italian political parties traditionally had significant internal divisions18. Some 
ideologically motivated factions centred on different leaders from the same party and did not 
follow the official party policy line (the case of the major parties), while some power-oriented 
factions attempted to align their policy positions with those of the Executive if motivated to join 
it (the case of smaller political parties).  
Furthermore, the Italian proportional representation electoral system had constantly led to a 
large number of parties in Parliament until 1993. The political parties present in Parliament 
represented a wide range of ideological identities: from extreme left to extreme right, a divided 
centre and versatile centre-right and centre-left political parties. The outcome had been a 
                                                 
18 For a detailed presentation and analysis of the internal divisions of Italian political parties see Cotta (1979), Cotta 
and Verzichelli (1996), Farneti (1983, 1985) and Sartori (1982). 
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constant legislative instability which made the recourse to DL a rational strategy of the Italian 
Executive, in a constant attempt to overcome the incapacity of the partisan veto-player structure 
of accountability to reach policy decisions after negotiation and compromise. 
The institutional veto-player structure of Italy favours the Parliament: the powers of the 
Executive are weak when dealing with a negative legislative response to a DL. In case the DL is 
rejected, the Executive cannot veto the rejection of the Parliament. However, the 1947 
Constitution does not mention any provisions in case the legislative coalitions choose the cost-
efficient strategy of tacit rejection and allow the DL to lapse by ignoring it. The Italian Executive 
speculated on this constitutional loophole throughout the decades and increasingly re-issued the 
lapsed DL, only with slight formal changes, in an attempt to compensate for its weak 
institutional veto-player powers, as a surrogate form of veto power, as I will explain later. 
The direct effect of an institutional veto power in favour of the Parliament is a high 
Executive accountability: low success-rate and high amending rate of DL, despite the gradual 
trend of increased DL issuing since 1948. The trend to rule by DL increases significantly over 
time despite the constitutional reform of 1996. This indicates that the interaction between the 
institutional and partisan structures of accountability induces a legislative practice highly 
detrimental to the quality of democracy, by attempting to promote policy without exposing it to 
parliamentary scrutiny. 
Therefore, the Italian political system exhibits the structural features that have the potential to 
lead to a low Executive accountability. However, the systemic trend towards low Executive 
accountability is counterbalanced by the formal configuration of the Executive-Legislative 
relations in so far as DL is concerned, granting almost total agenda-setting power to the 
Parliament through effective mechanisms of institutional control over the Executive.  
The empirical information in this chapter contains data for legislation initiated by the Italian 
Executive through DL as well as through normal procedure (NPL) in both the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate for the reasons explained earlier in the thesis.  
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2. Legislative fragmentation and the partisan veto-player structure of 
accountability 
 
 
The Italian Executive rarely enjoyed solid parliamentary support between 1948 and 1993. 
Most of the legislative coalitions supporting the Executive had been oversized, fraught with 
intra-partisan and inter-partisan divisions, made up of political parties weary of electoral loss, 
always ready to desert the coalition if their political fortunes required them to do so. 
The Italian coalitional politics since 1948 had been highly determined by the polarized multi-
party system present in this country (Cotta and Verzichelli, 1996: 1-2). Seven parties of 
relatively stable weight had been the main actors of a game of forming and dissolving Cabinets 
in a constant search for a coalitional formula that would ensure a stable and efficient goverment: 
PC (Partito Comunista), PS (Partito Socialista), PSD (Partito Social Democratico), PR (Partito 
Republicano), DC (Democrazia Cristiana), PL (Partito Liberale) and MS (Movimento Sociale).  
The high fragmentation of the party system had been accompanied by an equally high 
political polarization along the pro-system/anti-system or communist/anti-communist divide, 
making it virtually impossible to assemble a governing coalition that would last in power long 
enough to ensure an efficient policy-making process.  
The major purpose of all governing coalitions assembled around Democrazia Cristiana (DC) 
since 1948 had been the relegation of the Communist Party (PC) to a permanent opposition 
status, given its anti-system programmatic orientation. In this act of fine coalitional balancing, 
the DC had attempted various coalitional formulae, bringing together parties that were 
ideologically opposed to each other, while fearful of electoral loss due to being part of the 
governing coalition.  
Except for the elections of 1948, DC itself never won a majority of votes that would have 
enabled it to govern on its own (Cotta and Verzichelli, 1996: 4). Caught between its own need to 
govern the country as the major party in government while keeping the Communist Party (PC) 
out of power, and the need of its smaller allies to mitigate electoral loss by distancing themselves 
from the governing coalition of which they formed part, DC had always had to build an 
oversized governing coalition, but also maintain the coalition long enough and ensure its proper 
functioning. The long string of cabinet resignations and re-negotiations among parties attempting 
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to form new Cabinets without calling elections testifies for the failures of DC to assemble and 
maintain governing coalitions. 
The explanation for this failure rests with the heterogeneous nature of the DC-centred 
coalitions: cabinets brought together either socialist/bourgeois coalitions, or clerical/anti-clerical 
coalitions (Cotta and Verzichelli, 1996: 4) with the obvious outcome of intra-coalitional 
bickering and eventual break-up (see diagram below for ideological positioning of the Italian 
political parties). 
 
Extreme     Centre   Extreme  
Left         Right 
PC PS PSD  PR   DC PL  MS 
 
 
Left DC         Right DC 
 
The first factor contributing to coalitional instability had been the competition imposed on 
the centre-left and centre-right parties by the extreme PC and neo-fascist MS: the socialist PS, 
the social democratic PSD and the left-republican PR had always competed with each other for 
the limited political space between the Christian Democratic DC and the PC, while being fearful 
of electoral loss to the latter. 
On the other side of the ideological divide, the right-liberal PL had always attempted to 
protect itself from losing votes to the extreme right MS. Therefore, both the centre-left and the 
centre-right attempted to impose policies closer to their ideological preference whenever in 
government, while opposing the policies promoted by the other coalition members. 
The second factor increasing the instability is the internal factionalism of DC itself, which 
had two large political wings, one more right/clerical-oriented, the other more left but still 
bourgeois-oriented. Each one of these wings came under the pressure of the other when in the 
government if it distanced itself from the political identity of DC when making policy 
concessions to the coalition allies.  
The third factor contributing to coalition instability is the interaction between the first and the 
second: DC factions attempted to ally themselves with the part of the political spectrum they 
were closest to outside DC. The other parties also had different factions leading to internal 
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dissent and coalition instability. PS had been divided on the question of collaborating with DC, 
PSD had the same internal divisions as PS but to less severe extent, while only the smaller PR 
and PL were more internally cohesive. 
The major outcome of this coalitional bargaining among polarized political parties is a 
complicated political game in which a number of short term political cycles emerge, each 
characterized by one specific coalition formula (see Table 1 below): Centrism, Centre-left, 
National solidarity (the only attempt to involve the communists in the act of governing) and the 
Pentapartito.  
 
Table 1: Phases and sub-phases of coalition government in Italy before the electoral 
reforms of early 1990s (source: Cotta and Verzichelli, 1996: 35) 
Phases Years Parties Cabinets Sub-phases and Prime-Ministers 
 
 
Centrism 
 
 
1948-
1960 
 
 
DC-PLI-
PSD-PR 
 
 
13 
Preparation: Gasperi 
Central period: Gasperi V, VI, VII 
Crisis: Gasperi VIII, Pella I, Fanfani I 
New stabilization: Scelba I, Segni I 
Final crisis: Zoli I, Fanfani II, Segni II, 
Tambroni I 
 
 
 
Centre-left 
 
 
 
1960-
1975 
 
 
 
DC-PS-PSD-
PR 
 
 
 
17 
Preparation: Fanfani III, IV, Leone I 
Central period: Moro I, II, III 
Crisis: Leone II, Rumor I, II, III 
New stabilization: Colombo  
Attempts to change: Andreotti I, II 
Decline and final crisis: Rumor IV, V 
Moro IV, V 
 
National 
solidarity 
 
 
1976-
1979 
 
DC-PC-PS-
PSD-PR-PL 
 
3 
Preparation and central period:  
Andreotti III, IV 
Crisis: Andreotti V 
 
 
Pentapartito 
 
 
1980-
1992 
 
 
DC-PS-PSD-
PR-PL 
 
 
14 
Preparation: Cossiga, Forlani 
Central period: Spadolini, Fanfani V, 
Craxi 
Crisis and re-negotiation: Craxi, Fanfani, 
Goria, De Mita 
New stabilization: Andreotti 
Final crisis: Amato 
 
The major difference among these coalitional phases, with the exception of the National 
solidarity phase, had been the inclusion or exclusion of one of the smaller parties, which 
generated severe instability by entering and deserting the coalition, or by staying in the coalition 
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but opposing the policies of the senior partner, particularly during the Centre-left phase and the 
Pentapartito phase. 
Before explaining the dynamics of coalition formation, functioning and breakdown, it is 
useful to distinguish between a coalitional formula, a coalitional phase and a coalitional sub-
phase (Cotta and Verzichelli, 1996: 4-5). 
A coalitional formula consisted of a certain partisan composition of the Government and the 
accompanying policy platforms, as well as the specific distribution of government posts 
according to the electoral weight of each party.  
A coalitional phase lasted a long period and it had been characterized by the continuous 
attempt of the political actors occupying positions in the Executive to make the coalition formula 
function; building and rebuilding Cabinets that would fit the policy position of all partners and 
their claims for government positions. 
Each coalitional phase experienced more or less three sub-phases. The preparatory sub-phase 
involved the experimentation with the new coalition formula, but without the full engagement of 
all political parties. The central sub-phase of each cycle implied more lasting Cabinets with all 
parties acting as full members of the coalition, while the ‘decline’ sub-phase had been 
characterized by increased instability, shorter-lived Cabinets and the disengagement of some 
coalition partners. Each phase, except that of National solidarity, experienced a sub-phase of 
crisis followed by a sub-phase of relative stabilization. The National solidarity phase does not 
exhibit the same sub-phase evolution given its high polarization due to the presence of the PC in 
the legislative coalitions supporting the Executive and the impossibility to renegotiate the 
coalitional formula (for a list of formulae, phases and sub-phases of Italian politics see Table 1 
above). 
The Italian polarized multi-partism itself had been the outcome of the PR electoral system in 
place from 1948 until 1993, which provided no serious incentive for electoral coalitions, leading 
to a large number of parties in Parliament.  
Another feature of the Italian political system that compounded the problems of polarized 
multi-partism had been the full bicameralism. There is no functional difference between the two 
Parliament chambers, which might well have different majorities, leading to the possibility that 
legislation passed in one chamber can be rejected in the other. This institutional configuration 
had been an incentive for building larger rather than smaller government coalitions in order to 
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ensure parliamentary support, therefore increasing the possibility that the coalition will be 
fragmented and polarized. 
The change in the electoral system that occurred in 1993 with the introduction of a 75% 
plurality representation and 25% proportional representation did not necessarily reduce the perils 
of fragmentation and polarization. The parties formed oversized electoral coalitions, but engaged 
in similar coalitional behaviour after elections: some parties of the same electoral coalition 
formed different parliamentary groups once in Parliament, while other parties of the winning 
coalition opted out of the government formula.  
Therefore, although the electoral competition became more “polarized” between two major 
camps along the left-right divide and the voters had a better defined electoral choice after 1993, 
the winning electoral coalitions did not necessarily form stable governing coalitions once in 
power. The reason is the same problem of fragmentation and polarization inside the same part of 
the political spectrum once the parties occupy their legislative benches: they organize and behave 
as individual partisan entities, sometimes in disregard to the electoral coalition logic that ensured 
their election to Parliament. 
However, a difference does emerge after the landmark changes of 1993: the Centre-right 
coalitions, built around Forza Italia (FI), are significantly less polarized and fragmented than the 
centre-left coalitions, built around Democratici di Sinistra (DS), an ample left-oriented coalition. 
The latter ones still exhibited higher fragmentation and polarization because of the many factions 
inside the leftist parties and the presence of the highly ideological PC communist party.  
This has important implications for the theoretical assumptions of this thesis, as I will show 
later in greater detail: it is the first time in Italian politics that Type 2 “dictatorial” coalitions 
emerge after 1993. The Italian centre-right coalitions have a low degree of polarization and 
fragmentation and a high capacity to put through the Parliament most of the legislation that they 
initiate. I will elaborate on this aspect later in this chapter. 
The legislative instability that ensued in a highly fragmented and ideologically polarized 
party system translated first and foremost into a decreasing success-rate of Executive-initiated 
NPL. This expectation is confirmed by empirical information (see Table 2 below). 
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Table 2: The volume of DL and the volume and success-rate of NPL in Italy 1948 – 2006. 
Coalitional phase I. 
DL issued 
II. 
NPL issued 
III. 
NPL success 
Centrism 1948-1960 3% (105) 97% (4292) 90% (3894) 
Centre-left 1960-1975 7% (310) 93%  (4310) 86% (3744) 
Solidarity 1976-1979 19% (185) 81% (831) 77% (644) 
Pentapartito 1980-1992 30% (1068) 70% (2573) 69% (1786) 
Transition 1993-1996 75% (810) 25% (273) 58% (161) 
New system 1996-2006 29% (401) 71% (999) 84% (839) 
Total 1948-2006 18% (2879) 82% (13278) 83% (11068) 
 
Column I in the Table 1 above indicates the number of DL issued by each Italian Cabinet 
since 1948, as well as the percentage volume of DL in the total volume of Executive-initiated 
legislation. Column II indicates the same measure, only for Executive-initiated NPL. Column III 
indicates the success-rate of Executive-initiated NPL. 
The information in Table 2 reveals a few important empirical findings. Firstly, Italy is not a 
country ruled by DL, as some of the democracy literature reviewed in the previous chapter on 
literature and theoretical review would predict by taking notice of a high number of these acts 
(O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003). Despite the obvious trend of increased DL issuing 
throughout the decades (see Column I in Table 2 above), the volume of DL compared to the 
volume of Executive-initiated NPL for the whole period under observation is only 18% (compare 
row Total for Column I and Column II in Table 2 above). 
Secondly and as expected, there seems to be a correlation between the success-rate of NPL 
and the tendency of the Italian Executive to issue DL. The Italian Executive had experienced 
increased difficulty in passing NPL in Parliament: the success-rate of NPL drops constantly from 
90% approval rate during the Centrist phase of Italian politics to a low 58% approval rate during 
the Transition phase (see Column III in Table 2 above). The lower the NPL success-rate, the 
higher the volume of DL issuing (see the inverse correlation between Column III and Column I 
in Table 2 above). The phase of Transitional politics (1993-1996) reaches a peak of DL issuing: 
the Italian Executive issues 75% of its legislative initiatives by DL and only 25% by NPL. 
However, 1993-1996 was a period of exceptional politics, marked by a major change in the party 
system and a national anti-corruption campaign that led to the arrest of important political 
figures. Most of the cabinets of this period are “technical” (non-political), as I will show later. 
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The overall trend indicates a correlation between the success-rate of NPL and the tendency to 
issue DL. I will test this assumption later through a series of two-tailed Pearson correlations. 
I will explore the functioning of legislative coalitions for each major phase of Italian politics 
as defined earlier in order to show why testing for possible correlations between the success-rate 
of NPL and the issuing rate of DL can strengthen the theoretical argument of the thesis. 
 
2.a. Coalitional phases, legislative instability and the issuing of Emergency decrees 
 
The Centrist phase of Italian politics (1948-1960), characterized by more coalition stability, 
exhibits a significantly smaller volume of DL compared to Executive-initiated NPL than the rest 
of coalitional phases. The stability is explained by a more clearly defined profile of the Christian 
democratic DC as a centrist party: its major factions did not begin to develop different legislative 
strategies as long as the coalitional formula had been functional. The success-rate of NPL is 
90%, as shown in row Total Column II in Table 3 below.  
 
Table 3: DL issuing, NPL issuing and NPL success-rate during Centrism. 
 
Despite the low rate of DL issuing (3% for the whole Centrist phase), the correlation between 
the success-rate of Executive-initiated NPL and the tendency to issue DL is already visible 
(compare the inverse correlation between Column III and Column I in Table 3 above). Research 
constraints prevented the collection of information on the success-rate of NPL for each coalition 
Cabinets: Centrism (1948-
1960) I. DL issued  II. NPL issued III. NPL success 
1. De Gasperi V (7) 
(6) 
(16) 
2% 
 
98% (2149) 
 
93% (1996) 2. De Gasperi VI 
3. De Gasperi VII 
4. De Gasperi VIII - 
(5) 
- 
(18) 
(29) 
(9) 
4% 96% (1564) 92% (1439) 
5. Pella I 
6. Fanfani I 
7. Scelba 
8. Segni 
9. Zoli 
10. Fanfani II (5) 
(5) 
(5) 
3% 97% (579) (aprox.) 79% (459) (aprox.) 
11. Segni II 
12. Tambroni 
Total Centrism (1948-1960) 3% (105) 97% (4292) 90% (3894) 
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(Cabinet) of this particular phase of partisan politics, as I have explained in the section dedicated 
to operationalization of accountability in Chapter II. This reduces the number of units of analysis 
from 12 (number of Cabinets in place during the Centrist phase) to only 3 (periods for which the 
success-rate of NPL can be correlated to the volume of DL issuing). Despite this empirical 
research constraint, the correlation between the Executive incapacity to promote its policy views 
through NPL and its tendency to rule by DL is shown in Column I and Column III in Table 3 
above. The NPL success-rate drops from 93% to 79% by the end of this coalitional phase, while 
the volume of DL issuing increases from 2% to 4% from the first to the 9th Cabinet of the phase 
(from De Gasperi V to Zoli in Table 3 above). 
The Centrist period of Italian politics exhibits longer tenures in power of Executive 
coalitions, given the lower ideological polarization and the subsequently low number of partisan 
veto-players in Parliament supporting the Executive. However, the first picture presented by the 
first period of coalitional politics is indicative of a structural tendency to govern by DL caused 
by the difficulty encountered by the coalition partners in reaching negotiated decisions. The 
difficulty of governing in a heterogeneous coalition formula had become manifest from within 
the DC itself: the Zoli Cabinet (1958) lost its legislative support before elections and had been 
asked to stay in power until a new Parliament had been elected (Cotta and Verzichelli, 1996: 22). 
The difficulty of reaching negotiated policy decisions grew exponentially during the next 
coalitional phase, when the DC intra-party conflicts became manifest. 
Generally, the Executive attempted to escape policy scrutiny in Parliament, as long as the 
controversial policies were expected to face parliamentary opposition even from within the 
benches of the parliamentary groups that supported the Cabinet.  
As I have argued earlier, the relevance of governance by DL resides in the volume compared 
to the volume of Executive-initiated NPL and in the actual trend (volume increasing over time), 
and not necessarily in the number of DL as such. It becomes irrelevant that the actual number of 
DL is significantly lower during the Centrist phase compared to later coalitional phases. The 
structural cause inducing a systemic propensity towards a low executive accountability is the 
partisan veto-player structure of the legislative coalitions, present since 1947 and generating 
effects which will become increasingly obvious across the decades, as I will show further. 
The next coalitional period (1960-1975), the Centre-Left already exhibited a higher degree of 
instability, after the “opening” of the more socially oriented factions of DC towards the Italian 
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left. Another factor that facilitated the aperture for the left and the emergency of this new phase 
of coalitional politics had been the gradual move of the socialist PS from the left of the political 
spectrum towards the centre and its increasingly moderate political discourse. The socialist PS 
and the social democratic PSD had been invited to take part in the Cabinet and support it from 
Parliament.  
The accompanying noticeable trend of diminishingly successful NPL is indicative of the 
difficulties encountered when the much needed policy negotiation could not be concluded 
because of the high number of partisan veto-players, given the fragmentation and polarization of 
the legislative coalition. The “opening” to the left of the DC-centred Executive had been 
motivated by the need to find a coalition formula that would mitigate the instability induced by 
the DC internal factionalism. Despite the goodwill pledges, it did not reach the intended outcome 
and the invitation of an increasing number of parties to join the legislative coalition and join the 
Executive had led to an actual increase in its level of fragmentation and polarization. 
The same research constraints mentioned earlier prevented the collection of information 
regarding the success-rate of NPL for each coalition (Cabinet) of this particular phase of partisan 
politics. This reduced the number of units of analysis from 17 (number of Cabinets in place 
during the Centre-Left phase) to only 4 (periods for which the success-rate of NPL can be 
correlated to the volume of DL issuing). Despite this empirical research constraint, the 
correlation between the Executive incapacity to promote its policy views through NPL and its 
tendency to rule by DL is shown in Column I and Column III in Table 4 below. The NPL 
success-rate drops from 97% to 83% by the end of this coalitional phase, while the volume of DL 
issuing increases accordingly from 2% to 10% from the first to the 17th Cabinet of the phase 
(from Fanfani III to Moro V in Table 4 below). 
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Table 4: DL issuing, NPL issuing and NPL success-rate for Centre-Left phase (1960-1975). 
Cabinets Centre-left (1960-
1975) 
I. DL issued  II. NPL issued III. NPL success 
1.Fanfani III (10)  
2% 
98%(904) 
(aprox.) 
97% (881) (aprox.) 
2.Fanfani IV (4) 
3. Leone I (4)  
 
6% 
 
 
94%(1442) 
 
 
87%(1259) 
4. Moro I (9) 
5. Moro II (26) 
6. Moro III (55) 
7. Leone II (6)  
 
 
8% 
 
 
 
92%(831) 
 
 
 
80%(663) 
8. Rumor I (11) 
9. Rumor II (11) 
10. Rumor III (11) 
11. Colombo (29) 
12. Andreotti I (2) 
13. Andreotti II (25)  
 
10% 
 
 
90%(1133) 
 
 
83%(941) 
14. Rumor IV (24) 
15. Rumor V (24) 
16. Moro IV (33) 
17. Moro V (26) 
Total Centre-left (1960-
1975) 
7% (310) 93%(4310) 86%(3744) 
 
The increased fragmentation and polarization brought about by the presence of leftist parties 
in the coalition supporting the Executive has increased throughout the years from 1960 until 
1975. The crises breaking down Cabinets were most often extra-parliamentary. The Fanfani and 
Moro Cabinets lost their legislative support before elections and had been asked to stay in power 
until a new Parliament would be elected (Cotta and Verzichelli, 1996: 22). 
The government composition had been difficult to agree on and it emerged only after a 
number of bargaining attempts lasting for a long period, sometimes months, while a minority 
cabinet was put in place. The role of such a Cabinet was transitional, while its sole purpose was 
to ensure the governing of the country and prepare the agreement for a new coalition. Such a 
transitional cabinet (which often has only one party) had been the base of the future cabinet 
containing all coalition partners. Examples of such transitional cabinets during the Centre-Left 
phase of Italian politics are Fanfani III (DC), Fanfani IV (DC-PR-PSD), Leone I (DC), Leone II 
(DC) and Rumor II (DC) (see Tables 1 and 3 on pages 89 and 93 earlier). The leaders continued 
to negotiate while these minority cabinets were in place. If no agreement was reached, then weak 
cabinets with unstable parliamentary support could drag on for many months in a political crisis 
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called “crisi al buio”, literally meaning “crisis in the dark”. The Moro V Cabinet is an example 
of “crisi al buio”, being asked to govern only until the next formula would be in place. Given the 
failure of this phase of coalitional politics, the Moro V Cabinet ensured the transition to the next 
phase of coalitional politics: National Solidarity.  
Continuing the trend of coalitional instability induced by the highly fragmented and polarized 
partisan structure of accountability, the National Solidarity coalitional period (1976-1979) 
exhibits a stronger tendency for unaccountable Executive rule through the issuing of an increased 
volume of DL compared to the Executive-initiated NPL. 
This is the period during which Italy was governed by the most heterogeneous Executive 
coalition before the collapse of its party system in the early 1990s. In an attempt to keep the 
country under control in times of resurgent terrorist activities, as well as contain the 
radicalization of the Italian communists, the DC accepted to govern together with an anti-system 
party, turning policy-making into a difficult negotiation game. The National Solidarity legislative 
coalition supporting the Executive contained the PC, besides the other leftist parties (the socialist 
PS and the social-democratic PSD) (Cotta and Verzichelli, 1996: 38-39), increasing the 
legislative instability and the tendency of the Executive to issue DL in order to compensate for 
the incapacity of coalition partner to negotiate policy.  
 
Table 5: National solidarity period of 1976-1979: NPL success-rate and DL issuing. 
 
The approval rate of NPL drops from 90% (during the Centrist phase) and 86% (during the 
Centre-Left phase) to 77% during the National Solidarity phase (see row Total for Column III in 
Table 5 above). The volume of DL compared to the volume of NPL increases spectacularly, 
from 3% under Centrism and 7% under Centre-Left to a high of 18% under National Solidarity 
(see row Total for Column I in Table 5 above). 
Cabinets National 
solidarity (1976-1979) 
I. DL issued  II. NPL issued III. NPL success 
30. Andreotti III (87) Not available Not available 
31. Andreotti IV (50) Not available Not available 
32. Andreotti V (48) Not available Not available 
Total National solidarity 
(1976-1979) 
18% (185) 82% (831) 77% (644) 
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The National solidarity phase represents a significant political compromise of the Italian 
political class and its party system, given their incapacity to assemble functional legislative 
coalitions that would ensure stable support for Executive first and foremost through the 
negotiation and passage of Executive-initiated NPL. This phase was short-lived compared to the 
previous ones, lasting only three years, given the unstable legislative support offered by the PC, 
whose party representatives did not join the Executive themselves, but supported it from 
Parliament after a formal agreement. The last cabinet of Andreotti V had been asked to stay in 
power after losing its legislative support until the next phase of Pentapartito. 
The next coalitional period, the Pentapartito (1980-1992), reflects even more strongly the 
systemic tendency towards a high volume of DL issuing. The legislative coalition supporting the 
Executive had been made up of the Christian democratic DC, the socialist PS, the Republican 
PR, the social democratic PSD and the liberal PL, a formula that searched without success for 
governance stability by including all the non-extremist political parties who pledged to stay 
together without deserting the coalition in order to govern the country efficiently. Despite the 
goodwill pledges, the Italian political establishment found its ultimate failure in building 
negotiation and consensus with the Pentapartito period. On a background of decreasing DC 
electoral fortunes and an increasingly assertive socialist party (PS), the coalitional instability 
grew stronger than ever before. The country confronted a prolonged economic crisis and a 
resurgence of organized crime activities pervading State structures and targeting State officials. 
The renegotiation of the cabinet structure in order to avoid calling early elections became 
more difficult when the inter-partisan polarization of the coalition increased under the 
Pentapartito phase. The number of Executives brought down by inter-party conflicts increased 
(Figura, 2000). The Spadolini I Executive (1981-1982) had been dismissed after the socialist 
ministers left the Coalition because the legislative majority supporting it in the Chamber rejected 
a DL on taxing oil products. The Craxi I (1983-1986) and Craxi II (1986-1987) cabinets fell 
because of policy disagreements between the junior coalition partners the socialist PS and the 
left-republican PR, as well as the incapacity to reach an agreement between the socialists PS and 
the senior coalition partner the Christian Democratic DC regarding the individual who should 
occupy the position of Prime Minister, the socialist Craxi or the Christian Democrat De Mita 
(Figura, 2000). 
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The Fanfani V (1982-1983) cabinet collapsed after the socialist PS abandoned the majority. 
Early elections had been called after no agreement had been reached to form a new government. 
The Goria I cabinet (1987-1988) had been dismissed as the outcome of a dispute between the 
senior coalition partner Christian Democratic DC and the junior coalition partner the socialist PS 
on maintaining the functioning of a nuclear power plant, while the De Mita I Executive (1988-
1989) had been dismissed simply because the participants at the Congress of the socialist PS had 
engaged in strong rhetoric against their own governing partner, the Christian Democratic DC. 
The failure of the coalition formula is accurately reflected in the dynamic of NPL success-
rate (see Column III in Table 6 below) and DL issuing (see Column I in Table 6 below): 
 
Table 6: DL and NPL issuing and success-rate Pentapartito period (1980-1992). 
Cabinets Pentapartito (1980-1992) I. DL issued  II. NPL issued III. NPL success 
1. Cossiga I 13% (45) 87% (326) 77% (254) 
2. Cossiga II 15% (18) 85% (104) 75% (78) 
3. Forlani 32% (54) 68% (120) 68% (82) 
4. Spadolini I 31% (91) 69% (208) 63% (133) 
5. Spadolini II 28% (15) 72% (40) 37,5% (15) 
6. Fanfani V 38% (25) 62% (41) 56% (23) 
7. Craxi I 21% (176) 79% (680) 73% (502) 
8. Craxi II 46% (69) 54% (81) 11% (9) 
9. Fanfani VI 98.4% (60) 1.6% (1) 0% (0) 
10. Goria I 26% (76) 74% (218) 90% (198) 
11. De Mita I 36% (122) 64% (221) 76% (170) 
12. Andreotti VI 33% (128) 67% (264) 68% (180) 
13. Andreotti VII 45% (84) 55% (105) 46% (49) 
14. Amato I 42% (114) 58% (164) 56% (93) 
Total Pentapartito 30% (1068) 70% (2573) 69% (1786) 
 
The partisan veto-player structure reaches its most devastating effects for the legislative 
process during the Pentapartito: the Executive has no other option for promoting legislation but 
the recourse to DL. The volume of DL compared to NPL increases spectacularly from 13% 
under the first cabinet of the period (see Column I for the Cossiga I Cabinet in Table 6 above) to 
a high 45% under the Andreotti VII cabinet. The success-rate of Executive-initiated NPL 
fluctuates, with a high of 90% under the Goria I cabinet, and a low of 11% under the Craxi II 
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cabinet. Most importantly, the total of DL issuing is 30% under the Pentapartito, the highest 
issuing rate since 1948 (see Column I in last row Total Pentapartito in Table 6 above).  
The next two coalitional phases of Italian legislative politics, namely the transition period 
(1993-1996) and the new party and political system (1996-2006), provide a good opportunity to 
compare legislative trends in order to identify the causal factors behind the tendency of the 
Executive to issue DL. 
The Transition period (see Table 7 below) heralds the highest volume of DL issuing in Italy, 
after almost half a century of unsuccessful attempts to overcome the fragmentation and 
polarization of the party system. 
 
Table 7: The issuing of DL and its treatment during the Transition period. 
Cabinets Transitional phase (1993-
1996) 
I. DL issued  II. NPL issued III. NPL success 
47. Ciampi 85% (311) 15% (58) 31% (18) 
48. Berlusconi I 53% (163) 47% (143) 76% (109) 
49. Dini 83% (336) 17% (72) 47% (34) 
Total transitional phase 75% (810) 25% (273) 58% (161) 
 
The Italian party system collapsed in the early 1990s under criminal investigations revealing 
large corruption schemes involving almost all leaders of all political parties. The impossibility to 
assemble political cabinets imposed “technical” Executives, whose primary function had been 
the governing of the country while the new party system was in the making. The only attempt to 
form a political cabinet, the Berlusconi I Executive, did not last: it collapsed because of a typical 
inter-partisan conflict in the Executive coalition (Cotta and Verzichelli, 1996: 25). The junior 
partner Lega Nord abandoned the coalition given its high veto-player potential because of the 
slow progress towards the administrative devolution of the country, but also because of intra-
Cabinet dissension about the pension reforms (Figura, 2000: 235). 
The technical cabinets of Ciampi and Dini initiated most of their legislation by DL. The 
technical cabinets presented the Parliament with a disproportionately larger number of DL 
compared to NPL (see Table 7 above). Even the political cabinet of Berlusconi I initiated most of 
its policy by DL, given the political instability. 
This period of Italian politics has similarities to the emergency situations found in many new 
democracies, where newly established political institutions and unstructured party systems 
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struggle to tackle financial collapses, military uprisings or civilian unrest. The primary function 
of these Executives had been the overcoming of the crisis, by all means, including turning the 
Legislature into a rubberstamp institution by taking over legislative functions in the form of 
governance by Decrees based on constitutionally granted prerogatives.  
The major relevance of this period of Italian politics rests with the manifold crises that it 
experienced and the non-political nature of governance by DL. Now it is not the number of 
partisan veto-players that provokes the Executive to rule by DL rather than NPL, but the need to 
keep the situation under control without wasting precious time in parliamentary debates and 
scrutiny.  
Turning now to the new electoral and party system in place in Italy after 1996, it noticeably 
exhibits the same tendency of the Executive to rule by DL as before 1993, despite the 
constitutional reform of 1996 attempting to prevent the re-issuing of Decrees (see Table 8 
below).  
 
Table 8: DL and NPL issuing and NPL success-rate New political system (1996-2006). 
Cabinets New system (1996-2006) I. DL issued  II. NPL issued III. NPL success 
50. Prodi I  
51. D’Alema I 
52. D’Alema II 
53. Amato II 
13th Parliament 
(1996 – 2001) 
28% (198) 72% (519) 83% (428) 
26% (42) 74% (122) 71% (87) 
31% (15) 69% (34) 55% (19) 
47% (44) 53% (50) 38% (19) 
54. Berlusconi II 
55. Berlusconi 
III 
14th Parliament 
(2001 – 2006) 
37% (187) 63% (324) 97% (317) 
56% (42) 44% (34) 97% (33) 
Total new system 32% (548) 68% (1118) 81% (914) 
 
Table 8 above reveals two important trends. Firstly, the centre-left Cabinets (Prodi I, 
D’Alema I, D’Alema II and Amato II) continue to encounter a low success-rate of their 
respective NPL sent to the Parliament: it drops from 83% to 38% (see Column III in Table 7 
above). The DL issuing increases accordingly: from 28% of the total initiated legislation to 47% 
(see Column I in Table 8 above for the first four Cabinets). 
The new political and party system in place after 1996 until 2006 (the last year for which 
empirical information is accounted for in this thesis) still exhibits a high polarization of the 
centre-left coalitions with the countless factions of the Communist party and the various strands 
of socialists and social democrats: four leftist Cabinets governed Italy during the 13th Parliament, 
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from 18th May 1996 until 11th June 2001, rotating in power without calling elections after inter-
partisan negotiations following the same pattern as between 1948 and 199319.  
The Prodi I, D’Alema I, D’Alema II and Amato II Cabinets had been based on the broad 
leftist alliance of L’Ulivo, comprised of not less than 9 political parties of varying leftist 
orientations. In a constant attempt to hold the Executive in power L’Ulivo gradually allied itself 
with the communist PDC (Partito Demo-Communista) and the Christian democratic splinter 
UDR (Unione Democratica per la Reppublica) leading to the D’Alema I Executive. The second 
expansion of the coalition occurred when the Christian democratic splinters of DEMO and 
UDEUR joined the Executive leading to the formation of the D’Alema II Executive. The number 
of Executive partners went even higher under the Amato II Executive with the social democratic 
SDI joining the Executive. The coalition fragmentation and polarization was as high as before 
1993, with Communists, Christian Democrats, Greens, Socialists and Social democrats 
attempting to govern together. The Cabinet changed each year between 1996 and 2001 at a rate 
that is similar to those of traditional Italian politics of 1948-1993. 
Secondly, coalitions of a “dictatorial”-type emerge clearly after 1996, given that the new 
electoral system and the political party system reforms led to more cohesive centre-right 
coalitions, with a significantly lower degree of fragmentation and polarization, therefore a 
significantly low number of partisan veto-players.  
The new Italian centre-right, built around Forza Italia, the political party presided over by 
Silvio Berlusconi, did not confront the same political circumstances the DC confronted for 
almost 50 years. The latter had to build oversized coalitions to prevent the rise to power of the 
Communist party under the political constraints of the Cold War. DC always had to make policy 
concessions, often not being capable of reaching any agreement with its coalition partners over 
policy sensitive issues. The new Italian centre-right does not have to organize oversized 
coalitions to support the Executive, therefore reducing the number of coalition partners to the 
political parties that it really is closest to in ideological and policy terms. 
The cabinets of Berlusconi II and III have a success-rate of 97% of their NPL, while still 
issuing a high number of DL compared to NPL. These two Cabinets initiated their legislation 
37% and 56% through DL (see Table 8 on page 101 earlier). These are Executives that MP 
Machiavelli quoted in the opening of the chapter refers to as “strong, authoritarian Executive”, 
                                                 
19 Information from the official website of the Italian Executive Hwww.governo.itH  
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which can easily pass most of their legislative initiatives through Parliament, as proven by the 
high approval rate of their NPL (97% for both Berlusconi cabinets). 
The cohesion of the new centre-right political Cabinets is proven by their duration in power 
for almost 5 years (the Berlusconi II and III Cabinets governed Italy between 11.06.2001 and 
17.05.2006)20. Both Berlusconi II and III Cabinets had been based on the ideologically close 
Cassa delle Liberta political alliance initially comprised of only four ideologically close centre-
right political parties (Forza Italia, Aleanza Nazionale, Lega Nord and Unione Demo-Christiana). 
The Berlusconi II Cabinet lasted in power in this coalitional formula for four years (June 11, 
2001 – April 23, 2005), the longest surviving Italian Executive in the post-World War II history 
of the country. The Berlusconi III Cabinet expanded the political alliance Cassa delle Liberta to 
include two more political parties, without disintegrating before elections. The ideological 
cohesion of these Cabinets ensured their capacity to pass any type of legislation through 
Parliament without having to negotiate with the Opposition. 
The same holds true for the Berlusconi I cabinet, which initiated most of its legislation by DL 
(53%) (see Table 7 on page 100 earlier). The only difference between the Cabinets Berlusconi I, 
II and III is that the first one had governed Italy under extreme political circumstances during 
times of political transition, which strengthened its tendency to issue DL proportionately higher 
than necessary, given not only its Type 2 “dictatorial” nature, but also the political circumstances 
it had to confront. 
However, all centre-right Cabinets continue to issue a disproportionately large number of DL 
even after the political transition had finished and even when their NPL has a high success-rate. 
This is explained by the nature of the coalitions, which could guarantee the success of any type 
of legislative initiative and choose to issue a large number of DL simply because this act has 
immediate legal effect and is more expedient than the NPL. Having to choose between a 
legislative proposal with immediate legal effect and a high probability of success in the 
Parliament (DL) and a legislative proposal without immediate legal effect and the same high 
probability of success in the Parliament (NPL), the “dictatorial” coalitions will choose the first 
option for its obvious advantages. 
Italy clearly had in place a party system that led to coalitions with a high number of veto-
players that prevented the Executive from passing NPL between 1947 and 1996. Its coalitional 
                                                 
20 Information from the official website of the Italian Executive www.governo.it  
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dynamic evolved according to the phases and sub-phases explained earlier. However, the 
Berlusconi I, II and III cabinets had a lower number of partisan veto-players and consequently 
had been more adept at passing legislation through NPL as proven by the high success-rate 
shown in Table 8 above. The Berlusconi Cabinets become deviant cases from the argument of 
the thesis: the lower the success-rate of NPL the higher the DL issuing. They issue DL even 
when the success-rate of their NPL is high. 
I will next run three two-tailed Pearson correlations to check for the assumed inverse 
negative relation between the NPL success-rate and the tendency of the Executive to issue DL. It 
is expected that the strongest correlation is found for the 1947-1993 period of coalitional politics, 
when Italy had been governed by weak Executives, exhibiting a high number of partisan veto-
players that prevented the conclusion of negotiated policy compromises.  
When looking at the whole period under observation (1948-2006) the correlation mentioned 
above is .656 as shown below. 
 
Correlation between NPL success-rate and volume of DL issuing in Italy, 1947-2006. 
  success_rate
decreespresentedP
erc 
success_rate Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -,656(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
  N 33 33 
decreespresentedPer
c 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-,656(**) 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000   
  N 33 33 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
The above sample contains 33 units of analysis, including the Cabinets of the Transition 
phase (which seem to deviate from this argument given the exceptional nature of this phase) and 
the centre-right Cabinets of the new political system (which seem to deviate from this argument 
given their nature explained earlier). The initial correlation is expected to become stronger once 
the units of analysis (Cabinets) of the Transition phase are excluded, considered statistically 
irrelevant, for reasons explained above. For the purpose of this argument and in order to 
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highlight an increasing correlation, I will next eliminate only the Transition phase Cabinets and 
maintain in the sample the centre-right Cabinets of the new political system. The correlation 
between the low success-rate of Executive-initiated NPL and the tendency to issue DL increases 
to .769, as further shown below. 
 
Correlation between NPL success-rate and volume of DL issuing without the Transition Phase. 
 success_rate
decreespresented
Perc 
success_rate Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -,769(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 30 30 
decreespresentedPerc Pearson 
Correlation 
-,769(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 30 30 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
However, the units of analysis used for the correlation above still contain the “dictatorial” 
Executives of Berlusconi I, II and III, which are not statistically relevant, as I explained above. 
Once these Executives are excluded from the sample of units of analysis, the correlation between 
the low success-rate of Executive-initiated NPL and the Executive tendency to rule by DL 
further increases to a high of .801, as shown below. 
 
Correlation between NPL success-rate and volume of DL issuing without the Transition, Berlusconi I, II and III. 
   success_rate
decreespresente
dPerc 
success_rate Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -,801(**)
  Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000
  N 27 27
decreespresentedPerc Pearson 
Correlation 
-,801(**) 1
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
  N 27 27
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Thus far I have revealed a strong negative correlation between the incapacity of the Italian 
Executive to pass NPL in the Parliament and its tendency to issue DL. The coalition types 
generated by the Italian party system make the recourse to DL a rational option. For reasons 
explained above, the Italian legislative coalitions were either weak (fragmented and polarized 
until 1993) or strong (low fragmentation and low polarization after 1996, only on the centre-right 
of the political spectrum).  
The weak type of legislative coalition is not able to offer the Executive stable legislative 
support by providing a negotiation base that would ensure the passage of NPL. The key to 
understanding this incapacity is the two-fold Executive-Legislature relationship: the relation 
among the legislative parties that support the Executive and the relationship between the 
Executive and the legislative Opposition.  
The parties that support the Executive cannot agree on policy decisions given the oversized 
Executive coalition leading to a high number of partisan veto-players and the consequent 
coalitional behaviour explained above. The only feasible solution remains the negotiation 
between the Executive and the Opposition, which is virtually impossible, given the presence of 
the Communist party and its increasing electoral prominence throughout the decades. The 
increasing electoral strength of the Communist party translated into higher and higher incapacity 
of the DC-centred Executive to negotiate policy with the Opposition, beside its manifest 
incapacity to reach policy agreements inside the governing coalition. The recourse to DL ensued 
as the only solution for promoting policy that would otherwise be blocked by legislative 
deadlock. This is not to say that policy negotiation had been entirely impossible. However, the 
compromises that had been reached translated into highly amended Executive-initiated 
legislation. 
The strong type of legislative coalition (“dictatorial”) emerging on the centre-right of Italian 
politics after 1996 does not have any incentive to govern by NPL, since it can reach policy 
decisions easily, given its lower fragmentation and polarization. It need not negotiate the passage 
of policy measures through the Parliament with the legislative Opposition either. The recourse to 
DL proves a very cost-efficient solution for promoting policy.  
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3. Institutional veto-player power: the legal status of DL 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I will explore the capacity of the Italian Parliament to hold the Executive to 
account by rejecting or at least amending the DL, since this legislative resource attempts to 
promote policy by evading legislative scrutiny. It is expected that the DL should be rejected or 
amended extensively, particularly when the Legislature is active in opposing other types of 
Executive legislative resources, such as the NPL.  
 
Table 9: DL and NPL success and amending rates between 1948 and 2006. 
Coalitional phase I.  DL issued 
II. 
DL. success 
III. 
DL amend. 
IV. 
NPL issued 
V. 
NPL success
Centrism 1948-
1960 
3%  
(105) 
97%  
(102) 
53% 
 (54) 
97%  
(4292) 
90%  
(3894) 
Centre-left 1960-
1975 
7% 
 (310) 
92%  
(286) 
60%  
(172) 
93%  
(4310) 
86%  
(3744) 
Solidarity 1976-
1979 
19% 
(185) 
72% 
 (134) 
73%  
(98) 
81%  
(831) 
77%  
(644) 
Pentapartito1980-
1992 
30% 
(1068) 
52% 
 (564) 
82%  
(468) 
70%  
(2573) 
69%  
(1786) 
Transition 1993-
1996 
75%  
(810) 
28%  
(231) 
78%  
(180) 
25% 
 (273) 
58% 
 (161) 
New system1996-
2006 
29% 
(401) 
83%  
(333) 
88%  
(296) 
71%  
(999) 
84%  
(839) 
Total 1948-2006 18% (2879) 
57%  
(1650) 
77%  
(1268) 
82% 
(13278) 
83% 
(11068) 
 
The theoretical expectation is confirmed by empirical information: the success-rate of the 
Italian DL has been decreasing, while the amending rate has been increasing, as shown in Table 
9 above. The success-rate of DL in Italy between 1948 and 2006 is 57% and the amending rate is 
77% (see row Total in Columns II and III in Table 9 above). Overall, the DL has a low success-
rate and a high amending rate, which proves that the Italian Executive was accountable to the 
Parliament, despite the increasing volume of DL issuing in the years since 1948.  
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However, the relevant empirical finding in Table 9 above is the trend of a decreasing 
success-rate of DL from the Centrist phase to the Transition phase (see Column II DL success-
rate in Table 9 above). It decreased spectacularly from 97% success-rate (Centrism) to a very 
low 28% success-rate (Transition period). Inversely, the DL amending rate increased from 53% 
under Centrism to around 80% under Pentapartito and the Transition phases (see Column III in 
Table 9 above). The trend is that of a very strong Executive accountability to the Parliament: the 
higher the DL issuing, the lower the success-rate and higher the amending rate. 
According to the institutional veto-player model explained in the literature review and 
theoretical chapter, the success-rate of DL is determined by the combination between its legal 
status (full law or simple legislative proposal) and the rules governing its treatment in the 
Legislature (tacit rejection, tacit approval and the strength of the Executive veto power on the 
decision of the Legislature). 
The Italian DL is regulated primarily by the Constitution of December 1947. Emerging from 
the Second World War, the Italian political establishment designed the Constitution attempting 
to prevent a new dictatorship by putting in place institutional mechanisms that would make it 
difficult for the Executive to bypass the Parliament, without denying the latter the possibility to 
react in circumstances of crisis and instability (Della Sala and Kreppel, 1998: 177). Article 77 of 
the 1948 Constitution reflects these concerns by granting the Executive the power to issue DL 
which come into effect immediately, but expire after 60 days if not discussed and decided on in 
the Parliament. 
The second set of legal provisions regulating the legislative decision process on DL is made 
of parliamentary rules of procedure granting the Executive very low resources in controlling the 
legislative agenda. Although these rules of procedure had been reformed throughout the decades 
attempting to relieve the tension of legislative deadlock by allowing the Executive some 
influence when the legislative content and timetable were discussed, the effect on the governance 
by DL has been mostly insignificant21. 
The most important feature of the DL in the Italian system is its legal status of legislative 
proposal. The legal status is the major element dispersing the institutional veto-player power in 
favour of either one of the two branches of government, by exposing the Executive legislative 
                                                 
21 For a comprehensive review of the reforms and revisions of the parliamentary rules of procedure in Italy, see 
(Della Sala and Kreppel, 1998: 177-178), Kreppel (1997: 332), Hine and Finocchi (1991: 79-86). 
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initiatives to compulsory or non-compulsory policy scrutiny in the Legislature before they can 
become full law.  
The Italian DL must be approved in the Parliament before it becomes full law. It is a special 
legislative proposal with immediate legal effect under the pretence of special circumstances, but 
requires decision in the Parliament before it is endorsed as law.  
The immediate consequence of this legal status is that the Italian Parliament discusses and 
decides on the Executive DL after it is compulsorily forwarded to its attention. The Executive 
does not have any veto power on the decision of the Parliament. Most often, the Parliament 
ignores the DL, particularly if they promote sensitive policies, as a very cost efficient manner of 
dealing with them, leading to tacit rejection after the passing of the 60 days constitutional 
deadline. 
The legal status of special legislative proposal for the DL and the rule of tacit rejection, 
combined with the inexistence of veto power on the part of the Executive, sets the most 
important parameters of institutional veto-player model of accountability, by granting the 
Parliament almost total power when it comes about DL (this might not be the case with other 
legislative resources and it certainly does not imply that the Italian Parliament is a locus of 
fervent policy-making).22 
The clear definition of DL (a special legislative proposal) and the existence of the tight 
regulation regarding its treatment (the rule of tacit approval through the 60 days constitutional 
deadline) ensure that it is turned into a weak institutional resource of the Executive. The 
institutional veto-player power strongly in favour of the Italian Parliament explains the high level 
of Executive accountability to the Parliament: the higher the DL issuing, the lower the success-
rate and higher the amending rate. It also explains the high Executive accountability even during 
the Transition phase of Italian politics, despite the very high volume of DL issuing (see Table 10 
below). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 The unstable nature of legislative coalitions leads to an avoidance of the initiation and passage of important 
legislation, with a tendency to initiate legislative proposals that once approved are called “leggine”, an euphemism 
for legislation of narrow policy importance (DiPalma, 1977). 
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Table 10: DL and NPL success and amending rates for Transition phase (1993-1996) 
 
Coalitional phase 
 
 
I.DL issued 
 
II.DL. 
success 
 
III.DL 
amend. 
 
IV.NPL 
issued 
 
V.NPL 
success 
 
Transition  
1993-1996 
 
 
75% (810) 
 
28% (231) 
 
78% (180) 
 
25% (273) 
 
58% (161) 
 
The Transition phase is the only one when Italy is governed by technical Cabinets mainly by 
DL, in extraordinary political circumstances, as explained in the previous section exploring the 
functioning of the partisan veto-players. The Executive initiated 75% of its policies through DL 
and only 25% through NPL (Columns I and IV in Table 10 above). However, the level of 
Executive accountability to the Parliament is still high, given the low DL success-rate (28% in 
Column II in Table 10 above) and the high DL amending rate (78% in Column III in Table 11 
above). 
 
 
3.a. The Constitutional reform of October 1996 
 
 
The Italian Constitution of December 1947 grants strong institutional veto-player powers to 
the Parliament as far as the DL is concerned. However, it lacks provisions regarding the re-
issuing of DL which had been rejected or allowed to lapse in the Parliament. It left some aspects 
of governance by DL unanswered, such as the possibility that the Executive will issue and re-
issue one and the same DL with only slight modifications after the Parliament rejected it directly 
or tacitly. The framers of the Italian Constitution assumed that both branches of government 
would act responsibly: the Executive will issue DL only in situations of true urgency and 
necessity, while the Parliament would certainly discuss and decide on these acts (Della Sala and 
Kreppel, 1998: 177).   
However, the Italian Executive has ended up making excessive use of a constitutional 
resource meant to tackle other types of circumstances than legislative deadlock. Lacking the 
institutional veto-player power that would enable it to influence the decision of the Parliament on 
DL, the Italian Executive chose to reissue a large number of these acts after they had been 
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rejected directly or tacitly by the Parliament. Whole “chains” of DL (literally versions of the 
same policy act only with slight formal modifications) had been issued and reissued, sometimes 
leading to the situation of having a specific policy in place without any legislative scrutiny for 
years. 
The Italian constitutional reform had addressed the problem of DL re-issuing, not necessarily 
the excessive use of DL. Consequently, the Supreme Court issued Court Sentence 360/1996 
banning the reissuing of a DL that lapsed in Parliament. The Supreme Court justified its decision 
claiming that the ample and constant reissuing of DL exposed the Legislature to the danger of 
losing its primary function, that of legislating. Significantly enough, the ample institutional veto-
player power of the Executive present in other countries leads exactly to the danger invoked in 
Italy, as I will show in the next chapter on Argentina.  
The Italian political class however had been concerned with the excessive use of DL. It 
allowed the Executive an increased influence in setting the content and the schedule of the 
legislative agenda by reforming the rules of parliamentary procedure ever since the 1980s23, 
hoping that this concession would make the recourse to DL unnecessary.  
Only the sentence of the Supreme Court banning the reissuing of DL had led to the intended 
outcome: as of October 1996, the Executive issued only the DL of whose legislative approval it 
was certain in order to comply with the new constitutional requirement (Di Porto, 2006). This 
explains the high DL approval rate after the constitutional reform.  
However, the increased role of the Executive in setting the legislative agenda did not lead to 
a decreased volume of DL issuing: the volume of DL compared to the volume of NPL stays at 
the same levels as during the highly unstable Pentapartito phase (see Table 9 on page 107 
earlier). 
Therefore, the constitutional reform did not constrain the use of DL but it increased its 
success-rate. After the constitutional reform, a high DL issuing rate had been accompanied by a 
high success-rate, for the first time in Italian politics since 1947. The DL had a high success-rate 
under Centrism and Centre-left phases (97% and 92% respectively), but the volume of issuing 
had been low (3% and 7% respectively) compared to the new system, when the volume of 
issuing is 29% and the success-rate is 83% (see Table 9 earlier on page 107 for Centrism, Centre-
                                                 
23 For a comprehensive review of the reforms and revisions of the parliamentary rules of procedure in Italy, see 
Della Sala and Kreppel (1998: 177-178), Kreppel (1997: 332), Hine and Finocchi (1991: 79-86). 
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left and New system). The amending rate remains high even during the new political system 
phase (88%) showing that the Italian Executive is still accountable to the Parliament even when 
issuing a large volume of DL with a high success-rate, as long as the Parliament infuses these 
acts with its own policy views when extensively amending them (see Columns II and III in Table 
10 on page 110 earlier.). The policy amendments of the Parliament prevail over the policy 
intentions of the Executive as long as the latter does not have any institutional veto power on the 
decision of the former. 
It becomes irrelevant how many DL the Executive issued before the constitutional reform 
(Cazzola, 1975) or after the 1996 constitutional reform (Di Porto, 2006) per month or per year. 
The volume of DL as compared to the volume of Executive-initiated NPL, representing the two 
policy promotion strategies at hand for any Executive in a given circumstance, remains the same. 
It had been claimed that the issuing of DL went from “river flow” to “rain drop” (Di Porto, 
2006). This is the case of DL re-issuing, but not the case of DL issuing, as I have shown. 
A further and more detailed exploration of the DL success-rate during the new political 
system phase (1996-2006) can reveal substantially more regarding the causes of high DL 
success-rate even when the volume of DL is high (a situation not encountered between 1948 and 
1993). 
The new political system phase consists of two Parliaments (the 13th and the 14th 
Legislatures) and six Executive coalitions between 1996 and 2006: four left-oriented Executive 
coalitions supported by the 13th Legislature and two right-oriented coalitions during the 14th 
Legislature.  
I have explained the behaviour of the two types of coalitions present during the new system 
phase, as well as their effect of the tendency of the Executive to issue a large volume of DL, in 
the previous section dealing with partisan veto-players. I have shown that the first four coalitions 
exhibit the same tendency to issue DL for the same reason as all previous coalitions between 
1948 and 1993: the high level of fragmentation and polarization. I have also shown that the last 
two coalitions of the new system (Berlusconi II and III) issue a large volume of DL despite the 
high NPL success-rate because of their “dictatorial” nature, given their lower level of 
fragmentation and polarization. At this stage of the argument, the nature of the Executive 
coalitions during the new system phase has important consequences for the success-rate of DL.  
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The weak (highly fragmented and polarized) Executive coalitions of left political orientation 
had an overall low success-rate of their policy promoted by DL (60%) (see Column II in Table 
11 below). This had been almost equal to the average success-rate of previously unstable 
coalitional politics during the National Solidarity and Pentapartito coalitional phases. 
 
Table 11: Left-oriented coalitions of the New system compared to the most unstable periods 
of coalitional politics (National Solidarity and Pentapartito). 
Left-oriented 
Cabinets 
 
I.DL 
issued  
II.DL 
success 
III.DL 
amending 
IV.NPL 
issued V.NPL success 
Total 13th 
Parliament 
(1996-2001) 
29%  
(299) 
60% 
(180) 
83%  
(150) 
71% 
 (725) 
76% 
(553) 
Solidarity and 
Pentapartito  
(1976-1992) 
27%  
(1253) 
55%  
(698) 
81%  
(566) 
73%  
(3404) 
71%  
2430) 
 
 
Table 11 above reveals that the left-oriented coalitions governing Italy during the new 
political system produce the same legislative patterns as the traditionally unstable Italian politics, 
with the slight difference of 5% in the success-rate of DL (see Column II in Table 11 above). 
However, the information in Table 11 above still contains the legislative production of the 
Prodi I Cabinet before the Constitutional reform. If this is eliminated, the DL success-rate of the 
left-oriented coalitions of the New system increases to 79% (see row Total in Column II in Table 
12 below). This increase in the DL success-rate is explained by the effects of constitutional 
reform presented earlier. 
Table 12: Left-oriented coalitions of the New system after the constitutional reform. 
Left-oriented 
Cabinets 
(1996-2001) 
I. 
DL issued  
II. 
DL success 
III. 
DL 
amending 
IV. 
NPL issued 
V.  
NPL success 
Prodi I after decision 14% (71) 74% (53) 83% (44) 86% (435) 83% (364) 
D’Alema I 26% (42) 90% (38) 78% (30) 74% (122) 71% (87) 
D’Alema II 31% (15) 66% (10) 90% (9) 69% (34) 55% (19) 
Amato II 47% (44) 81% (36) 77% (28) 53% (50) 38% (19) 
Total 13th Parliament 
Without Prodi I 27% (172) 79% (137) 81% (111) 73% (641) 76% (489) 
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Comparing the legislative performance of the New system left-oriented Cabinets after the 
Constitutional reform (i.e., eliminating the legislation initiated by the Prodi I Cabinet before the 
reform) to the average legislative performance of the Cabinets in power during the most unstable 
coalitional phases (National Solidarity and Pentapartito), the difference between the respective 
DL success-rates is a significant increase of 24% from 55% to 79% (see Column II in Table 13 
below). 
 
Table 13: Left-oriented coalitions of the New system after the constitutional reform 
compared to the unstable phases of National Solidarity and Pentapartito. 
Cabinets 
(1996-2001) I.DL issued 
II. 
DL success 
III. 
DL 
amend. 
IV. 
NPL issued 
V. 
NPL success 
Total 13th 
Parliament without 
Prodi I before 
Constitutional 
reform 
27% (172) 79% (137) 81% (111) 73% (641) 76% (489) 
Solidarity and 
Pentapartito 
(1976-1992) 
27% (1253) 55% (698) 81% (566) 73% (3404) 71% (2430) 
 
Thus far I have shown and explained the effect of Constitutional reform on the legislative 
performance of the highly fragmented and polarized Italian Executive during the 13th Parliament: 
the volume of issued DL is the same as during the National Solidarity and Pentapartio phases at a 
similar NPL success-rate. However, the success-rate of DL is significantly higher, given that the 
Executive is issuing only the DL that is certain to pass in the Parliament after the constitutional 
reform of 1996. 
The second part of the New political system phase consists of the 14th Italian Parliament, 
which supported the Berlusconi II and III Cabinets, both having a low number of partisan veto-
players. I have explained the legislative efficiency of these two coalitions and the effect of their 
nature on their tendency to issue a large volume of DL in the previous section of the chapter. The 
success-rate of DL initiated by these two coalitions is overall high at 86% (see Column II in 
Table 14 below). 
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Table 14: DL and NPL issuing and success-rates for the “dictatorial” Cabinets of 
Berlusconi II and III supported by the 14th Parliament. 
Right-oriented 
Cabinets 
I.  
DL issued 
II. DL. 
Success 
III. DL 
amending 
IV. 
NPL issued 
V. 
NPL Success 
Berlusconi II  37% (187) 88% (165) 95% (157) 63% (324) 97% (317) 
Berlusconi III 56%  (42) 73% (31) 90%  (28) 44%  (34) 97%  (33) 
Total 14th Parliament 
(2001-2006) 39%  (229) 86% (196) 94% (185) 61%  (358) 97% (350) 
 
The major difference between the Cabinets of Berlusconi II and III, on the one hand, and the 
left-oriented Cabinets supported by the 13th Parliament is the high DL issuing rate (39%) even 
when the NPL success-rate had been very high (97%) (see Columns I and V in Table 15 above). 
The DL issued by the “dictatorial” Cabinets of Berlusconi II and III have a higher success-rate 
(86%) when compared to the fragmented and polarized left-oriented Cabinets supported by the 
13th Legislature (79%).  
The Berlusconi II and III Cabinets have a higher capacity to agree on their own legislative 
initiatives than the left-oriented Cabinets, given their significantly lower level of fragmentation 
and polarization. Both the centre-left and the centre-right Cabinets of the new political system 
send to the Parliament only the DL that will most likely pass knowing that reissuing is 
impossible. However, the “dictatorial” Cabinets have a significantly higher success-rate of their 
legislative initiatives (both DL and NPL), given their nature explained earlier. 
I will next attempt to establish the difference between what the Executive aims for when 
promoting policy by DL (ratio issued DL/issued NPL) and what the Parliament is willing and 
able to do with policy promoted by DL (ratio approved DL/approved NPL).  
The picture that is revealed confirms the assumption that the Italian Executive rules 
accountable to the Parliament even when it issues a high volume of DL: the ratio approved 
DL/approved NPL is either lower than or identical to the ratio issued DL/issued NPL (compare 
Column I to Column II in Table 15 below). 
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Table 15: Volume issued DL/NPL and volume of successful DL/NPL. 
Coalitional phase I. DL issued/NPL issued II. Success.  DL/ Success. NPL 
Centrism 1948-1960 DL: 3% (105)  NPL: 97% (4292) 
DL: 3% 
NPL: 97% 
Centre-left 1960-1975 DL: 7% (310)  NPL: 93%  (4310) 
DL: 7% 
NPL: 93% 
Solidarity 1976-1979 DL: 19% (185)  NPL: 81% (831) 
DL: 8% 
NPL: 82% 
Pentapartito 1980-1992 DL: 30% (1068)  NPL: 70% (2573) 
DL: 24% 
NPL: 76% 
Transition 1993-1996 DL: 75% (810)  NPL: 25% (273) 
DL: 59% 
NPL: 41% 
New system 1996-2006 DL: 29% (401)  NPL: 71% (999) 
DL: 29% 
NPL: 71% 
Total 1948-2006 DL: 18% (2879) NPL: 82% (13278) 
DL: 13% 
NPL: 87% 
 
Overall, the intentions of the Italian Executive to undermine the legislative function of the 
Parliament are met with resistance by the latter given its ample institutional veto-player 
resources when dealing with the DL. This is reflected in the difference between the DL issuing 
rate of 18% for the whole period under observation (see row Total in Column I in Table 15 
above) and the DL success-rate of only 13% (see row Total in Column II in Table 15 above). 
The Italian Executive initiates 18% of its policies by DL and 82% by NPL, while the treatment 
of the two resources in the Parliament leads to approved Executive-initiated legislation of 13% 
DL and 87% NPL. The Executive intentions are reflected in the 18% DL issued, while the 
Parliament treatment of DL and NPL is reflected in the outcome of 13% DL of  in the final body 
of approved Executive-initiated legislation. 
An important observation ought to be made here: the phases of Centrism and Centre-left (the 
most stable coalitional phases in Italian politics) exhibit an identical ratio between the percentage 
of initiated DL and NPL and the percentage of approved DL and NPL (see the respective rows in 
Table 15 above). The same holds true for the new system phase: the intentions of the Executive 
are accurately reflected in the outcome of parliamentary decision (see the new system row in 
Table 15 above). The only phases that exhibit a lower ratio of approved DL/approved NPL than 
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the ratio of issued DL/issued NPL are the most unstable ones in Italian politics: the National 
Solidarity, the Pentapartito and the Transition phases.  
The theoretical significance of this finding is that when the Executive issues policy by DL 
when strictly necessary (the Centre and Centre-left phases), these acts are approved accordingly 
in the Parliament and have a high amending rate, as shown earlier. However, the DL has a 
significantly lower proportion in the final body of approved legislation initiated by the Executive 
when the Executive issues policy by DL in order to overcome its manifest incapacity to pass 
NPL due to increased coalitional instability. 
 
 
4. Conclusion: high Decree issuing and high Executive accountability 
 
 
In this chapter I have shown that the issuing of DL is structurally induced in Italy. I have 
shown that the Italian Executive issues an increasing number of DL since 1948 mainly because 
its NPL is met with resistance by the fragmented and polarized legislative coalitions. I have 
further shown that the overall success-rate of DL is low and the amending rate is high. The high 
level of Executive accountability to the Parliament is ensured by the strong institutional veto-
player powers of the latter. 
The constitutional definition of DL and the inexistence of Executive veto on the decision of 
the Parliament allow the latter to keep under control the tendency of the Executive to rule 
unaccountable. As long as the Executive is issuing DL when strictly needed, the volume of 
approved DL in the total body of approved Executive-initiated legislation accurately reflects 
intentions of the Executive. Once the Executive is issuing DL excessively, the Parliament rejects 
these acts accordingly, leading to a lower volume of approved DL in the body of total Executive-
initiated legislation. Regardless of success-rate, policies promoted by DL are frequently amended 
in the Parliament. 
The empirical information for the Italian case study indicates a high level of Executive 
accountability to the Parliament ensured by the institutional veto-player structure of 
accountability consisting in a clear constitutional definition of DL and tight regulation of its 
treatment in the Parliament, as I have already shown.  
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There is a marked trend towards lower accountability on the part of the Italian Executive, 
which issues an increasingly number of DL in order to overcome the legislative deadlock 
induced by the fragmentation and polarization of the legislative coalitions supporting the 
Executive. However, the institutional structure of accountability granting the Parliament high 
agenda-setting powers compensates for the fragmentation and polarization of the legislative 
coalitions, reversing the systemic tendency towards low Executive accountability through a low 
success-rate and high amending rate of DL in Parliament. 
The partisan configuration exhibiting a high number of veto-players persists over time. The 
political, constitutional or electoral reforms taking place in the early 1990s did not succeed in 
mitigating the strong and lasting effects induced by the two coalition types generated by the 
Italian party system (either Type 1 “weak” coalitions or Type 2 “dictatorial” coalitions). The 
disappearance of the traditional Italian parties in the early 1990s did not lead to the creation of a 
new party system. The electoral reforms led to a different electoral competition, but not to 
different legislative politics, as long as the legislative fragmentation and polarization remained 
high. Also, Court Sentence 360/1996 banning the reissuing of any DL that had been rejected or 
allowed to lapse in the Parliament did not reverse the systemic trend towards low Executive 
accountability: policies continued to be promoted by DL at rates similar to those experienced 
before the Court sentence, while the DL amending and rejection rates remained overall high. 
Perhaps the most important observation is that the perpetuation of a fragmented and 
polarized party system leads to specific coalition types that either cannot reach negotiated 
agreements or can impose their policy views without having to negotiate them.  
The implications of governance by DL on the Italian democracy are important. Although the 
Italian Parliament is successful in holding the Executive accountable as I have shown, negative 
effects on the quality of democracy obtain. 
Firstly, important pieces of legislation tend to be initiated and decided on outside the 
Parliament, in a process of depriving this important deliberative institution of its primary 
function, that of debate and decision of important legislative proposals. A good example in this 
sense is that the most important policies (therefore the most politically divisive) tend to be 
promoted by DL, increasingly leaving less important policies to be promoted by NPL. The 
relevance of this particular legislative dynamic is that the Parliament is left to pass “leggine” 
122 
 
(literally “little laws”), laws of reduced policy importance. The number of these laws increased 
year after year, rendering the legislative arena increasingly irrelevant to policy (Di Palma, 1977). 
Secondly, this tendency of unilaterally promoting policy outside the Parliament is 
strengthened by the practice of re-issuing the DL that lapsed in Parliament, only with slight 
content modifications. Important policy measures, such as building regulations, had been in 
place for many years without being discussed in the Parliament (Di Palma, 1977). 
The Italian democracy is certainly not affected to the same extent as the new democracies by 
the governance by DL, as I will show in the next chapters on Argentina and Romania. But this is 
not to say that Italy does not experience negative consequences which lower the quality of its 
democracy, as I have shown in this chapter. 
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Argentina: excessive Decree issuing and inexistent Executive 
accountability 
 
 
Motto: “Within this constitutional framework, in instances where I am able to take action by decree, I am going to 
do it”  
Carlos Saul Menem, President of Argentina 1989-1999, quoted in Rubio and Goretti, 1998 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
This chapter explores the level of accountability of the Argentine President to Congress by 
explaining the cause of issuing a large number of Decrees of Necessity and Urgency (DNU) by 
the Presidents of Argentina and the success-rate (rejection or amending) of these acts in 
Congress. 
 The quote opening this chapter reflects the large degree of freedom granted by the 
Constitution of 1994 to the Argentine presidents when deciding what constitutional resources 
they can use to pursue their policy goals. Carlos Menem, long considered the embodiment of a 
President unaccountable to Courts or Congress, sums up a constitutional reality that allows any 
Argentine president to initiate policy bypassing the Congress and denies the latter the capacity to 
react.  
This chapter is organized as follows: the first section explores the influence of partisan 
configurations in Congress supporting or opposing the policy initiatives of the President on the 
propensity of the latter to issue DNU. I argue that the internal divisions of the Argentine parties, 
combined with the presence of small provincial parties in Congress and the control of local party 
leaders over the careers of legislators lead to a policy-making process in which the fragmented 
and polarized legislative coalitions cannot ensure a stable congressional support for presidential 
NPL. Furthermore, the important resource of Executive removal from office, specific of 
parliamentary systems, is absent in Argentina. The outcome is significant presidential leeway in 
dealing with the fragmented and unstable congressional coalitions. More specifically, the 
President issues DNU in order to overcome the congressional deadlock. The trend towards low 
124 
 
Executive accountability is induced by the partisan veto-player structure in the Argentine 
Congress, which makes the recourse to DNU an efficient presidential strategy to overcome 
congressional deadlock. 
The second section will present the formal legal status of the DNU in Argentina before and 
after the constitutional reform of 1994 and its effect on the success-rate of DNU. I argue that the 
very lax constitutional definition of the DNU guarantees a high DNU success-rate (low or 
inexistent amending or rejection in Congress). The DNU legal status of full law rather than a 
legislative proposal and the inexistence of provisions regarding the legislative treatment of this 
powerful presidential resource in Congress grant the Argentine President excessive institutional 
veto-player powers, allowing him or her to impose policy unilaterally whenever confronting 
congressional opposition. The presidential capacity to impose policy unilaterally is increased by 
the very strong constitutional veto powers on any piece of legislation coming out of Congress, be 
it a presidential initiative or a congressional initiative. 
Furthermore, I argue that the DNU is a strong agenda-setting instrument of the Argentine 
President used in a legal vacuum before the constitutional reform that took place in 1994 and 
later legalized. The constitutional reform has no effect on the level of Executive accountability, 
since it does not grant the Congress any institutional veto-player power that would allow it 
successfully to reject or amend policy promoted by DNU. The only effect the constitutional 
reform has is an increase in the volume of DNU issuing. The reason is the formalization of a 
previously informal, but very powerful, legislative resource. The level of Executive 
accountability as a function of rejection and amending rates is the same before and after the 
constitutional reform: almost inexistent. 
The third section offers some tentative conclusions about the dynamic relation between the 
Argentine Congress and the President: the partisan veto-player structure of accountability 
induces the trend towards a low Executive accountability making the issuing of DNU necessary 
through congressional opposition to the Executive-initiated NPL, while the institutional veto-
player structure strengthens it, instead of constraining it, as in the case of Italy. The outcome is 
an inexistent Executive accountability to Congress, ultimately determined by the constitutional 
definition of the DNU. 
I will show that the Argentine Congress is literally subdued by a President that can 
constitutionally eliminate it from any policy field regulated by DNU (this is not the case with 
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presidential legislative proposals sent to Congress through NPL). To say the Argentine Congress 
is a rubberstamp institution because of a specific political culture in which the President 
legitimately prevails over other institutions would imply that the Congress has the opportunity to 
effectively oppose the President, but it refuses to do so even when its legislative function is 
undermined by an excessive use of DNU. That is hardly the case. The parties in the Congress do 
make use of their scarce legislative resources against the President, albeit with little success, as I 
will show later.  
Furthermore, the process of constitutional reform does not place any constraints on the use of 
DNU and does not increase the institutional veto-player power of the Congress, proving that 
institutional structures persist overtime, even when producing deleterious effects for the 
democratic consolidation or the quality of the policy-making process, as long as they serve the 
interests of political parties, as I will show later in this chapter.  
The President-Congress relation exhibits a different dynamic when the former is using DNU, 
as compared to NPL. The Congress successfully opposes presidential policies promoted by NPL, 
while incapable or unwilling to do the same for policies promoted by DNU. Nevertheless, 
despite occasional congressional opposition to the presidential policy views, the latter always 
prevails due to very strong formal veto power on any piece of legislation coming out of 
Congress. 
The empirical information in this chapter contains data for legislation initiated by the 
Argentine Presidents through DNU, as well as through normal procedure (NPL) in both the 
Argentine Senate and Chamber of Deputies since 1983. I chose to account for data sent to the 
Congress rather than data for only the Chamber of Deputies because the Argentine President can 
initiate legislation equally in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Informal practice led to a 
situation where Presidents send their legislative proposals firstly to the congressional chamber 
where they have a stronger majority, given the stronger decision power of the chamber where 
legislation is initiated in case of disagreements between the two chambers of the Congress. As an 
example, President Carlos Menem initiated most of his NPL in the Senate (744 pieces of NPL), 
and not in the Chamber of Deputies, where he initiated only 426 pieces of NPL, if both of his 
presidential mandates are accounted for (1989-1995; 1995-1999) 
I did not include here the presidential Decrees issued based on a special law of delegation, 
such as Law 23.696/1990 (Reform of the State) and Law 23.697/1990 (Economic Emergency 
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Law). Such laws of delegation represent a willing and temporary abdication of Congress from its 
policy-making authority, for a clearly defined period and on specific policy issues. I consider this 
type of “delegated” decree power theoretically irrelevant for the argument of this thesis. Why 
Legislatures willingly give up on their institutional prerogatives for a limited period, on specific 
policy issues, is an entirely different question to why the Executives tend to bypass Legislatures 
by excessive issuing of DNU without the acquiescence of the latter. 
 
2. Congressional fragmentation and the partisan veto-player structure of 
accountability 
 
 
The Argentine Presidents rarely enjoy a majority in both the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate (Negretto, 2004: 555). Such a majority occurred only between 1995 and 1997, when the 
party of President Menem had more than 50% of the legislative seats in both chambers. Except 
for this rare occurrence, the party supporting the President has had a comfortable plurality in at 
least one chamber. The political party that had a president in office had held between 45% and 
51% of congressional seats since 1983, particularly in the Chamber of Deputies. The number of 
effective parties has been between 2.3 and 2.7 in the Argentine Senate and 2.2 and 2.3 in the 
Argentine Chamber of Deputies between 1983 and 1999 (Molinelli, Palanza y Sin, 1999: 305-
306).  
Such legislative partisan representation, combined with a constantly low number of effective 
parties in Congress, should ensure disciplined partisan support for the President, which would 
automatically translate into an efficient passage of presidential NPL (although occasional 
negotiation should not be precluded). Empirical information contradicts this assumption. The 
success-rate of presidential NPL is not as high as expected (see Column III in Table 1 below). 
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Table 1: Volume and success-rate of presidential NPL in Argentina since 1983. 
Presidency I. DNU issued II. NPL issued III. NPL success 
Alfonsin 1983-1989 2% (11) 98% (590) 68% (401) 
Menem 1989-1999 18% (248) 82%  (1170) 59% (693) 
De la Rua 1999-2001 24% (52) 76%  (166) 69% (114) 
Saá 1 week Dec. 2001 60% (6) 40% (4) 0% (0) 
Duhalde 2002-2003 54% (151) 46%  (127) 57% (72) 
Kirchner 2003-2006 46% (231) 54%  (274) 57% (155) 
Total 1983-2006 23% (699)  77%  (2331) 62% (1435) 
 
 Column I in the Table 1 above indicates the number of DNU issued by each Argentine 
President since 1983, as well as the percentage volume of DNU in the total volume of 
presidential legislation. Column II indicates the same measure, only for presidential NPL. 
Column III indicates the number and volume of successful presidential NPL. 
The information in Table 1 above reveals two important empirical findings. Firstly, 
Argentina is not a country ruled by DNU, as the “delegative” democracy literature reviewed 
earlier in the thesis would predict by taking notice of a high number of these acts. Policy 
promoted by DNU constitutes only 23% of the legislation initiated by the President since 1983, 
as shown in the last row of Column I in the Table 1 above. 
Only presidents Adolfo Saá and Eduardo Duhalde have issued more DNU than NPL (60% 
and 54%). But even in these cases, President Saá had been in power only for one week, 
appointed by Congress, under the circumstances of resignation of the previous President as an 
outcome of the economic crash of 2001, accompanied by civil protests and street violence. He 
issued only 6 DNU and sent to the Congress only 4 pieces of NPL. His mandate is hardly 
relevant for the use and treatment of DNU in the context of the legislative process. President 
Duhalde, also appointed by Congress, had to solve the economic situation in 2002 and exercised 
the presidential power under serious constraints imposed by the international financial 
community.  
DNU exceeding the number of presidential NPL is hardly a surprise in such times of 
economic turmoil and social unrest. Even Italy, a well-established parliamentary democracy, had 
been governed by DL between 1993 and 1996, with the transitional cabinets of Ciampi, 
Berlusconi I and Dini, as shown in the previous chapter on governance by Decree in Italy. 
The Argentine President Nestor Kirchner is probably the most emblematic example of 
excessive use of DNU as an outcome of structurally induced governing style (see Table 1 above). 
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Although the success-rate of his legislative proposals sent to the Congress through NPL is almost 
equal to that of Carlos Menem (see Column III in Table 1 above), his use of DNU is significantly 
higher (see Column I in Table 1 above).  
Secondly, the average success-rate of presidential NPL is only 62% since 1983, as shown in 
Column III of Table 1 above. This is hardly indicative of a rubberstamp Congress. It also shows 
that the Argentine political parties are not as disciplined (or subjugated to presidential will) as 
assumed (Negretto, 2004; Mustapic, 2002). They do oppose the President, regardless of 
occasional ideological convergence, attempting to force him or her to negotiate policy 
compromises.  
This empirical finding is not that surprising. Existing literature accounted for sufficient 
circumstances when the President could not count even on the support of his own party when 
promoting policy sensitive issues such as privatization or social reforms (Llanos, 2001; Magar, 
2001; Palanza, 2005; Panizza, 2000). Further strengthening the relevance of this empirical 
finding, President Menem encountered congressional opposition to his NPL initiatives even 
when his own party had more than 50% of congressional seats between 1995 and 1997 (see 
Table 2 below). 
 
Table 2: Use and success-rate of NPL and DNU for Carlos Menem 1995-1998. 
 I. DNU issued II. NPL issued III. NPL success 
01.03.1995-
28.02.1996 8% (7) 92% (87) 68% (59) 
01.03.1996-
28.02.1997 9% (9) 91% (97) 64% (62) 
01.03.1997-
28.02.1998 12% (23) 88% (163) 51% (83) 
TOTAL 10% (39) 90% (347) 59% (204) 
 
President Menem could have passed any legislative initiative he pleased given his ample 
congressional majority between 1995 and 1998. The landslide electoral success of Partido 
Justicialista in the mid-1990s leading to congressional majority had been in great part owed to 
the success of President Carlos Menem in containing the economic crisis and eventually 
generating economic growth. Nevertheless, it did not translate into a corresponding 
congressional support for its own President. The low success-rate of NPL initiated by President 
Menem (on a decreasing trend from 68% to 51% between 1995 and 1998 as shown in Column 
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III of Table 2 above) clearly indicates that the presidential Partido Justicialista stood against its 
own President. Some factions of the presidential party opposed the neo-liberal economic policies 
promoted by the President, while others supported the presidential bids of other candidates from 
the same party and disregarded their own incumbent (Llanos, 2001: 92; Llanos, 2002: 165). 
Furthermore, returning to the empirical information in Table 1 on page 124 earlier shows that 
all Argentine Presidents use less NPL across the years since 1983 and have increasing recourse 
to DNU. Indeed, the issuing trend increasingly favours the DNU rather than the NPL. Not only 
the allegedly ‘authoritarian’ Carlos Menem issued an increasingly high number of DNU. All 
Argentine Presidents excessively use a constitutional resource meant to be used only in 
extraordinary circumstances of necessity and urgency. 
Existing literature took notice of the comfortable presidential pluralities in the Congress and 
automatically assumed that the excessive recourse to DNU is owed to an ‘authoritarian’ political 
culture in which the President can bypass the Congress if he or she pleases, despite the 
comfortable partisan composition of the Congress. However, as I have already shown, the 
recourse to DNU seems to be correlated to the success-rate of presidential-initiated NPL. I 
assumed that a large number and an increasing trend of DNU issuing are inversely correlated to 
the success-rate of presidential NPL.  
I will next test this correlation. In order to increase the number of units of analysis and 
warrant statistical relevance, I have re-ordered empirical information regarding the number of 
NPL, its success-rate and the number of DNU.  
Instead of organizing the information for each presidential mandate as shown in Table 1 
earlier, I have ordered the information for each legislative period (March 1 to February 28 of 
next year, from 1983 until 2006) as provided by Dirección de Información Parlamentaria of the 
Argentine Chamber of Deputies.  
The ordering of information for each presidential mandate had been made possible by the 
detailed lists of presidential legislative initiatives for each calendar year, provided separately by 
the same specialized department of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies. Reordering the 
information according to legislative periods rather than presidential mandates increases the 
number of units of analysis from 6 to 29.  
The correlation between the success-rate of NPL and the number of DNU (assuming that the 
President tends to issue DNU when NPL are rejected) is almost zero for the whole period under 
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observation (-,066) and a high level of significance (,732) (see below). This is puzzling, given 
the low success-rate of NPL shown in Table 1 earlier. 
 
Once eliminating the deviant case studies of Presidents Adolfo Saá and Eduardo Duhalde, 
who ruled Argentina mainly by DNU in times of economic crisis under the imperative of 
necessity and urgency (see Table 1 earlier, on page 124), the two-tailed Pearson correlation 
increases to (-,232), but the level of significance decreases to (,274), as shown below.  
 
 
The number of units of analysis in the second two-tailed Pearson correlation decreases to 24, 
given that the mandate of President Duhalde comprised five legislative periods, while the 
mandate of President Saá lasted only for one week, after being appointed by the Congress under 
severe economic circumstances. The small number of units of analysis prevents stronger 
statistical claims. 
I have not eliminated the legislative periods of the presidential mandate of Carlos Menem, 
who also ruled Argentina in times of true Necessity and Urgency, particularly until 1993. The 
reason is that Menem promoted most of his contentious legislation by Decrees issued based on 
   
DNU 
presented 
Success-rate of NPL sent 
to Congress 
DNU presented Pearson Correlation 1 -,066
  Sig. (2-tailed)  ,732
  N 29 29
Success-rate of NPL sent to 
Congress 
Pearson Correlation -,066 1
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,732  
  N 29 29
   DNU presented 
Success-rate of NPL 
sent to Congress 
DNU presented Pearson Correlation 1 -,232
  Sig. (2-tailed)   ,274
  N 24 24
Success-rate of NPL sent to 
Congress 
Pearson Correlation -,232 1
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,274  
  N 24 24
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two special laws of delegation passed by Congress: Law 23.696/1990 (Reform of the State) and 
Law 23.697/1990 (Economic Emergency Law). I do not consider these Decrees as being DNU. 
The passing of a law of delegation represents a willing abdication of the Congress from policy-
making on a limited period and the Decrees issued based on such law are theoretically irrelevant 
for this argument, as I have argued earlier in the chapter. 
This methodological choice is as questionable as the legal status of DNU in Argentina until 
the constitutional reform of 1994 (Rubio Ferreira and Goretti, 1995; Rubio Ferreira and Goretti, 
2000), which I will address later in the chapter. Nevertheless, the correlation between the 
success-rate of presidential NPL and the volume of DNU is only a moderate one. The negative 
slope of the linear regression further shown below indicates some reasonable relationship 
between the success-rate of NPL and the volume of DNU: the lower the success-rate of 
presidential NPL, the higher the number of DNU. 
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The congressional resistance to presidential NPL, as reflected in the success-rate, is indeed 
part of the cause of a high number of DNU, but this is not entirely relevant for causality. In other 
words, the Argentine Congress does oppose the President as proved by the success-rate of NPL. 
However, the Argentine Presidents do issue more DNU than required by the success-rate of their 
NPL. I will explain this empirical finding in the section dealing with the institutional veto-
players. 
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Thus far, I have shown that Argentina is not ruled by DNU in the aftermath of its 
authoritarian regime. I have also shown that the Argentine Congress does react to presidential 
policy initiatives attempting to hold the President to account. Most importantly, I have revealed a 
moderate negative correlation between the success-rate of presidential NPL and the volume of 
issued DNU. 
However, the most puzzling empirical finding so far is the congressional opposition to 
presidential NPL even in case of ideological convergence between the Congress and the 
President. What explains such opposition? Ideological convergence between the President and 
the congressional majority should translate first and foremost into a high capacity to negotiate 
policy, reflected in a high success-rate of presidential NPL. Is there any other causally relevant 
factor that would explain the tendency of the President to issue DNU more than made necessary 
by the congressional opposition to presidential NPL? 
I will attempt to answer these questions by further exploring the dynamic of congressional 
coalitions in relation to the President and also by comparing the success-rate of NPL to the 
success-rate of DNU in order to find any theoretically relevant differences. 
I will explore the formation of congressional coalitions in order to understand their 
legislative behaviour by looking at the party system and the electoral system in Argentina. 
Understanding how coalitions form is instrumental in understanding their legislative behaviour, 
even more so their different strategies when dealing with different presidential initiatives (either 
NPL or DNU). 
The distinction between party discipline and legislative discipline is an instrumental one in 
the case of Argentina, given its regionalized party system. The legislative behaviour of the 
Argentine members of the Congress is controlled by local party leaders from provincial level, as 
opposed to party systems where the national leadership controls the legislative behaviour of 
legislators through the floor leaders.  
The Argentine electoral rules place the power of nomination in the hands of influential local 
party leaders, through the control of a closed-lists PR system (Jones et al.., 2000; Calvo and 
Murillo, 2005; Jones and Hwang, 2005). Furthermore, the party leadership is not a unified one: 
although the national leadership exerts a certain degree of influence on provincial level 
leadership, the locus of partisan power stays at provincial level, which is made of a constellation 
of district-level party organizations. 
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The Argentine PJ (Partido Justicialista), is the paradigmatic example of this type of party 
organization (Levitsky, 2001). It is centred on local leaders to such an extent that it ran three 
different candidates for the presidency in the national elections of 2003, after each one of them 
created a new party as an electoral vehicle, registered at the local level24. 
Furthermore, there are situations in which the same political party registers different 
congressional groups. This explains the high level of congressional fragmentation, despite the 
low number of effective parties in Congress (Molinelli, Palanza y Sin, 1999: 277-278). 
Other examples of factionalized parties are the Japanese Liberal Democrats (Cox and 
Rosenbluth, 1996) and the Italian Christian Democrats (Sartori, 1982). Both in the case of Japan 
and Italy, the factions are not regional, but form around leaders, according to the varying degrees 
of ideological orientation within the same party (Sartori, 1982). The formation of factions in the 
Argentine parties is centred on strong leaders controlling resources at the local level and it is 
mainly resource-oriented, rather than policy-oriented. 
The Argentine local leaders sometimes recommend or even mandate voting against the 
national party line, if their personal political fortunes or the constituency interests are at stake. In 
order to obtain the collaboration of legislators, the floor leadership of each party has to ensure 
the support of provincial party bosses, sometimes by pressuring the President to offer them 
financial incentives (Jones et al., 2000: 5). Therefore, party discipline does exist in the Argentine 
Congress, but it plays out it in a different dynamic than in centralized party systems that are 
organized nationally. Legislators are disciplined mainly (but not exclusively) in relation to the 
provincial leadership. 
The very same legislators exhibit varying degrees of discipline in relation to the President, 
depending on circumstances: if the local leaders who control their careers ask them to do so or if 
their local leaders are weaker than the President in allocating resources. The latter situation is 
encountered when they represent a province where their party boss does not control resources 
other than the access to the party list. The support of the Argentine legislative coalitions cannot 
be counted on, unless the President negotiates with the party bosses, or unless the President can 
offer more to a legislator than his or her local party leader.  
                                                 
24 Information collected through personal interviews and discussions with Argentine scholars and researchers in 
Buenos Aires, between March and May 2007. 
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The Argentine Congress reached very high levels of fragmentation under President Kirchner, 
to the extent that even some members of the opposition UCR (Unión Cívica Radical) chose to 
support the President under the name of Radicales-K (“K” stood for the ideologically-opposed 
President Kirchner). The coalitional dynamic had been decided ad hoc, on an issue-by-issue 
basis, according to the resources offered as an incentive by the President. The tactic was 
successful, as long as the local party leaders were not in the position to offer the Radicales-K 
anything more than one legislative term, while supporting the popular Nestor Kirchner could also 
garner resources and popular electoral support for the Radicales-K themselves.25 
This has not always been the case with the Argentine political parties and their congressional 
behaviour, and certainly some parties or individual legislators are more resource oriented than 
others. Traditionally, the current opposition UCR had been a party with consistent ideological 
loyalties, but the decline of its electoral fortunes throughout the last decade led to increasingly 
easy to buy out legislators.  
The PJ is probably the best example of a party with strong ideological orientation, so strong 
that some of its factions engaged in terrorist activities against the government in the 1970s. 
However, given its “movementist” nature and loose organization centred on strong leaders, it had 
been exposed to the phenomenon of legislative desertion of various factions or individuals. The 
more ideologically-oriented factions strongly supported the traditional PJ economic statist 
policies throughout the 1990s, voting against the policies of liberalization and privatization of the 
PJ President Carlos Menem (Llanos, 2001; Negretto, 2004: 557). Other factions voted against 
Menem in the Congress simply because they supported the presidential bid of other Peronist 
leaders, such as Eduardo Duhalde. 
In addition to intra-partisan divisions, the presence of small provincial parties is another 
factor that increases the fragmentation of the Argentine Congress. These parties have only a few 
legislators representing just their province, such as Partido Bloquista from the San Juan 
province, Movimiento Popular Fueguino from the province of Tierra del Fuego, Fuerza 
Republicana from the province of Tucumán or Movimiento Popular Neuquino, from the province 
                                                 
25 This information had been collected through personal interviews and discussions with Argentine scholars and 
researchers in Buenos Aires, March-May 2007. 
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of  Neuquén.26 Some of them are strong at local level, such as Movimiento Popular Neuquino, 
which had been in power in the province of Neuquén since 1993. However, the Argentine 
provincial parties would not be able to pass any legislative initiative on their own and therefore 
become very versatile in changing sides across the main partisan divisions, depending on the 
policy issues and the financial incentives or policy concessions they are offered.  
Therefore, the Argentine Congress is highly fragmented and polarized despite the low 
number of effective political parties. The causes of fragmentation and polarization are the 
regionalized nature of the party system centred on local leaders and the presence of small, easy 
to buy out, provincial parties. 
How does the partisan fragmentation affect the capacity of Congress to hold the President to 
account? More specifically, how does the partisan fragmentation influence the capacity of the 
Argentine Congress to amend or reject presidential legislative initiatives of any type, be they 
NPL or DNU? 
Empirical information reveals that presidential NPL is met with resistance by the fragmented 
congressional coalitions and its success-rate is not as high as existing literature assumed, but not 
necessarily because NPL is rejected. The Argentine Congress acts more like a ‘blunt veto-player’ 
than an active one, when it comes to presidential NPL:27 it does not vote against it, but simply 
drags-on discussions without any final decision until the NPL become caduco, i.e., lapsed after 
two years of congressional inaction.28  
The cause of this peculiar legislative behaviour is the strong presidential veto power on any 
decision of the Congress. The President can veto any law passed by Congress, returning the 
policy issue to the previous status quo. The Constitution further strengthens the presidential 
power by requiring a two-thirds majority of congressional votes in order to override the 
presidential veto, which in turn is difficult to assemble given the fragmentation and polarization 
of congressional coalitions explained above. This ample presidential leeway in dealing with 
                                                 
26 The information on the legislative behaviour of small provincial parties in the Argentine Congress was collected 
through personal research interviews and discussions with Argentine scholars and researchers in Buenos Aires. For 
further information on the congressional behaviour of provincial parties see Llanos, 2002: 118-119. 
27  For a detailed analysis of the capacity of Legislatures to oppose the Executive, see Jones et al., 2000: 6. On a 
continuum of legislative efficiency, a blunt veto-player Congress would rank somewhere between the extreme 
rubberstamp institution assumed by the democratization literature and the ideal locus of policy design and 
supervision described by the literature on the US Congress, being a situation in which the Congress reacts, rather 
than acts, doing so sporadically and inefficiently. 
28 Law 13.640 on the sanctioning of legislative proposals 
(Hhttp://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/camunicipales/archivo/ley13640.htmlH)  
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congressional opposition is compounded by the system specific independence of the Executive 
mandate from legislative support, as opposed to parliamentary systems where the capacity to 
remove the Executive from office grants legislative coalitions increased bargaining power.  
Facing the futility of congressional action (given the strong presidential veto power) the 
partisan veto-players in Congress use the only legislative resource that can constitute some form 
of threat against the President, albeit a weak one: the tacit rejection of presidential NPL through 
its delay until it lapses. Here the complicated legislative procedure that allows the partisan actors 
to send one piece of legislation from one Chamber to another up to five times (until the reform of 
1994) and still up to three times (after the reform of 1994) is a gate-keeping resource that used 
when delaying the presidential NPL.29 
From a rational perspective, the gate-keeping and delay powers are literally the only 
legislative resources the Argentine parties have at their disposal that could change the policy of 
the President.30 It would simply be irrational to dedicate effort and risk electoral fortunes voting 
against the presidential NPL, amending or rejecting it, only to have the final version easily 
vetoed by the President, bringing the policy back to the presidential preference, which in turn is 
almost impossible to reverse given the two-thirds veto-override requirement.  
From an institutional perspective, the Argentine Congress appears to be an institution that 
can formulate its own policy views, given its share of legislative initiative slightly lower than the 
presidential NPL between 1983 and 1989 and slightly higher than the same presidential NPL 
between 1989 and 1995 (Mustapic, 2000: 30). On the other hand, it also appears to be an 
institution that reacts sporadically and mostly in a blunt manner to the presidential policy 
initiatives forwarded to its attention through NPL by exercising gate-keeping and other types of 
delay strategies (Jones et al., 2000: 24). 
In this section I have showed that the low success-rate of NPL initiated by the Argentine 
President is explained by the strategies of tacit rejection used by the fragmented and polarized 
partisan veto-players in Congress, which use delay strategies and gate-keeping resources in an 
attempt to force the President negotiate policy. The strong presidential veto-power on any 
                                                 
29 See the sanctioning of legislative proposals in the Argentine Congress at 
Hhttp://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dip/congreso/diagrama_del_mecanismo_de_sancio.htmH  
30 Other congressional resources, such as Written Inquiries (Palanza, 2005) are also used by the Argentine members 
of the Congress, but they do not have the capacity to change the policy of the President, merely contributing to a 
better informational level of the Congress, or used as weak bargaining tools in a larger negotiation context. 
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decision of the Congress makes the delay strategies and the gate-keeping resources the only 
available means of negotiation, albeit weak ones.   
How are the DNU treated by a Congress exhibiting a high number of partisan veto-players 
acting with a scarcity of legislative resources? If the partisan veto-players attempt to force the 
President to negotiate policy by delaying the NPL until it lapses in Congress, how do the same 
partisan veto-players react when confronted with the presidential policies promoted by DNU? I 
will attempt to answer this question in the next section. 
 
 
3. Institutional veto-player power: the legal status of Emergency decrees 
 
 
The DNU should be rejected or amended extensively, particularly when the Congress is 
active in opposing other types of presidential legislative resources, such as the NPL. This 
expectation is contradicted by empirical information. The DNU have an astoundingly high 
success-rate as shown in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Success-rate of DNU in Argentina since 1983. 
Presidency I. DNU issued II.DNU success 
Alfonsin 1983-1989 (11) 100% (11) 
Menem 1989-1999 (248) 99% (246) 
De la Rúa 1999-2001 (52) 94% (49) 
Saá 1 week Dec. 2001 (6) 100% (6) 
Duhalde 2002-2003 (151) 99% (150) 
Kirchner 2003-2006 (231) 100% (231) 
Total 1983-2006 (699) 99% (693) 
 
Existing literature found that if legislative inaction and ratification are counted together as 
favourable responses to a DNU, 92% of these strong agenda-setting instruments had been 
successful without amendments (Negretto, 2004: 553). The empirical information on which this 
chapter is based shows an even higher success-rate of 99% (see Table 3 above), but still close 
enough to the empirical findings of existing literature to indicate a high degree of reliability of 
empirical information. 
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What explains the differences between the success-rate of NPL (62% on average since 1983) 
and the success-rate of DNU (99% on average since 1983)? The Argentine congressional 
coalitions are ostensibly active in opposing the NPL through delay strategies, but seem utterly 
incapable of rejecting the DNU, which undermine their legislative function. The difference in the 
success-rate of the two presidential legislative resources (NPL and DNU) can only be explained 
by possible differences in their legal status, as defined in Constitution. 
According to the institutional veto-player model explained in the literature review and 
theoretical chapter of the thesis, the success-rate of the DNU is determined by the combination 
between its legal status (full law or simple legislative proposal) and the rules governing its 
treatment in the Legislature (tacit rejection, tacit approval and the degree of Executive veto 
power on the decision of the Legislature). 
The Argentine presidents had only three types of decree power until the 1994 constitutional 
reform (Rubio Ferreira and Goretti, 1998: 33): rule-making Decrees in the course of 
implementing legislation, autonomous Decrees based on constitutionally endowed presidential 
powers and delegated Decrees as outcome of a special law of delegation passed by the Congress 
allowing the President to legislate in clearly defined policy areas and for a fixed period. 
Furthermore, the Constitution granted the President emergency Decree powers in the case of 
a state of siege declared by Congress or the President in situations of interior unrest or external 
attacks on the country, when civil rights can be suspended. Even in such extreme circumstances, 
the Decree power did not include the right to legislate (Rubio Ferreira and Goretti, 1998: 34). It 
should be emphasized here that all the Decree types defined by the Argentine Constitution do not 
represent legislative initiatives. They are simple administrative acts of the President in the course 
of exercising presidential prerogatives. This aspect is highly relevant when accounting for the 
success-rate of DNU, given that when the Argentine president issues a DNU, he is actually 
issuing law. The DNU need not be approved in Congress to have full legal effect including 
before the Courts (Rubio Ferreira and Goretti, 1998: 33). The President only needs to inform the 
Congress that he has issued a DNU, presenting the legislative body with a de jure fait accompli, 
and not only with a de facto, political one. 31  
                                                 
31 I acknowledge the useful explanations offered by Delia Ferreira Rubio during my research trip to Argentina in 
March-May 2007, who eloquently explained that according to Kelsen’s law pyramid (Kelsen, 1989), the DNU had 
been equal to a law passed by Congress, on the second place as importance in the body of law, after the 
Constitution, but existing and being used outside the constitutional system. After the constitutional reform of 1994, 
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The 1853 Constitution did not include any specific provisions regulating the DNU, but 
various Presidents had made use of it claiming that circumstances out of the ordinary require 
them to legislate directly and bypass the Congress to expedite the policy-making process in times 
of necessity and urgency: 25 DNU had been issued between 1853 and 1983 in circumstances 
such as internal civil unrest or the economic crisis of the 1930s. President Raul Alfonsin (1983-
1989) has issued 11 DNU in serious situations such as the change of the national currency 
(Ferreira Rubio and Goretti, 1995: 78).32 
This legal limbo has been consolidated by the decision of the Argentine Supreme Court, 
which ruled that DNU is a valid legislative instrument of the President in 1990, whilst deciding 
on the constitutionality of DNU 36/1990 creating a forced public loan system (Negretto, 2004: 
551). The only two conditions set forth by the Court were the existence of “serious social 
danger” requiring the adoption of rapid measures, and a Congress that “does not adopt decisions 
different from the decree on the involved issues of economic policy” (Negretto, 2004: 552). 
Neither of the two conditions represented a significant constraint on the presidential use of DNU: 
deciding what constitutes serious social danger rests completely with the President, while the 
will of the Congress could prevail only if initiating a new law either specifically rejecting the 
DNU or regulating the same policy area. This would be a costly and inefficient option, given the 
strong presidential veto power on any law passed in the Congress, as I have explained earlier. 
Firstly, the legal status of the DNU strategically favours the agenda-setting power of the 
President through the para-constitutional rule of tacit approval (Negretto, 2004: 552). The DNU 
had always been considered approved by Congress even in cases of congressional inaction. The 
para-constitutional tacit approval of the DNU is exactly the opposite of the Italian tacit rejection 
of DL: the expression of a total relegation of the Argentine Congress from any policy area that is 
regulated by recourse to this strong constitutional resource of the President.  
Secondly, given that a DNU is equal to a law passed by Congress, it can be amended or 
rejected accordingly: proposing and passing a new law. However, as I have already mentioned in 
the previous section, the President can entirely veto or partially modify with a line veto any law 
passed by the Congress, including the laws initiated by legislators. Furthermore, overriding the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the DNU retains its place within the pyramid as equal to a law passed by the Congress, superior to other types of 
decrees, only this time included in the constitutional system by Article 99.3. 
32 There is an ongoing legal-constitutional debate about the status of the DNU in Argentina before 1994, but the 
para-constitutional use of this instrument had been made possible by a flexible interpretation of its nature by the 
Supreme Court of the country. 
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presidential veto requires a two-thirds majority in Congress, almost impossible to achieve, given 
the high fragmentation of the Argentine Congress and the specific legislative coalitional 
dynamic, as I had also shown in the previous section. This is exactly the opposite as in the case 
of a similar decree power in Brasil (Negretto, 2004), Italy (Della Sala and Krepel, 1998), or 
Romania (Constitution of 1991 and 200333), where the equivalent of the Argentine DNU is a 
special legislative proposal, albeit one with immediate legal effect, which must be endorsed in 
the Legislature before it can formally become law. 
Therefore, the institutional veto-player configuration allows the President to sustain a DNU 
in its initial form with the support of only one-third of legislators, imposing his policy views in a 
highly favourable institutional set-up (Negretto, 2004: 552-553). The outcome is that the vast 
majority of DNU have a very high success-rate (see Table 3 on page 134 earlier). Most often, the 
DNU is not even discussed in Congress, given its legal status explained earlier (Rubio Ferreira 
and Goretti, 1998: 51-53). 
Saying that a DNU had passed without amendments would be erroneous and misleading, 
since the DNU does not actually have to “pass” any congressional scrutiny to act as full law, as 
with the NPL. Nevertheless, there are many congressional legislative initiatives challenging 
various DNU, either with outright rejection or amending (122 between 1999 and 2007)34.Given 
the presidential veto powers on any law coming out of the Congress, the vast majority of these 
congressional initiatives end up neither rejected nor approved, failing the 2-year constitutional 
deadline for decision.  
Only ten congressional legislative initiatives challenging a DNU either with rejection or 
amending have ended up in congressional debate and decision between 1999 and 2007: one had 
been retracted by the Members of Congress who initiated it, one had been a declaration 
appealing to the goodwill of the President to reconsider a DNU, one had been rejected by the 
Congress, five passed in one chamber but lapsed in the other becoming caduco, and only two had 
passed the congressional debate and succeeded in either rejecting or amending a presidential 
DNU.  
                                                 
33 Hhttp://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=371H  
34 According to the empirical information on which the current thesis is based, provided by Dirección de 
Información Parlamentaria (DIP) of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies in the form of two separate documents, 
Trabajo Especial 282 of 9th April 2007 and Trabajo Especial 304 of 16th April 2007, as outcome of a formal written 
request. 
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The attempt to reject or amend a DNU became so futile, that the Argentine members of the 
Congress developed a different practice in dealing with it: appealing to the goodwill of the 
President by issuing Declarations (an official act of the Congress, but with no legal effect) 
literally asking the President to reconsider a specific DNU on policy grounds.35 
Therefore, the major difference between the NPL and the DNU is their respective legal 
status. The first is a legislative proposal and it requires treatment and debate in Congress before 
it can become law and produce legal effects. The partisan veto-players in the Congress latch on 
this slim opportunity to go against a presidential initiative and delay the NPL as much as they 
can, until it lapses after failing the constitutional deadline for debate and decision, in an attempt 
to force some form of negotiation on the President. Voting against the presidential NPL would 
expose the congressional action to the strong institutional veto powers of the President. 
The DNU has been a law as such until 2006 (given its para-constitutional status). The 
Congress had no legal/institutional power to delay its discussion and decision as it did with the 
NPL. The only congressional action against a DNU had been the initiation of a new law by the 
Congress dealing with a specific DNU directly (amending or rejecting it) or regulating the same 
policy issue as the DNU.  
Nevertheless, the presidential veto power on the congressional decisions on NPL and DNU is 
the same for both acts. It becomes clear that the President enjoys stronger institutional veto 
powers when using the DNU than when using the NPL. The excessive recourse to the former 
comes as no surprise. 
Thus far in this section I have explained why the DNU are preferred by the Argentine 
Presidents to the NPL. The DNU simply grant more institutional veto-power to the President 
than the NPL, through the combination of legal status (para-constitutional law) and the veto 
powers on the decision of the Congress.  
How did the constitutional reform of 1994 change the legal status of DNU and did the change 
have any effect at all on the level of accountability of the Argentine President to the Congress? I 
will attempt to answer this question next in this section. 
                                                 
35 An example would the project of Declaration 3995-D-2001 initiated by a group of deputies from the opposition 
parties FREPASO, ARI and Frente para el Cambio. It had been approved in the Chamber on 24th October 2001, 
asking the President to annul DNU 815/2001 dealing with the reform of the social security system, particularly 
regarding public transport passes and meal vouchers for employees. 
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The inclusion of the DNU in the article 99.3 of the Constitution after the constitutional 
reform that took place in 1994 practically retains the same major feature: the DNU remains a law 
not requiring compulsory discussion and decision in Congress. The inclusion of the DNU in 
Constitution on such terms represents an actual reinforcement of the President’s power as long as 
the same legal status of full law is transformed from para-constitutional to constitutional, 
formalizing the strong presidential agenda-setting power (Ferreira Rubio y Goretti, 1995: 89). 
However, the 1994 constitutional reform did introduce a few regulations regarding the use 
and treatment of the DNU. The President cannot issue a DNU on matters of taxation, penal code, 
elections or political parties (Rubio Ferreira y Goretti, 1995: 90).  
The new constitutional provisions require that a DNU must be forwarded to the Congress 
within ten days after being issued, specifically sent to a special bicameral Committee, which will 
discuss it and make recommendations to the Congress on approval, amending or rejection. This 
condition came after some DNU had never been forwarded to the Congress, particularly in the 
early 1990s, given the para-constitutional status of full law.  
Another provision stipulates that the decision of issuing a DNU has to benefit from the 
support of all ministers and the Chief of the presidential Cabinet, while the Congress has to deal 
with the DNU immediately. This constitutional provision attempted to prevent the President 
from acting discretionary when issuing DNU. 
The new constitutional provisions in place since 1994 do not constrain the use of DNU by the 
President. The exclusion of the afore-mentioned policy fields responds more to a question of 
principle, rather than constraining the actual issuing of DNU, while the Chief of Cabinet (as any 
other member of the Cabinet) can be removed by the President at any moment, therefore 
removing any incentives to oppose the issuing of DNU (Rubio Ferreira y Goretti, 1995: 90).  
Furthermore, the 1994 Constitution stipulates that the Congress has to pass a specific law for 
setting up of the bicameral Committee dealing with a DNU. Such a law would also better 
regulate procedural matters, like amending or rejection of any DNU, the presidential veto on a 
law initiated by the Congress repealing a DNU, the rule of procedure in case a DNU is sent 
simultaneously to the Senate and the Chamber, the outcome of congressional inaction towards a 
DNU, or the outcome of no congressional decision after discussing a DNU.  
However, the law setting up the special Committee and detailing the procedural matters 
applying to the treatment of the presidential DNU had not been passed in Congress until 2006, 
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for almost 12 years after the constitutional reform of 1994. Whenever the opposition initiated the 
law, the party of the President ensured its rejection with the support of smaller, easy to buy out 
congressional parties or partisan splinters of the major political parties.36 
Once the opposition managed to win the next elections, it did the same, repealing the law 
initiated by the parties who supported the previous President, now in the opposition. This game 
of initiation-rejection of the special law setting up the Committee and regulating the procedural 
matters for the treatment of DNU went on for almost 12 years, always ending in rejection of any 
provision that would truly constrain the use of DNU. The outcome of this reluctance on the part 
of Argentine political parties to constrain the use of DNU and hold the President accountable led 
to a situation where the rule of tacit approval established by the afore-mentioned 1990 Peralta 
decision of the Supreme Court regulated the legal validity of DNU until 2006 (Negretto, 2004: 
553). 
The constraints imposed on the presidential DNU power by the 1994 constitutional changes 
are hardly significant, given the loopholes left by the constitutional reform and the lack of 
willingness on the part of the political parties to pass the law setting up the specialized 
Committee. The issuing of DNU has increased after 1994, as compared to the use of presidential 
NPL (see Table 4 below). 
 
Table 4: Constitutional reform of 1994 and the use of DNU and NPL. 
  
I. DNU issued 
 
II. NPL issued 
 
III.NPL success 
 
Before 1994 
 
 
13% (161) 
 
87% (1085) 
 
64% (693) 
 
After 1994 
 
 
30% (538) 
 
70% (1246) 
 
60% (742) 
 
It could be hypothesized that the Argentine Presidents increased the number of DNU as 
compared to NPL as an outcome of congressional resistance to their policy initiatives, as in the 
case of Italy (della Sala and Krepel, 1998). However, as Column III in Table 4 above shows, this 
is hardly the case: the success-rate of presidential NPL remains almost the same before and after 
                                                 
36 This information had been collected through personal interviews and discussions with Argentine scholars and 
researchers in Buenos Aires, March-May 2007. 
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the constitutional reform: 64% before 1994 and 60% after 1994. The decrease in the success-rate 
of presidential NPL is only 4%, while the 17% increase in the use of DNU is disproportionately 
higher (see the difference between 13% DNU issuing before reform and 30% after the reform in 
Column I in Table 4 above). 
The policy-making structures of the Argentine political system, both partisan and 
congressional, remain the same after 1994, leading to the same success-rate of presidential NPL. 
This finding is similar to the situation in Italy, explained in the previous chapter, and indicates 
that the cause of an excessive use of Executive decrees is the persistence of partisan legislative 
structures, while the institutional structure determines the respective success and amending rates 
of DNU. Furthermore, empirical information shows that Carlos Menem, long considered the 
most “dictatorial” of all Argentine presidents after 1983, did not ruled Argentina by DNU either 
when considering the issuing (volume of issued DNU compared to volume of initiated NPL).  
The case of Menem ruling by DNU has attracted a good deal of scholarly (Rubio Ferreira y 
Goretti, 1995; Rubio Ferreira and Goretti, 1998; Llanos, 2001) and media attention37. President 
Menem had been taken as standard reference of high DNU issuing and all other Presidents had 
been compared to him. The empirical evidence indicates that Menem’s use of DNU after the 
constitutional reform of 1994 is the same as before (see Column I Table 5 below). 
 
Table 5: DNU and NPL of Carlos Menem before and after constitutional reform. 
  
I. DNU issued 
 
 
II.NPL issued 
 
III. NPL success 
 
Menem before reform 
 
 
23% (150) 
 
77% (505) 
 
57% (287) 
 
Menem after reform 
 
 
23% (198) 
 
77% (665) 
 
61% (406) 
 
The assumption that the constitutional reform as such, with its irrelevant regulations 
regarding the DNU, led to decreased DNU issuing proves to be unsubstantiated. As was 
emphasized the DNU issuing trend had picked up pace once again towards the end of the 1990s, 
under Menem himself, as an effect of economic deterioration, despite Menem’s overall 
                                                 
37 See Capriata in footnote 12 on page 52.  
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decreased issuing of DNU during his second mandate (Rubio Ferreira and Goretti, 2000) (see 
Table 6 below). 
 
Table 6: Use and success-rate of DNU and NPL for Carlos Menem by mandate. 
  
I.DNU issued 
 
 
II.NPL issued 
 
III.NPL Success 
 
Carlos Menem 1989-1995 
 
 
20% (154) 
 
80% (611) 
 
61% (375) 
 
Carlos Menem 1995-1999 
 
 
15% (94) 
 
85% (559) 
 
57% (318) 
 
In other words, although Menem had issued less DNU during his second mandate, he 
increasingly resorted to DNU towards the end of his tenure in power, as he confronted an 
increased congressional opposition, as already explained earlier in this country chapter. 
Menem did not issue more DNU than NPL throughout his two mandates in power. The ratio 
between DNU and NPL has actually improved during his second mandate, when he ruled more 
accountable to the Congress than during his first mandate.  
Despite the notable increase in presidential power during Menem’s two mandates (Rubio 
Fereirra and Goretti, 1998; Llanos, 2001; Negretto, 2004) empirical information indicates that he 
is a president who uses DNU under extreme economic circumstances and sends most of his 
policy initiatives to Congress through NPL or through Decrees issued based on special laws of 
delegation of legislative power passed by the Congress, as shown earlier in the chapter. 
However, this is not to say that Menem did not manipulate the Courts or engage in acts of 
corruption.  
In this section I have shown that the constitutional reform of 1994 reinforced the legal status 
of the DNU by turning it from a para-constitutional resource into a constitutional resource, while 
retaining its major legal features that grant the President excessive institutional veto powers 
when using this policy-imposition resource: the DNU remains a law until 2006 and any decision 
pertaining to its text or policy substance is exposed to the same strong presidential veto powers 
which require a two-thirds congressional majorities to override. The cause of recourse to DNU is 
congressional opposition to presidential NPL through delay and tacit rejection, but the excessive 
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use of DNU is explained by its iron-clad constitutional design favouring the President, which 
guarantees its success. 
I will next show how the constitutional design of the DNU totally in favour of the President 
distorts the intentions of the latter. It leads to a higher volume of approved DNU than the volume 
of approved NPL in the final body of approved presidential legislation. 
Thus far I have revealed the structural causes that explain the increasing trend in DNU 
issuing and the high success-rate of this policy-imposition resource of the Argentine President. 
The partisan veto-players in the Congress make the recourse to DNU necessary when they 
oppose the presidential NPL, while the institutional veto power favouring the President leads to a 
steep increase in DNU issuing and a high DNU success-rate since 1983. I have also shown that 
the constitutional reform of 1994 has strengthened the presidential DNU power rather than 
constraining it.  
The veto-player configuration of the institutional policy-making structures of Argentina 
favours the DNU to such an extent that it distorts the intentions of the President. Comparing the 
volume of issued DNU to the volume of issued NPL reveals the policy-making intentions of the 
President, more precisely the extent to which the Argentine President is willing to undermine the 
legislative function of the Congress in order to impose his or her own policy views when using 
DNU.  
However, another comparison becomes more relevant at this stage of the argument: namely 
between the volume of approved DNU and the volume of approved NPL. The picture that is 
revealed is devastating for the Argentine democracy: the DNU end up constituting a higher than 
initially intended percentage of successful policy initiatives. In other words, the policy-making 
“grinder” of partisan and institutional structures of accountability distorts the presidential 
intentions, as reflected in the ratio between approved DNU and approved NPL (see Table 7 
below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
147 
 
Table 7: Volume issued DNU and NPL compared to volume of successful DNU and NPL 
Presidency I. DNU issued/NPL issued II. DNU Succ/NPL Succ. 
Alfonsin DNU: 2% (11) NPL: 98% (590) 
DNU: 3% (11) 
NPL: 97% (401) 
Menem DNU: 18% (248)  NPL: 82% (1170) 
DNU:26% (246) 
NPL: 74% (693) 
De la Rua DNU: 24% (52)  NPL: 76% (166) 
DNU:30% (49) 
NPL: 70% (114) 
Saá DNU: 60% (6) NPL: 40% (4) 
DNU:100% (6) 
NPL: 0% (0) 
Duhalde DNU: 54% (151)  NPL: 46% (127) 
DNU:68% (150) 
NPL: 32% (72) 
Kirchner DNU: 46% (231)  NPL: 54% (274) 
DNU:60% (231) 
NPL: 40% (155) 
Total DNU: 23% (699)  NPL: 77% (2331) 
DNU:33% (693) 
NPL: 67% (1435) 
 
All Argentine Presidents issued a lower ratio DNU/NPL than the ratio of approved 
DNU/approved NPL. The most important observation is that this trend increases over time from 
President Alfonsín to President Kirchner. 
President Raúl Alfonsín promoted 2% of his policy initiatives by DNU and 98% by NPL. 
After going through Congress, the volume of approved DNU in the total volume of approved 
presidential legislation became 3% (50% higher than the volume of issued DNU) while the 
volume of approved NPL is 97% (almost the same as the initial intention of 98%).  
President Menem promoted 18% of his policy initiatives by DNU and 82% by NPL. The 
volume of approved DNU compared to the volume of approved NPL is 26% vs.. 74%. The 
difference between his intention to rule by DNU (volume of issued DNU of 18%) and the actual 
outcome (volume of approved DNU of 26%) is an increase of 44%.  
The same holds true for all other Presidents. The outcome is that the Argentine Presidents 
promote only 23% of their policy views by DNU since 1983 (Column I in Total row in Table 7 
above), while the country ends up being ruled by DNU 33% (Column II in Total row in Table 7 
above). This constitutes a noticeable 50% difference between intentions and outcome.  
The cause is not congressional acquiescence to DNU, as I have shown earlier, but the 
constitutional definition of this policy-imposition resource of the President (it would be 
misleading to consider the DNU a policy-bargaining resource since its constitutional definition 
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totally favours the President in relation to the Congress, precluding any bargaining by total 
imposition). 
 
 
4. Conclusion: excessive Decree issuing and inexistent Executive 
accountability 
 
 
In this chapter, I have shown that the Argentine Presidents issued an increasing number of 
DNU since the emergence of democracy in 1983 because their NPL was met with resistance by 
Congress, which makes use of gate-keeping and delay powers in order to force the President to 
negotiate policy. Nevertheless, the DNU was excessively used (more than made necessary by the 
congressional resistance to the presidential NPL) because the Constitution grants the President 
more power in relation to the Congress when using this resource.  
I have further shown that the very high success-rate of the DNU (particularly when compared 
to the success-rate of presidential NPL) is owed to the constitutional definition of this important 
Presidential resource.  
Most importantly, I have shown that the institutional veto-player structure of accountability 
completely in favour of the President leads to a higher volume of approved DNU in the total 
body of approved presidential legislation (i.e., approved DNU/approved NPL) than the volume 
of issued DNU compared to the volume of issued NPL. The outcome is an inexistent Executive 
accountability of the Argentine President to the Congress. 
  The findings of this chapter can be further improved by exploring the partisan structures of 
Argentina, given their reticence to change the constitutional design that excessively favours the 
President. The Argentine political parties had set up the specialized congressional Committee 
dealing with DNU 12 years after the constitutional reform of 1994, proving utterly incapable or 
totally unwilling to hold the President to account. 
This chapter did not focus on the role of the Argentine Congress in the process of policy-
makings, despite the existence of literature dealing with the topic: its share of legislative 
production, the success-rate of legislative congressional initiatives, the incidence of presidential 
veto on legislation initiated and passed by Congress and the success of the latter in overriding the 
presidential veto on its legislative initiatives turned into law (Mustapic y Goretti, 1991; Mustapic 
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and Goretti, 1993; Mustapic y Ferreti, 1995). The reason is the concern of this chapter with 
presidential accountability to the Congress in Argentina as a function of the success-rate of 
DNU, which has a specific theoretical relevance, as I have shown earlier in the thesis. 
The absence of Executive accountability is the outcome of an institutional veto-player 
structure of accountability in favour of the President to such an extent that it reinforces the 
tendency towards low Executive accountability induced by the partisan veto-player structure of 
accountability, instead of constraining it, as in the Italian case. The Argentine legislative 
coalitions simply cannot afford to push the negotiation game too far and hold the President 
accountable for his policy views, given that the President can always escape negotiation 
constraints bypassing the Congress with a DNU and vetoing any further possible legislative 
action against it. 
Given the scarcity of their legislative resources in relation to the President and the weak 
institutional veto power of the Congress, the Argentine legislative actors do make recourse to 
any other resource that would improve their bargaining position. They condition their legislative 
behaviour on electoral support whenever upcoming elections force the President to be more open 
to the demands of the legislative coalitions (Llanos, 2001, 2002). Besides this circumstantial 
accountability, the Argentine legislative coalitions hardly have any power resources that would 
impose Executive accountability.  
According to the coalition classification elaborated in the literature and theoretical review 
chapter, Argentina has weak Type 1 congressional coalitions that cannot ensure stable support 
for presidential policies. The incapacity to reach negotiated policy outcomes is compounded by 
the paucity of legislative resources of legislators in their direct relationship with the President. 
Although the coalition type present in Argentina is the same to the Italian one until 1993, the 
major difference between the two countries resides in the constitutional resources available to the 
partisan veto-player structure of accountability when dealing with an Executive decree. The 
political parties disperse the policy agenda mapping-out the Executive-Legislature relations in 
different ways in Italy and Argentina.  
The Italian partisan veto-players do make use of their solid legislative resources (rule of tacit 
rejection of DL and no Executive veto on the decision of the Parliament) and hold the Executive 
accountable for policy promoted by Decree, although they cannot offer it stable legislative 
support.  
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The Argentine partisan veto-players cannot offer constant congressional support, but they are 
not capable to hold the President to account for DNU either, given the rule of tacit approval and 
the strong presidential veto power on any decision of the Congress. As long as no credible 
legislative threat can be assembled against the President, the fragmentation and polarization 
works in favour of the latter, offering legitimacy to the bypassing of the Legislature with DNU 
whenever the legislative coalitions become excessively demanding. 
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Romania: excessive Decree issuing and low Executive 
accountability 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
  
This chapter explores the level of accountability of the Romanian Executive branch of 
government (Cabinet) by establishing the success-rate (amending and rejection) of Ordonanta de 
Urgenta a Guvernului (or OUG, the Romanian name of the Executive Decree exercised based on 
constitutional decree authority) in Parliament.  
This chapter is organized as follows: the first section explores the influence of partisan 
configurations in the Romanian Parliament on the propensity of the Executive to issue a large 
volume of OUG since 1992. I show that the Romanian political party system generates two types 
of legislative coalitions, exactly as in the Italian case: either weak, having a high level of 
fragmentation and polarization (Type 1 coalitions according to the classification in the literature 
and theoretical review), or strong, with a low level of fragmentation and polarization, therefore 
capable of passing through the Parliament any type of legislative proposal (Type 2 “dictatorial” 
coalitions according to the classification in the literature and theoretical review chapter).  
The two coalition types that the Romanian party system generates lead to a weak partisan 
veto-player structure of accountability. Romania is the only study case which also presents the 
Type 3 “balanced” type of coalition between 1992 and 1996 (according to the classification in 
the literature and theoretical review chapter). As I have explained in the literature review section, 
this coalition type can reach policy decisions only after negotiation and compromise, given its 
structure. Firstly, no senior coalition partner can impose its views on the junior partners. 
Secondly, the close ideological proximity among coalition partners allows them successfully to 
conclude policy negotiations. However, the Romanian party system did not replicate this type of 
coalition across the years since 1996 until 2007 (the last year for which this thesis has accounted 
for empirical information regarding the Executive legislative initiatives), given its fluid nature, as 
I will explain later. 
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The second section will present how the legal status of the OUG defined in the Romanian 
Constitutions of 1991 and 2003 affects the capacity of the Romanian Parliament to hold the 
Executive to account by rejecting and/or amending the OUG.  I argue that the lax definition of 
the OUG in the 1991 Constitution allows the Executive to easily bypass the Parliament in the 
process of policy-making. Furthermore, the Constitution of 2003 strengthens the capacity of the 
Romanian Executive to rule unaccountable to the Parliament: the legal status of the OUG is 
better defined, but in favour of the Executive.  
The third section offers some tentative conclusions about the dynamic relation between the 
Romanian Parliament and the Cabinet. The Romanian legal system favours the Executive 
without necessarily granting it the formal excessive policy-making powers by Decree that the 
Argentine President enjoys. Furthermore, the Romanian constitutional system does not deny the 
Parliament the capacity to react to an excessive use of OUG, as in the case of Argentina. It 
remains to be seen to what extent the Romanian Parliament makes use of its institutional veto-
player power and its success in holding the Executive accountable for policy promoted by OUG 
by rejecting and amending these acts. 
The empirical information this chapter is based on contains data for legislation initiated by 
the Romanian Executive through OUG and NPL between 1992 and 2007 in both the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate. I have used the data for Cabinets in power after November 1992 given 
that the OUG is regulated by the Constitution of December 1991. The Cabinet governing 
between September 1991 and November 1992 had been a technical one, put in power with 
parliamentary support after the violent street events of September 1991 under special 
circumstances. Furthermore, this technical Cabinet could not use OUG for the first part of its 
mandate given the inexistence of constitutional provisions. I chose to collect and interpret data 
for Executive-initiated legislation in both Chambers of the Parliament for reasons explained 
earlier in the thesis. 
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2. Legislative partisanship and the partisan veto-player structure of 
accountability 
 
 
2.a. The Romanian Parliament: weak, dictatorial and balanced legislative coalitions 
 
 
An important feature of the Romanian political landscape is the high number of effective 
parties in Parliament, revealing a highly fragmented Legislature throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s. Romania has constantly had a high number of parties that accessed the Parliament, 
particularly until 2004 (Stefan and Grecu, 2004): 13 parties entered the Parliament after the 
elections of 1992 and 1996. The introduction of 5% thresholds for individual parties and 10% for 
electoral alliances in 2000 reduced the number of parties in the Parliament to only 8, while the 
Parliament elected in 2004 still had 7 political parties38. 
The high number of parties in Parliament is already indicative of coalition governments, but 
in the context of ideologically polarized politics of post-Communism it shows that Romania has 
experienced fragmented Executive coalitions, with a generally high level of polarization. This 
has been particularly compounded by the excessive number of splits of political parties after 
gaining parliamentary representation. 
It would be difficult to argue that Romania has a structured party system, leading to 
predictable coalition alliances based on ideological orientation, generating a constant number of 
active parties in the Parliament, according to the classic definition of a political party system 
(Sartori, 1976). The number of parties competing in elections has varied across the years, with 
many exits and entries from and into the legislative arena. The Romanian partisan establishment 
has experienced a high number of fusions and splits, highly influenced by the interests of 
political leaders, renaming and changes in their declared ideological orientations (Stefan and 
Grecu, 2004). 
Emblematic for the fluidity of the still inchoate Romanian party system is the turning of the 
early 1990s FSN (Frontul Salvarii Nationale, or the Front of National Salvation) from a strongly 
                                                 
38 I draw extensively on Stefan and Grecu, 2004, when referring to the number of parties and their ideological 
polarization, as well as the number of partisan splits and fusions. I have also combined this information with 
empirical information on the composition of the legislative coalitions supporting the Executive available on the 
official website of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies (www.cdep.ro). 
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leftist party, which inherited the political legacy of the pre-1990s Romanian Communist Party, 
into two major political parties which currently occupy the centre-left of the Romanian political 
establishment (PSD, the Social Democratic Party) and the centre-right (PD-L, the Democratic-
Liberal Party). The latter emerged as the outcome of a fusion between the PD (Partidul 
Democrat, or the Democratic Party) and a leader-centred splinter from the PNL (the National 
Liberal Party) in late 2007. The process of organizational and ideological transformation of the 
left-right ideological divide lasted 17 years and is still an ongoing process. 
Similar to the Italian case, the Romanian political establishment organizes coalitions that 
govern the country based on direct negotiations among parties, in order to find a coalition 
formula whose members’ share of legislative seats would at least in theory ensure some form of 
governance stability.  
The Romanian political parties derive their power and ensure their access to the Executive 
office from their bargaining capacity and not from their electoral performance, leading to a 
democracy used by political parties for their exclusive interests (Barbu, 2003: 259). The 
examples of the centre-right executive coalitions (1996-2000 and 2004 – present) are illustrative 
in that sense: taken singly, the parties in the Executive had lower electoral scores than the main 
opposition party (the social democratic PDSR in 1996, renamed PSD in 2000)39.  
This type of coalition formation is specific to multi-partisan politics in parliamentary 
democracies, where the proportional representation electoral system with closed lists generates 
partisan fragmentation, which in turn leads to coalitional games in which the policy-platforms 
are less important than the distribution of government positions, managerial posts with state-run 
enterprises and public utility companies.  
The life of an Executive coalition had been highly conditioned by the relations among party 
leaders, by the specific interests of each member of the Executive coalition as well as by its 
importance in coalition. The government performance counted less for the cohesiveness of the 
Executive coalition than the political and economic interests of the parties in the coalition. The 
more fragmented and polarized the Executive coalition, the more difficult to conclude policy 
negotiations and reach decisions. Given the high fragmentation and low ideological definition of 
the Romanian partisan establishment, coalition instability has characterized most of the cabinets 
that governed the country. 
                                                 
39 Data from the official website of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies (www.cdep.ro). 
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Table 1: OUG and NPL issuing, success and amending rates since 199240  
 
 
As Table 1 above reveals, Romania has been ruled extensively by OUG since 1992 until the 
present day: the Executive promoted 48% of its policy initiatives through OUG and 52% by NPL 
(see row Total in Table 1 above).  
Secondly, the centre-right coalitions of Vasile, Isarescu and Tariceanu I and Tariceanu II, 
have many veto-players as I will explain later, governed mainly by OUG, particularly in times of 
extensive economic reforms (1996-2000) (see row Total in Column I in Table 1 above for each 
coalition).  
Thirdly, the increased use of OUG is not correlated to the level of success of Executive-
initiated NPL, as in the case of Italy (see Column III in Table 1 above). All Romanian 
Executives enjoyed high NPL success-rates, despite the fragmentation and polarization of the 
Parliament.  
This can be explained by the policy irrelevant content of these acts, given that close to 100% 
of policies are promoted by OUG. I will return to this important aspect later. As I will show later, 
the success-rate of OUG is very high, with an average amending rate (particularly compared to 
the Italian case, where the DL are heavily amended and frequently rejected, particularly through 
tacit rejection). This is already indicative of a Parliament that is acquiescent of the Executive 
                                                 
40 Data collected directly from the Library and the website of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies (www.cdep.ro). 
Coalition I. OUG issued II. NPL issued III. NPL Success 
VACAROIU 
19.11.1992 - 11.12.1996 (19) Info not available (369) 
CIORBEA 
11.12.1996 - 15.04.1998 39% (102) 61% (160) 91% (145) 
VASILE 
15.04.1998 - 21.12. 1999 58% (260) 42% (189) 77% (146) 
ISARESCU 
21.12.1999 - 28.12. 2000 78% (306) 22% (86) 91% (78) 
NASTASE 
28.12.2000 - 28.12.2004 47% (680) 53% (767) 95% (725) 
TARICEANU I 
28.12.2004 - 02.03.2007 51% (362) 49% (343) 95% (327) 
TARICEANU II 
03.03.2007- 19.12.2007 57% (145) 43% (109) 94% (103) 
TOTAL 
Romania 1992-2007 
 
48% (1874) 
 
52% (2023) (aprox.) 94% (1893) 
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practice of governance by OUG, although it could make use of its institutional resources to reject 
them. 
 
 
2.b. Partisan veto-players, legislative coalitions and governance by Emergency decree 
 
 
Despite the fluidity of partisan politics and the low importance of ideological orientations 
when organizing cabinets, coalitional patterns do emerge. Romania had been governed by seven 
Executive coalitions since 1992, all the outcome of post-electoral negotiations and/or intra-
coalition reshuffling (see Table 2 below). 
With the exception of the first Executive coalition under observation (Vacaroiu 1992 – 
1996), the centre-left has generated one strong and cohesive coalition (Nastase 2000-2004), with 
a low number of veto-players, able to pass legislation without having to negotiate with the 
opposition (I will explain the functioning of this particular coalition later in this chapter).  
The centre-right has generated five coalitions, all highly fragmented and ideologically 
polarized. The last centre-right coalition (supporting the Executive Tariceanu II in power since 
March 2007 until December 2008 when new elections took place) organized a minority 
Executive which governed in a climate of continuous political instability.  
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Table 2: the political composition of coalitions governing Romania since 1992. 
Coalitions Political composition 
1.VACAROIU 
19.11.1992 – 11.12. 1996 
(minority government with 
external support) 
FDSN (34.3%) 
PUNR (8.8%)+PRM (4.7%)+PSM (3.8%)+PDAR (only 
Senate representation) 
 
TOTAL : 51.6% 
2. CIORBEA 
11.12.1996 – 15.04.1998 
PNTCD (23.9%)+PNL (7.2%)+PNLCD (1.7%)+ PER 
(1.4%)+FER (0.3%)+PAR (0.8%)+PD (12.5%)+ 
PSDR (2.9%)+UDMR (7.2%) 
 
TOTAL: 57.9% 
3. VASILE 
16.04.1998 – 21.12.1999 
PNTCD (23.9%)+PNL (7.2%)+PNLCD (1.7%)+ PER 
(1.4%)+FER (0.3%)+PAR (0.8%)+PD (12.5%)+ 
PSDR (2.9%)+UDMR (7.2%) 
 
TOTAL: 57.9% 
4. ISARESCU 
22.12.1999 – 28.12. 2000 
PNTCD (23.9%)+PNL (7.2%)+PNLCD (1.7%)+ PER 
(1.4%)+FER (0.3%)+PAR (0.8%)+PD (12.5%)+ 
PSDR (2.9%)+UDMR (7.2%) 
 
TOTAL: 57.9% 
5. NASTASE 
29.12.2000 – 28.12. 2004 
PSD (40%)+PSDR (3.1%)+UDMR (7.8%)+PUR/PC 
(1.7%) 
 
TOTAL: 52.6% 
6. TARICEANU I 
29.12.2004 – 02.03.2007 
PNL (19.3) +PD (14.46%)+UDMR (7%)+PUR/PC 
(5.7%) 
 
TOTAL: 46.46% 
7. TARICEANU II 
03.03. 2007 –  December 2008 
(minority government) 
PNL (19.3%) + UDMR (7%) 
 
TOTAL: 26.3% 
 
The centre-right has also governed the country between 1996 and 2000, a period of extensive 
economic reforms and political turmoil, organizing three different coalitions literally among the 
same political parties, but with different Prime-Ministers (see Table 1 above for the Cabinets of 
PMs Ciorbea, Vasile and Isarescu) in a continuous attempt to find a coalition formula that would 
appease the discontent of the major partners in order to remain in power. 
The centre-right legislative coalitions supporting the Romanian Executive had a high number 
of veto-players, lacking policy congruence, while some of the veto-players exhibited a low level 
of policy cohesion (namely dissimilarity of policy positions among the units of each veto-
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player). Therefore, none of the conditions necessary for reaching efficient policy decisions is met 
when the Romanian centre-right coalitions organized the Cabinet. 
The centre-right Cabinets that governed Romania between 1996 and 2000 are highly 
illustrative (see Table 2 above): they exhibited a high level of fragmentation and polarization, 
being comprised of eight political parties and one association of the Hungarian minority living in 
Romania that acted as a political party (under Romanian law, cultural associations of minorities 
can run electoral lists). 
The centre-left of the Romanian political establishment has managed to impose one 
“dictatorial” coalition reflecting the outcome of elections (Type 2 coalition according to the 
classification in the literature and theoretical review chapter), while the centre-right has 
generated five highly fragmented and weak coalitions (Type 1 coalitions according to the 
classification in the literature and theoretical review chapter), organized as an outcome of inter-
partisan post-electoral negotiations, not reflecting the popular vote. The only Executive coalition 
that governed Romania having to negotiate to ensure its staying in power, while also being able 
to conclude negotiations is the legislative coalition supporting the Vacaroiu cabinet (1992-1996), 
for reasons that I will explain in the next section. This had been a Type 3 “balanced” coalition 
according to the classification in the literature review and theoretical chapter. 
As it comes out of empirical investigation, the Executive coalition that governed Romania 
between 1992 and 1996 has issued a strikingly low number of OUG, when compared to the 
volume of its NPL (see Table 3 below). 
 
Table 3: Legislative output of the Vacaroiu Government. 
 
The information regarding the volume of issued NPL of the Vacaroiu Executive (Column II 
in Table 2 below) is not available anywhere, given the low institutionalization of the Romanian 
political system in the early 1990s. However, the information on the volume of successful NPL 
is available, given that it is considered legislative output of the Parliament based on legislative 
Coalition I. OUG issued II. NPL issued III. NPL success 
Vacaroiu:  
19.11.1992 - 
11.12.1996 
5% (19) 95% aprox. (info not available) 369 
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proposals coming from the Executive41. Even in the eventuality that all the issued NPL had been 
approved and the issued NPL is equal to approved NPL, the volume of OUG issuing is still low 
compared to NPL issuing (an approximate 5% OUG and 95% NPL). Therefore, the Vacaroiu 
Cabinet is the only one among units of analysis in all three country cases which did not attempt 
to undermine the legislative function of the Parliament through an excessive use of OUG. 
Paradoxically, the early 1990s politics and the low Executive determination towards 
economic reforms and political liberalization hardly qualify Romania to the status of a 
democracy, save for the regularly organized elections. However, the Vacaroiu Cabinet issued 
significantly less OUG given that it had been supported by a legislative coalition that needed to 
bargain in order to reach policy decisions and had the capacity to do so given its low polarization 
and moderate fragmentation (Type 3 “balanced” coalition according to the classification in the 
literature and theoretical review chapter). The close ideological proximity of the coalition 
partners facilitates policy negotiations while the dependency of the senior partner on the junior 
coalition partners makes negotiation unavoidable, as I will show later. 
 
Table 4: the political composition of the Vacaroiu Executive. 
VACAROIU Cabinet 
19.11.1992 – 11.12. 1996  
(minority government with external 
support) 
FDSN (34.3%) 
PUNR (8.8%) 
PRM (4.7%) 
PSM (3.8%) 
PDAR (only Senate representation) 
 
TOTAL : 51.6% 
 
 
FDSN, the party that won the elections in 1992, had garnered 34.5% of votes, but the 
configuration of power allowed it to form a mostly informal but effective legislative alliance 
with PUNR, PRM, PSM and PDAR, which offered external parliamentary support in exchange 
for policy compromises, joining the Executive only for brief periods of time (see Table 4 above).  
Despite the large number of parties accessing the Parliament (13), the presence of “two 
oppositions” (on the one hand the “Red” group of leftist-nationalist parties of PUNR, PRM, PSM 
and PDAR, on the other the “democratic” opposition of PD and the parties member of the 
                                                 
41 Information available in the legislative database of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies 
(Hhttp://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/legis_acte_parlamH)  
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Democratic Convention electoral alliance) allowed FDSN to negotiate policy with those parties 
that had been ideologically close to had remained for the whole mandate without changing the 
prime-minister or losing their position of primacy in the Executive (see scheme below). 
 
    FDSN/PDSR  
     (Centre-left) 
 
PSM, PRM, PUNR    PD, PSDR, PER, PAC, PNLAT, PNLCD, 
(“Red” Opposition)    UDMR, PNTCD (“Democratic” Opposition)  
 
Initially, FDSN started with a minority government having a strong technocratic component: 
11 ministers coming from the winning party FDSN and 10 ministers from the technocratic elite 
inherited from the central administration of the pre-1989 communist regime (Radu, 2000: 55). 
After insuring the parliamentary support of the leftist-nationalist parties of the Red Opposition, it 
had been able to pass legislation that allowed it to go through the particularly harsh winter of 
1992-1993 facing dire economic circumstances.  
FDSN proposed a governing agenda in accordance with its own ideological orientation, but 
also pleasing its non-reformist legislative partners. The minority executive presented its 
economic program in Parliament on March 4, 1993. Its policies had been characterized by 
excessive social protection, excessive involvement of the State in the economy, strict and 
discouraging measures for private economic initiative, with an economic target of 0% economic 
growth for 1993, 70% inflation and the privatization of an estimated 5-7% of the State owned 
enterprises (Radu, 2000: 54-55).  
The presence of “two oppositions” and the ideological proximity of FDSN to one of the two 
opposition blocs, offered the minority Executive the possibility to negotiate policy and conclude 
negotiations after policy compromise. FDSN soon discovered that a minority government with 
external parliamentary support is more advantageous than a full executive coalition that would 
offer Executive positions to its allies. Consequently, FDSN developed a strong interest in 
maintaining the initial Executive composition (Radu, 2000: 55).  
This coalitional logic had been confirmed by the voting on the first motion of censorship 
introduced by the democratic opposition in Parliament on March 19, 1993: 260 votes against the 
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motion and only 192 in favour of Cabinet removal. The results indicated that the Executive could 
count on 11 more MPs compared to the moment of its investiture in the autumn of 1992. The 
voting on the censorship motion revealed that the “Democratic opposition” had been extremely 
vocal in terms of political declarations, but highly ineffective when confronted with the 
legislative bloc supporting the Executive.  
The first year of minority government passed without significant changes in the alliance 
supporting the Executive. Throughout 1993, FDSN changed its name to PDSR and engaged in 
various reshuffles among its own cabinet members and the technocrats holding some ministerial 
positions, but it did not invite its legislative allies to take over Executive positions. As the 
economic reforms became stringent, the Prime Minister Nicoale Vacaroiu declared that the next 
year of 1994 would be “the year of privatization”, much to the displeasure of its staunchly anti-
reformist legislative allies. Two of the supporting parties, PSM and PUNR, engaged in 
increasingly threatening rhetoric alluding that they would withdraw their parliamentary support.  
The political context of the first year of minority government revealed an Executive skilful in 
outplaying the “Democratic opposition” by negotiating with the “Red opposition”, but still under 
the pressure from two parliamentary blocs. 
The “democratic opposition”, very vocal but rather ineffective in terms of parliamentary 
action, simply pressured the Executive with motions of censorship and incendiary political 
statements. The “Red” opposition supported the minority Executive from Parliament in exchange 
for policy compromises: statist economic policies, international political isolationism and the 
containment of the demands for cultural and political rights for the Hungarian minority, which 
had been perceived as the major danger to Romanian national unity. A new censorship motion 
introduced by the “Democratic opposition” failed in the Parliament on December 17, 1993, but 
the very close voting results (236 against the motion and 223 in favour of bringing down the 
Executive) indicated the diminished legislative support for the minority Executive (Radu, 2000: 
56).  
The strong legislative pressure forced FDSN (later renamed PDSR) to demand presidential 
intervention in negotiating with all political parties in Parliament in order to decide on a new 
legislative coalition formula that would lend its legislative support to the faltering Executive. The 
“Democratic” opposition (PD and the parties of the Democratic Convention) demanded that the 
Executive should change its structure and composition in exchange for parliamentary support. 
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The reaction of PDSR had been to offer Executive positions to one of its “Red” allies, the anti-
Hungarian nationalist PUNR, on February 2, 1994. However, PDSR delayed the formal 
appointments as much as it could, offering the same positions to the “democratic” opposition, 
using the perspective of the anti-Hungarian PUNR joining the Executive as blackmailing method 
against the “Democratic opposition”. 
The decreased support for the Executive had been revealed once more on June 30, 1994, 
when its ally PDAR (which had only Senate representation) supported a new censorship motion 
introduced by the “Democratic” opposition. The attempt to remove the Executive failed again 
(227 votes pro-Executive and 208 against the Executive) but the very close vote as well as the 
defection of PDAR are indicative of an Executive that can survive even without the support of 
one of its legislative allies (although one that had only Senate representation) but is increasingly 
forced to make policy compromises in order to ensure its survival.  
PDSR eventually kept its promise and offered executive positions to PUNR in August 1994 
and the immediate reaction of its other allies had been to demand similar positions (Radu, 2000: 
59-60). PDSR managed to buy out its allies by offering positions in the Executive, so that the 
Privatization Law passed through Parliament containing all policy provisions put forth by the 
Executive, with full support of its legislative allies, after significant negotiations.  
The last test of 1994 had been a new censorship motion initiated by the “Democratic 
opposition”, which failed with 249 votes against and 206 for. It is important to notice that the 
privatization process failed lamentably in 1994, with only about 25% of its target being 
accomplished (Radu, 2000: 60-61). The major reason is the low determination to implement 
market-oriented reforms on the part of PDSR and the staunch opposition to any significant 
reforms on the part of its legislative allies. This is highly indicative of an Executive ruling under 
close control of the Parliament, given the policy compromises that it has to make. 
The period 1995-1996 marks a new dynamic of the coalition supporting the Executive, with 
elections in sight in 1996. The Executive signed a formal protocol with its allies on January 20, 
1995. In practice, the coalition partners engaged in contradictory rhetoric, nevertheless 
supporting the Executive in Parliament and from their newly gained ministerial positions. PRM, 
PUNR, PDAR and PSM (all anti-reformist “Red” opposition parties) started to give up on their 
Executive positions towards the end of 1995, invoking various reasons, but fearing electoral 
punishment in the upcoming elections of 1996. PRM left the Executive on October 19, 1995, 
163 
 
PSM at the beginning of 1996. Denouncing the signing of good neighbourliness treaty between 
Romania and Hungary, PUNR gave up its Executive positions on August 31, 1996 (Radu, 2000: 
64-65). All of them continued to offer the external legislative support to the minority Executive. 
All these resignations from Executive positions did not lead to the downfall of the Cabinet 
for two reasons: the ideological incompatibility between the allies of PDSR and the “Democratic 
opposition” led to the impossibility of a parliamentary collaboration against the Executive, while 
the “Democratic opposition” itself became increasingly disinterested in the resignation of the 
Executive with elections approaching.  
Generally, the “Red opposition” had been constructive, pressuring the Executive for policy 
concessions but nevertheless supporting it. This is the major explanation for the passage through 
Parliament of the most important laws at the end of 1995 and in 1996: the Law for Accelerating 
Privatization (the vote of PSM had been decisive), the Education Law (PUNR voted against 
given some concessions for own language education rights granted to Hungarians), the Budget 
Law passed with substantial support after policy negotiation and compromise (245 supporting 
votes and 108 against) (Radu, 2000: 65).  
The Executive responded to the legislative pressures coming from all sides with a large 
number of cabinet reshuffles. There had been three reshuffles in 1996 alone and seven 
throughout the mandate since 1992, with no less than 40 ministers and under-ministers changed. 
It is interesting to note that all these reshuffles had been implemented at the proposal of the 
Prime Minister by presidential decree, without any debate in Parliament, due to the interpretation 
of Article 85 of the Constitution to the effect that only the change of the Prime Minister requires 
a vote in the Parliament. This shows an Executive determined to get its way without Parliament’s 
intervention and negotiations, if possible. Given the opportunity to bypass the Parliament 
through presidential intervention in the reshuffling process, the Executive opted to do so. This is 
highly significant for the argument of this thesis. The Vacaroiu Executive could not bypass the 
Parliament on policy-making matters, given its dependence on the “Red Opposition”, but it did 
not hesitate to bypass it when it needed approval for cabinet reshuffles of ministerial and sub-
ministerial positions, by turning to the President of the country and interpreting the Constitution 
according to its own interest. 
To sum up, the presentation of coalitional dynamics for 1992-1996, FDSN (renamed PDSR) 
understood that a simple legislative coalition supporting its minority government suffices for its 
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non-reformist governing program given its capacity to negotiate with the “Red Opposition”. It 
offered executive positions to its legislative allies only when pressured to do so.  
A few factors had a significant influence in making this tactic possible. Firstly, PDSR 
managed to ensure the support of the non-reformist parties in Parliament given their close 
ideological orientation. Secondly, the collaboration between the two legislative groups 
representing the Opposition had been impossible given their antithetical ideological orientation: 
the nationalist PUNR and PRM could not collaborate with UDMR, which represented the 
Hungarian minority. PDSR itself could not establish any collaboration with PD, although both 
originated in the FSN, given the different positions of their leaders towards economic reforms. 
PNTCD, the leading party of the electoral alliance CDR, had a staunchly anti-Communist 
position and could not offer its support for any Executive built around PDSR, considered the 
inheritor of the pre-1990 Communist Party. 
Empirical information constantly shows a PDSR making policy concessions to its junior 
allies in the Parliament. This is explained by the total number of legislative seats of only 51.6% 
of those parties supporting the Executive. PDSR itself held only 34.5% of legislative seats. The 
very narrow Executive majority increased the blackmailing potential of all the parties supporting 
the Executive, despite their individually low number of seats. Had any of PSM (3.8%), PUNR 
(8.8%) or PRM (4.7%) withdrew its support for the Executive and voted against it along with the 
PD-CDR democratic opposition, the fate of the Executive would have been sealed.  
Therefore, the 1992-1996 coalition has a major partner (FDSN/PDSR) that could not impose 
its will on the junior partners given their capacity to precipitate Executive downfall. The senior 
partner had to negotiate in order to reach policy decisions and its ideological proximity to the 
junior partners facilitated the negotiations. 
In terms of partisan veto-players, the average number (three veto-players) and their 
ideological proximity to the senior coalition partner (all parties are of leftist ideological 
orientation in terms of economic policy and all display a certain nationalist discourse, which is 
nevertheless extreme in the case of PRM and of PUNR), allowed for an increased capacity to 
reach policy decisions after negotiations.  
One more aspect should be highlighted here. Although the Vacaroiu Executive did not 
implement significant economic or political reforms, it nevertheless had to confront an 
increasingly unstable economy with a weak budget. It did initiate some legislation to privatize 
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the state industries only late in its mandate, mostly forced by the economic context and going 
against its own orientation and legislative allies.  
However, the large number of approved Executive-initiated NPL is equally high to that of the 
next Cabinet (1996-2000), which had implemented extensive economic and political reforms. It 
could be reasonably argued that the Vacaroiu Executive could have issued a large volume of 
OUG, given the high agenda-setting power of these acts (as I will show in the next section on the 
institutional veto-player structure of accountability) and then further reject legislative action by 
issuing other OUG changing the policy views of the Parliament, a tactic used by the Executive 
coalitions of 1996-2000 (as will be shown next).  
However, the very nature of the Executive coalition would have made this tactic suicidal. 
Confronted with an Executive bypassing them, the legislative “Oppositions” (the Red and the 
Democratic one) could have easily joined forces to throw out an Executive whose major partner 
(PDSR) had only 34.3% of the legislative seats. Negotiation and policy compromise had been the 
only means of reaching policy decisions between 1992 and 1996 made necessary by the low 
number of legislative seats of the Executive party (FDSN/PDSR) and made possible by the close 
ideological proximity to the “Red Opposition”. 
I will next explore the nature and functioning of the coalition that supported the first centre-
right reform-oriented Cabinets between 1996 and 2000. This period had been marred by 
legislative instability and coalitional dissent, which translated into an increased need on the part 
of the Executive to overcome its internal divisions by an increased issuing of OUG.  
The Executive has issued a strikingly large volume of OUG between 1996 and 2000 (61%) 
(see Table 5 below), compared to the Vacaroiu Executive presented earlier (5%). Furthermore, 
the OUG issuing increases gradually, according to the increased coalitional instability. 
 
Table 5: OUG and NPL output for the reformist coalitions of 1996-2000. 
 
 
Coalition I. OUGs presented II.NPL issued III.NPL success 
CIORBEA 11.12.1996 - 15.04.1998  39% (102)  61% (160) 91% (145) 
VASILE 15.04.1998 - 21.12. 1999 58% (260) 42% (189) 77% (146) 
ISARESCU 21.12.1999 - 28.12. 2000 78%  (306) 22% (86) 91% (78) 
TOTAL 1996-2000 61% (668) 39% (435) 85% (369) 
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The legislative coalition supporting the Executive is made up of three different coalitions: 
CDR (Conventia Democratica din Romania, or the Democratic Convention of Romania, 
comprised of PNTCD, PNL, PNLCD, PER, FER and PAR), USD (Uniunea Social Democrata, 
or the Social Democratic Union, comprised of PD and PSDR) and UDMR, a Union of various 
associations representing the Hungarian minority.  
The actual winner of the November 1996 elections had been PDSR, with 26.5% of the votes. 
This had been a modest electoral outcome compared to its 34.5% in 1992, but the Executive 
coalition had been decided as the outcome of political negotiations among all political parties 
that opposed PDSR. The latter could not form the coalition itself together with its former “Red” 
allies PUNR and PRM, given their low total of legislative seats of only 37.2%. 
The negotiations aiming to form a legislative coalition that would support the Executive 
lasted for a whole month, from November 6 to December 6, 1996. The partners negotiated not 
only a common governing platform, but first and foremost all positions within the State, from 
parliamentary commissions to ministerial posts, which made the negotiations drawn-out and 
difficult.  
The difficulty of forming a coalition had been compounded by the ideological opposition 
between the centre-left electoral alliance USD and the centre-right CDR, as well as with the 
blackmailing capacity of USD without whose support the coalition had been impossible to 
assemble (15.4% of seats in Parliament).  
The major reasons in forming this ideologically polarized coalition had been the 
outmanoeuvring of PDSR (the actual winner of elections), preventing it from occupying 
government positions. The policy platform formally agreed upon had political and economic 
reforms at its core, but the actual strategy of implementation and the degree of social protection 
had constantly brought to the surface the ideological differences among the major partners. 
The number of parties accessing the Parliament remained 13, indicating a high level of 
legislative fragmentation (Stefan and Grecu, 2004). Interestingly, this fragmentation is entirely 
reflected in the composition of the coalition assuming Executive positions (see Table 2 on page 
154 earlier), but not at the level of the parliamentary opposition.  
The opposition is comprised of the ideologically closed PDSR, PRM and PUNR, former 
coalition partners between 1992 and 1996 (now totalling 37.2% of the seats in Parliament), 
which reverts the configuration of power between the legislative coalition supporting the 
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Executive and the parliamentary opposition, as compared to the previous coalition: a polarized 
and highly fragmented Executive coalition confronts an ideologically united and numerically 
strong opposition, in contrast to 1992-1996, when an ideologically closed Executive coalition 
with a low level of fragmentation confronted an ideologically divided and numerically weak 
“Democratic opposition”.  
This interesting configuration will prove highly influential in terms of legislative action 
against the Executive towards the end of the Executive mandate, when the CDR-USD-UDMR 
coalition had lost its parliamentary majority because of a high defection rate among its MPs and 
a low party discipline in voting. 
The constant internal bickering among the partners of the Executive coalition translated into 
a constant instability, reflected in the number of prime-ministers between 1996 and 2000: Victor 
Ciorbea (1996-1998), Radu Vasile (1998-2000) and Mugur Isarescu (2000), none of whom had 
been the president of the largest party in the coalition, the reform-oriented anti-communist 
PNTCD. 
This heterogeneous coalition had a low capacity to reach policy decisions given that none of 
the coalition partners held a numerically strong enough position to impose its policy views on the 
others, either by threat of coalition break-up or by negotiation, as well as given the serious 
ideological polarization of the coalition. The weak nature of this coalition (given its high level of 
fragmentation and polarization) is reflected in a number of legislative indicators. 
The number of important laws waiting in Parliament and the number of days required for 
passing them gradually increased across the years. Out of 449 laws awaiting approval in 
Parliament in 2000, 30 had been initiated in 1997, 143 in 1998 and 286 in 1999 (Pavel and Huiu, 
2003: 363). The low capacity of promoting legislation in Parliament reflects the incapacity of the 
coalition partners to develop a cohesive strategy for effective governance: a law had been passed 
every 13-14 days during the first months after taking over the power in 1996, but the average 
waiting time increased to 90-100 days by the end of 1997.  
In 1998, the year of the most serious conflict among the Executive coalition partners leading 
to the change of prime-minister Victor Ciorbea, the waiting time of legislation in the two 
chambers reached 150-170 days (Pavel and Huiu, 2003: 364). The legislative initiative on 
changing the Education Law to grant minorities increased rights to be educated in their own 
language racked up a record time of 750 days of waiting in Parliament, being opposed even by 
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some members of the parties present in the Executive coalition.  
The laws promoted by different Executive coalition partners encountered a long waiting time 
in either one of the Chambers, according to the political affiliation of the Chamber’s Presidents. 
When representatives of the Christian Democrats (PNTCD, the major partner in the CDR 
alliance) proposed legislation, the waiting time in the Chamber of Deputies (presided by 
Christian Democrats) was substantially shorter than in the Senate (presided by a Democrat, one 
of the two parties that constituted the USD alliance, part of the Executive coalition): 13 days in 
the Chamber and 197 days in the Senate. The same had been valid for legislation proposed by the 
Democrats: it spent 64 days in the Senate and 543 days in the Chamber (Pavel and Huiu, 2003: 
364).  
Therefore, the 1996-2000 Executive coalition has no major partner that could impose its will 
on the other partners. Despite the need to negotiate, the conclusion of negotiations is difficult, 
and often impossible. In terms of partisan veto-players, the actual number is only four, since only 
four parties have the capacity to lead to Executive downfall by withdrawing their parliamentary 
support (PNTCD, PNL, UDMR and PD). The actual number of veto-players is not significantly 
higher than for the previous coalition, but the ideological polarization makes the veto-players 
behave in a different way: instead of making use of their blackmail capacity in order to reach a 
negotiated policy compromise, the veto-players constantly blocked each other and brought the 
decision-making process to a constant halt. 
It is also worth noticing the high determination of the 1996-2000 coalition towards economic 
reforms. The Executive coalition confronted major financial crises both in 1997 and 1999. It also 
tackled the long-delayed privatization process, confronting hundreds of strikes. A long list of 
difficulties faced this highly fragmented and polarized coalition, the first one genuinely 
dedicated to reforms and the integration of Romania in the European Union and NATO. Suffice 
it to notice the high number of newly created institutions (84) and existing but reorganized 
institutions (45) required by the new economic and political turn of the country (Pavel and Huiu, 
2003: 575-578). 
Many of the 668 OUG issued by the three Cabinets in power between 1996 and 2000 had 
been decided on by the next Parliament (2000-2004), given the absence of a constitutional 
provision regarding the legislation that remains undecided from the previous Legislature. In this 
particular configuration, the Opposition itself can become a veto-player, particularly that the 
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Coalition lost its majority by the end of its mandate, given the numerous party splits: at the end 
of the legislative term, the number of parties in the Parliament increased from 13 to 17, given 
that four new political parties emerged splitting from the existing ones (Radu, 2000: 327-328). 
However, for political calculations, the leftist opposition preferred to oppose the Executive 
rather than negotiate policy. The electoral fortunes of all parties in power had been decreasing so 
steeply that the Opposition had no interest in negotiating policy, preferring more obstructionist 
legislative tactics and electoral rhetoric. The recourse to OUG had been the only legislative 
strategy available to this Executive coalition exhibiting a high number of veto-players, 
particularly given its ideological heterogeneity. Instead of waiting for the approval of its NPL 
(which could take months or even years), it preferred to issue a large number of OUG, which 
ensured immediate legal effect and the capacity to govern the country. The complicated 
legislative procedures (which I will describe in the next section) and the cohesive legislative 
opposition, which did not have any interest to negotiate policy with a faltering Executive, led to a 
situation where the Executive tended to issue an increasing volume of OUG. 
An allegedly “dictatorial” culture of politics in Romania does not determine the behaviour of 
the most democratic coalition that ever ruled the country. The democratic credentials of the 
major parties in the coalition are incontestable: PNTCD and PNL are historical Romanian parties 
banned by the communist regime whose leaders spent most of their life as political prisoners, 
both staunch supporters of political and economic liberalization. The UDMR representing the 
rights of the Hungarian minority living in Romania has long fought for any form of political 
liberalization that would ensure higher chances of success of its policy claims for increased 
minority rights. The leaders of PD had advocated stronger political and economic reforms in the 
early 1990s, eventually splitting from the leftist conservative FSN/FDSN to form a new reform-
oriented party in 1991. 
I will next explain the functioning of the only Type 2 “dictatorial” coalition that governed 
Romania since 1992. The Executive coalition that governed Romania between 2000 and 2004 
has also used OUG extensively, although at lower rates than the previous Executive coalition 
(see Table 6 below). 
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Table 6: OUG and NPL output of the Nastase Executive. 
Coalition I.OUG issued II.NPL issued III.NPL Success 
Nastase 28.12.2000 - 28.12.2004 47% (680) 53% (767) 95% (725) 
 
The Nastase Executive issued less OUG than the previous fragmented and unstable coalitions 
(47% of the total volume of its own legislation, compared to 61% issued by the CDR-USD 
coalition). Nevertheless, the volume of issued OUG constitutes almost half of the Executive 
legislative initiatives. What explains the similar legislative behaviour of Executive coalitions that 
are radically different in terms of structure and political identity? It is worth exploring the 
partisan legislative structure of the unit of analysis in order to explain its legislative behaviour. 
The number of effective parties in the Parliament decreased significantly to only 8, with a 
number of effective parties of 4.08 with the introduction of a higher electoral threshold in 200042. 
The lower legislative fragmentation is visible at the level both of opposition and of the Executive 
coalition. Even though the latter still consists of four political parties, the electoral weight of the 
junior partners is less important than in the case of the 1992-1996 coalition (see Table 2 on page 
154 earlier for political composition of the balanced Vacaroiu Cabinet). The senior coalition 
partner (PSD) has 40% of the seats in the Parliament after 2000, governing with significantly less 
important junior partners PSDR (3.1%), UDMR (7.8%) and PUR (1.7%). Furthermore, the 
legislative opposition is significantly weaker between 2000 and 2004, as I will show later. 
Firstly, the major difference between the junior partners of the Nastase Executive and those 
of the previous left Executive of Vacaroiu (1992-1996) resides in the level of ideological 
orientation: none of the junior partners of the Nastase Executive is as ideologically demanding as 
Vacaroiu Executive’s junior partners, as I have explained earlier for the 1992-1996 Executive 
coalition. UDMR is not concerned with economic policy issues as long as its demands for 
minority rights are satisfied. The senior partner itself is more dedicated to economic reforms and 
privatization than in the early 1990s. Furthermore, the smaller PUR and PSDR are effectively 
annexes of PSD, without whom they would not have accessed Parliament. 
Secondly, the Executive is again facing two “Oppositions” in the Parliament. However, it is 
                                                 
42 My own calculation, using the Laakso and Taagepera (1979:3) formula for number of effective parties in 
Legislature. 
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not forced to negotiate with either of them given its comfortable majority based on its own 40% 
of legislative seats. On the other hand, the EU integration process had already turned the 
nationalist, xenophobic PRM into a non-desirable coalition partner, even in terms of simple 
external parliamentary support, while PD and PNL had a low percentage of legislative seats 
(8.9% and 8.7% respectively) and were ideologically opposed to the primarily social democratic 
Executive. Therefore, the 40% of legislative seats granting PSD very strong negotiation power 
over the ideologically disinterested junior partners led to the formation of an Executive coalition 
which need not negotiate policy and exhibits a high capacity to pass through Parliament its own 
legislative initiatives.  
The coalitional configuration should make the use of OUG unnecessary. Why would an 
Executive able to pass any legislative proposal through the Parliament (given its stable 
legislative support) still govern by OUG? The Nastase Executive is the Romanian equivalent of 
the Berlusconi Executives in the Italian study case. It has a low number of partisan veto-players, 
a high level of policy congruence and coalition cohesiveness. It issues a large number of OUG 
simply because it need not negotiate policy and the opposition does not have the capacity to 
force it to negotiate. Furthermore, when confronted with the need to adopt policy in a fast and 
efficient manner, this type of Executive coalition is in the position to meet any urgency 
requirement. The period of 2000-2004 had been particularly demanding in terms of adoption of 
legislation requested by process of European Union integration. The recourse to the strong 
bargaining tool of OUG by a “dictatorial” type of coalition comes to no surprise. 
Thus far I have explained the functioning of the two types of legislative coalitions present in 
Romania. However, both of them (the weak and fragmented, as well as the “dictatorial” one) 
issue a large volume of OUG even when the success-rate of their NPL is high.  
I will next explain the functioning of the legislative coalitions supporting the two Cabinets in 
power between 2004 and 2008 (Tariceanu I and II). The elections of 2004 have brought back in 
power a centre-right coalition exhibiting the same features as the previous CDR-USD alliance 
that governed the country between 1996 and 2000: high fragmentation and polarization. The 
number of parties that entered the Parliament had been 7, while the number of effective parties in 
Parliament had been 4.8543. 
                                                 
43 My own calculation using the Laakso and Taagepera (1979:3) formula for number of effective parties in the 
Legislature. 
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The political realignments (both numerically and ideologically) are important: the centre-
right had been reconfigured after the demise of its leading party (PNTCD) which did not pass the 
electoral threshold since 2000. The previously social-democratic PD took over the newly vacant 
ideological space and joined the European Popular Parties, re-making itself into the leading 
centre-right force of the Romanian political establishment. The ideologically versatile PUR/PC 
entered the Parliament in an electoral alliance with PSD, but deserted it in order to join the spoils 
of the Executive. UDMR had been interested to govern with any political party, regardless of 
ideological orientation, as long as it could promote its minority rights platform and could join the 
Executive positions. 
The Romanian PR electoral system with closed lists and the fluidity of the centre-right part 
of the political spectrum (high number of fusions, splits, exits, ideological redefinition) have 
again generated an Executive coalition which does not reflect the electoral results, being the 
outcome of post-electoral coalition negotiation and manoeuvring. Table 7 below indicates the 
percentage of parliamentary seats of the Executive and the Opposition. The difference up to 
100% is made of independent MPs and MPs belonging to a special parliamentary group of 
national minorities other than the Hungarian UDMR (5.4%). They are versatile in terms of 
legislative behaviour; and position themselves neither with the Executive nor with the 
Opposition, voting on an issue by issue basis according to political and economic incentives.  
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Table 7: partisan configuration Executive -  Parliament: 2004-2008. 
EXECUTIVES 2004 – 2008 Political composition of Parliament 
TARICEANU I: 
29.12.2004 – 02.03.2007 
Executive 
 
PNL (19.3) 
PD (14.46%) 
UDMR (7%) 
PUR/PC (5.7%) 
 
 
TOTAL: 46.46% 
Opposition 
 
PSD (34%) 
PRM (14.5%) 
Ethnic minorities and 
independent MPs (5.4%) 
 
 
TOTAL:48.5% 
TARICEANU II:  
03.03. 2007 – 2008 
(minority government) 
Executive 
 
 
 
PNL (19.3%)  
UDMR (7%) 
 
 
 
TOTAL: 26.3% 
Opposition 
 
PSD (34%) 
PRM (14.5%) 
PD (14.46%) 
PUR/PC (5.7%) 
Ethnic minorities and 
independent MPs (5.4%) 
 
TOTAL: 68.66% 
 
With such a shifting political landscape, the post-electoral coalitional negotiations had been 
open to any outcome after the elections of 2004. As is salient in Table 7 above, the 2004 
elections had been won by the social-democratic PSD, in an electoral alliance with the 
ideologically versatile PUR/PC. The newly elected President of the country running on a PNL-
PD ticket had feared a cohabitation with a social-democratic PSD Executive and outmanoeuvred 
it in post-electoral negotiations forming a Cabinet, given the important role of the President of 
the country at this particular stage of political negotiations (similar to the function of the Italian 
President). The President managed to buy out the versatile PUR/PC and convinced the 
Hungarian minority to accept an Executive with the PNL-PD alliance by offering it more policy 
concessions and more Executive positions.  
Interestingly, the political configuration indicates a parliamentary Opposition which holds 
more legislative seats than the Executive (see composition for Tariceanu I in Table 7 above). 
This is the outcome of the status of the extremist-nationalist PRM, which had become an 
undesirable coalition partner for all Romanian political parties, including the social-democratic 
PSD, due to the European integration process and the new membership of the Romanian political 
parties in the European political establishment according to ideological orientations. 
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PSD had not been willing to form a government with PRM, but it had been outmanoeuvred 
by the President of the country, so that all potential coalition partners prefer to govern with PNL-
PD. The fate of the Executive hinged on the 5.4% percentage of legislative seats of the Ethnic 
Minorities (except the Hungarians, which form a distinct group) and individual MPs 
parliamentary group, as shown in Table 5 above, whose members had been engaged individually 
in legislative negotiations.  
Nevertheless, this frail composition is conducive of Executive instability. Compounding the 
numerical difficulties, the ideological orientations of the coalition partners and/or their political 
interest in distancing themselves from an Executive of which they are part fearing electoral loss 
led to constant internal bickering, legislative instability and the eventual desertion of the 
Executive by PD and PUR/PC in March 2007.  
The incapacity of the coalition partners to conclude constructive negotiations and reach 
policy decisions through compromise is reflected in the legislative output of the coalition and the 
high recourse to OUG as a preferred agenda-setting instrument, as well as in the desertion of 
coalition members leading to the minority Executive Tariceanu II (see Table 8 below). 
 
Table 8: OUG and NPL for the Romanian Executives since 2004. 
 
The Cabinets Tariceanu I and II have issued more OUG (53%) than NPL (47%), despite the 
high approval rate of its legislative proposals through NPL (95%). The Tariceanu II Executive 
formed after PD and PC/PUR deserted the coalition in March 2007. It had been based on only 
26% of the seats in the Parliament (the combined legislative seats of junior partners PNL and 
UDMR as shown in Table 7 on page 170 earlier) and is emblematic for the legislative instability 
generated by the PR electoral system and the fluid centre-right of Romanian politics. It could not 
be removed from power because of political calculations. The leading Opposition party (the 
social democratic PSD, formerly FDSN and PDSR), which held the highest percentage of 
Coalition I.OUG issued II.NPL issued III.NPL Success 
TARICEANU I 
28.12.2004 - 02.03.2007 362 (51%) 343 (49%) 327 (95%) 
TARICEANU II 
03.03.2007 – 19.12.2007 145 (57%) 109 (43%) 103 (94%) 
TOTAL 2004-2007 507 (53%) 452 (47%) 430 (95%) 
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legislative seats, had been more interested in keeping the Executive in power than in replacing it. 
Taken alone, neither PD (14.46% of legislative seats) nor PRM (14.5% of legislative seats) have 
the capacity to oust the Executive. The minority Executive did not need to negotiate policy with 
any of the parties in the Parliament in order to stay in power. 
In this section I had explored the coalitional dynamic of legislative alliances supporting the 
Romanian Executive as well as the interaction between the Executive and the Opposition. Except 
the “balanced” coalition of the Vacaroiu Executive (1992 – 1996), all the legislative coalitions in 
the Romanian Parliament had extensive recourse to OUG, despite the overall high success-rate of 
their NPL. Why would coalitions that have vastly different levels of fragmentation and 
polarization (both the “weak” and the “dictatorial” coalitions) use OUG extensively even when 
the success-rate of their NPL is particularly high? I will attempt to explain this empirical and 
theoretical puzzle in the next section focusing on the institutional veto-player structure in 
Romania, as far as the OUG is concerned. 
 
 
3. Institutional veto-player power: the legal status of the OUG 
 
 
Only two years after the collapse of a communist regime, the Romanian political 
establishment had to produce a Constitution that would regulate the functioning of the Romanian 
political system according to democratic principles, but still allowing the Executive the legal 
possibility to react swiftly and efficiently in times of economic or political emergency. The 
Romanian Constitution of 1991 regulated the Executive Decree power along two major 
dimensions: delegated decree authority (DDA) and constitutional decree authority (CDA).  
The former allows the Executive to issue decrees (ordinary Government Ordinances, 
Ordonanta Guvernului, or OG) only based on special law of delegation during times of 
legislative recess. This type of decree practice had been turned into a routine, during the 
vacations of the Parliament, when a law of delegation is passed clearly stipulating the policy 
areas and the deadlines when the Executive can rule by OG as long as the Parliament had been in 
recess. This type of Decree is not of interest for this thesis as explained in the previous chapters. 
However, the Romanian Executive can issue decrees (Emergency Government Ordinances, or 
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OUG) in exceptional cases of urgency and necessity (Chapter IV, Article 114, paragraph 4 of the 
1991 Romanian Constitution)44. The OUG has legal effect only after being sent to the Parliament 
for approval (as opposed to the case of Argentina, where the DNU does not have to be sent to the 
Congress before acting as full law before 1994). If the Parliament is in recess, it has to be 
convened immediately to discuss the OUG. The rejection or approval of the OUG is done 
through the issuing of a law. 
The necessity to send the OUG to the Parliament before it can have legal effect grants it the 
status of a special legislative proposal: although it has immediate legal effect under the pretence 
of emergency, it still has to be approved in the Parliament before it formally becomes a full law. 
This provision grants the Parliament institutional veto-player powers only in the presence of 
further provisions regulating the treatment of the OUG, such as the rule of tacit rejection in the 
Italian case. In the absence of any further constraints, the legal status of special legislative 
proposal does not constitute any institutional veto-player advantage for the Parliament, since it 
does not bear on the actual chances of success of the OUG. 
The need to convene the Parliament once an OUG is issued if the Parliament is in recess 
turned out to be irrelevant. No Romanian Executive issued OUG during the parliamentary 
vacation, since it could legislate by simple OG, based on a law of delegation. Furthermore, 
deciding the emergency nature of a situation has always been entirely at the discretion of the 
Executive, the 1991 Constitution did not stipulate what happened to an OUG that stayed in the 
Parliament for years without any decision, had no provision regarding the re-issuing of OUG that 
had been rejected in Parliament, and it did not mention policy areas that were the reserved 
domain of the Parliament. Therefore, according to the 1991 Constitution, the OUG can be issued 
at will, on any policy issues, can be re-issued without any constraints if rejected or heavily 
amended. Although it did not enjoy the formal veto powers of the Argentine President on any 
legislation coming out of Parliament, the Romanian Executive enjoyed total informal veto power 
through OUG, given the inexistence of precise and constraining constitutional regulations on the 
issuing or treatment of these acts.  
Given these vague and general constitutional provisions regulating the OUG, the Romanian 
Executives used it increasingly throughout the years, as they had to confront the difficult 
economic situation (300% yearly inflation in 1993), the necessary economic reforms and 
                                                 
44 Hhttp://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/act_show?ida=1&tit=3&idl=2 
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privatization of State run industries (commencing significantly since 1996) or situations of civil 
unrest and immediate danger of anarchy (such as the uprising of the coal miners in early 1999 
threatening a coup d’etat). Table 9 below shows that the Romanian Executive turned to the OUG 
as a favourite policy-making instrument, particularly since 1996. The OUG issuing rate is high 
overall (48%) (see Column I in Table 9 below), the success-rate of OUG is high (87%) and the 
amending rate low (41%) (see Column II in Table 9 below), particularly when compared to Italy. 
 
Table 9: OUG issuing, success and amending rates since 199245. 
 
The constitutional reform of 2003 regulated the OUG more clearly than the Constitution of 
1991, without necessarily placing institutional constraints on its use or treatment. The major 
                                                 
45 On the basis of personal data collection from the official website of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies 
(www.cdep.rom).  
Coalition I. DL issued 
II.  
OUG Succ. 
III.  
OUG 
amend. 
IV. 
NPL issued 
V.  
NPL Succ. 
VACAROIU 
19.11.1992 
11.12.1996 
19 100% (19) 32% (6) Missing info 369 
CIORBEA 
11.12.1996 
15.04.1998 
39% (102) 82% (84) 55% (46) 61% (160) 91% (145) 
VASILE 
15.04.1998 
21.12. 1999 
58% (260) 78% (203) 27% (55) 42% (189) 77% (146) 
ISARESCU 
21.12.1999 
28.12. 2000 
78% (306) 73% (224) 28% (62) 22% (86) 91% (78) 
NASTASE 
28.12.2000 
28.12.2004 
47% (680) 92% (627) 44% (301) 53% (767) 95% (725) 
TARICEANU I 
28.12.2004 
02.03.2007 
51% (362) 93% (336) 53% (178) 49% (343) 95% (327) 
TARICEANU 
II 
03.03.2007 
19.12.2007 
57% (145) 99% (143) 10% (15) 43% (109) 94% (103) 
TOTAL  
Romania  
1992-2007 
48% (1874) 
aprox. 87% (1636) 41% (663) 
52% (2023) 
aprox. 93% (1893) 
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provision regards the deadline for approving or rejecting an OUG: it becomes full law by tacit 
approval if the Chamber where it had been initially sent does not act on it within 30 days 
(Chapter IV, Article 115, paragraph 5 of the 2003 Romanian Constitution)46. This is exactly the 
opposite regulation compared to the tacit rejection present in the Italian study case, but even this 
major change is not relevant. The 2003 Constitution does not stipulate what happens to an OUG 
that had been decided on within 30 days in the Chamber where it had been sent, but drags on for 
months or years in the second Chamber. There are cases of OUG after the constitutional reform, 
which still take a long time to reach a final decision in the second Chamber, even if the first 
Chamber decides within the new constitutional deadline of 30 days. 
The explanation for this major loophole persisting in the Romanian Constitution is the fact 
that the Romanian political parties had not been concerned with holding the Executive 
accountable for policy promoted by OUG. Their major concern had been the very large volume 
of OUG without any decision, which remained in Parliament for years, sometimes being handed 
over from one legislative cycle to the next one. Whole chains of OUG had been issued and then 
forwarded to the Parliament, generating legal effects without parliamentary approval or rejection.  
All other 2003 constitutional provisions regarding the OUG hardly constitute an impediment 
on its issuing or treatment. The Executive has to justify in the text of the OUG the emergency 
(something which it did anyway before the 2003 constitutional reform).  
Also, the Executive cannot issue OUG dealing with constitutional laws, affecting the status 
and functioning regime of the major state institutions, the citizens’ basic freedom and rights, 
electoral rights or public requisition of private property. Just as in the case of the 1994 Argentine 
constitutional reform, these aspects refer more to questions of political principle than actual 
legislative practice.  
It comes as no surprise that the Constitution of 2003 did not produce any major change, 
except the increased approval rate of OUG, given the new rule of tacit approval (see Table 10 
below). 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=339&idl=2 
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Table 10: OUG issuing, success and amending before and after the 2003 constitutional 
reform. 
 
The explanation for the continued trends in OUG issuing and treatment is the continuation of 
the institutional and partisan veto-player structures of accountability, regardless of some 
irrelevant constitutional changes. The Romanian Parliament is characterized by full 
bicameralism in which none of the Chambers has prevalence over the other, exhibits a highly 
complicated legislative procedure leading to legislative deadlock and delay of legislative 
initiatives (Stefoi-Sava, 1995).  
Furthermore, the presence of a high number of effective parties in Parliament, as I have 
shown in the previous section focusing on partisan veto-players, turns the passage of legislation 
into a prolonged and uncertain process. Hundreds of pieces of legislation have passed from one 
Parliament to another after elections, without being decided on for years, regardless of which 
institution initiated them, the Executive or the Parliament (Pavel and Huiu, 2003). 
Confronted with the prospect of endless delays in Parliament for its NPL, the Romanian 
Executive preferred to promote legislation by OUG, which at least had immediate legal effect. 
The OUG followed the same institutional course in Parliament as the NPL. The OUG might as 
well be rejected or amended, as is the case with NPL. However, even though the Romanian 
Executive does not enjoy the formal/constitutional veto powers of the Argentine Presidents on 
any legislation coming out of Legislature, it can still amend it by issuing OUG promoting its own 
policy views. The outcome is an Executive which usually issues new OUG changing the content 
of previously issued OUG, changing the content of laws passed in Parliament, or amending the 
amendments made by the Parliament to a particular OUG. In a disorganized legislative process, 
the Executive is unaccountable to the Parliament in the absence of constitutional provisions 
regulating how the OUG can be used. 
This explains why the OUG is issued at increasingly high rates, particularly given the 
inexistence of constitutional constraints regarding the issuing and the legislative amending 
 
 
I. 
OUG issued 
II. 
OUG Succ. 
III. 
OUG amend. 
IV. 
NPL issued 
V.  
NPL Succ. 
Before 
reform 
 
49% (1221) 
aprox.  83% (1018) 40% (406) 
51% (1258)  
aprox. 93%(1167) 
After 
reform 46% (653) 95% (618) 42% (257) 54% (765) 95% (726) 
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and/or rejection. From a strictly legal standpoint, the OUG has equal chances of success or 
failure as the Executive-initiated NPL, since it follows the same legislative course without any 
special provisions until the reform of 2003, when the 30-day deadline had been introduced.  
However, from a political standpoint, the OUG allow the Executive to govern the country 
without any delays, given the difficulty of passing policy in Parliament. From the same political 
standpoint, the OUG grants the Executive important but informal institutional veto-player 
powers, since it allows it to change any legislation coming out of Parliament, including amended 
OUG, in the absence of any formal provisions that would legally deny such legislative 
behaviour.  
It is entirely up to the Parliament to reject or further change an OUG that amends its 
decisions. However, rejecting or amending an OUG can be costly, since this legislative act will 
have already generated legal effects and therefore can expose the political parties to the 
difficulties of continuously reversing legislation already in effect for years. It can also be 
inefficient, given that reversing an OUG is done by issuing a legislative proposal which follows 
the complicated legislative course, in a long drawn process with an uncertain outcome. 
Another important aspect that differentiates Romania from Italy requires explanation: if the 
Romanian Executive enjoys such a high success-rate of its NPL (which is not always the case in 
Italy), what explains its alleged need to issue such a large volume of OUG? The high success-
rate of legislative proposals initiated by the Executive through NPL shown in Table 9 on page 
174 earlier is misleading. Almost all policy relevant legal initiatives had been promoted by OUG. 
A cursory evaluation of the policy content of OUG and NPL of the Executive indicate that nearly 
100% of the latter are concerned with international treaties, membership in international 
organizations or irrelevant issues of territorial administrative nature, such as renaming 
municipalities or changing their administrative status from rural to urban.  
A similar trend, although not of equal amplitude, is found in the Italian case, as I had shown 
in the country case chapter, where the policy relevant measures are increasingly promoted by 
DL, while the normal procedure legislative proposals are mostly leggine, pieces of legislation of 
narrow policy importance. The Executive-initiated NPL in the case of Romania is highly 
successful because it is irrelevant in terms of policy. 
The continuation of the institutional and partisan policy-making structures ensured the 
prominence of the OUG as a preferred policy promotion instrument of the Romanian Executive. 
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Table 10 on page 176 earlier indicates that the issuing rate is almost the same (46% after the 
reform compared to 49% before), the amending rate stays almost the same (42% after the reform 
compared to 40% before). 
The only change is the success-rate of OUG, which increases from 83% before the reform to 
95% after the reform, proving the strengthening of Executive capacity to govern without 
Parliamentary review through the rule of tacit approval (see Column II in Table 10 on page 176 
earlier).  
Therefore, the Romanian OUG grants the Executive strong institutional veto-player powers 
in relation to the Parliament, particularly after the constitutional reform of 2003 and the 
introduction of the rule of tacit approval. The institutional veto-player power granted by the 
OUG had been informal before the constitutional reform, emerging out of legislative practice, 
without a clear constitutional definition. The Romanian OUG stands in contrast to the Italian DL, 
which does not offer the Italian Executive strong institutional veto power, given the institutional 
veto-player structure organized in favour of the Parliament, mainly through the rule of tacit 
rejection. 
It is already clear that the OUG is a strong institutional veto-player power of the Romanian 
Executive given its vague constitutional definition. Using legislative proposals through NPL 
would be irrational, particularly when promoting important highly contentious policies, given the 
uncertain prospects and long duration of legislative debate, particularly in times of political and 
economic crisis. It comes to no surprise that almost 100% of relevant policies are promoted by 
OUG. 
Thus far the empirical research revealed a large volume of OUG even when the success-rate 
of Executive-initiated NPL is high. Furthermore, the success-rate of OUG is high while the 
amending rate is low. These indicators show that the Romanian Executive is successful in its 
attempt to rule in a low accountability to the Parliament, as opposed to the Italian case study. 
This is explained by the constitutional provisions regarding the use and treatment of OUG. The 
constitutional definition of the OUG does not necessarily grant the Romanian Executive strong 
institutional veto-player powers. However, the vague definition allows the Executive to use it at 
will, any way it deems fit, making any parliamentary recourse against an OUG a costly action, as 
I have shown earlier. 
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I have compared the volume of issued OUG to the volume of issued NPL in order to reveal 
the intentions of the Romanian Executive in undermining the legislative function of the 
Parliament. However, at this point of the argument another comparison is needed: namely the 
ratio between the approved OUG and the approved NPL. This ratio reveals the willingness of the 
Parliament to comply with the intentions of the Executive. 
The picture reveals that the Romanian Parliament is acquiescent to Executive will, as far as 
the intentions to rule by OUG are concerned (see Table 11 below). 
 
Table 11: Volume issued OUG/NPL and volume of successful OUG/NPL. 
 
Overall, the intentions of the Romanian Executive to undermine the legislative function of 
the Parliament are not met with resistance: the ratio of issued OUG/issued NPL is closely 
reflected in the ratio of approved OUG/approved NPL (compare Column I to Column II in Table 
9 above). The difference between the OUG issuing volume of 48% for the whole period under 
Coalition I. OUG issued/NPL issued 
II.  
Success OUG/Success NPL 
VACAROIU 
19.11.1992 - 
11.12.1996 
19/ Missing info OUG: 5 % (19) NPL: 95% (369) 
CIORBEA 
11.12.1996 - 
15.04.1998 
OUG: 39% (102) 
NPL: 61% (160) 
OUGs: 37% (84) 
NPL: 63% (145) 
VASILE 
15.04.1998 - 21.12. 
1999 
OUG: 58% (260) 
NPL: 42% (189) 
OUG: 59% (203) 
NPL: 41% (146) 
ISARESCU 
21.12.1999 - 28.12. 
2000 
OUG: 78% (306) 
NPL: 22% (86) 
OUG: 74% (224) 
NPL: 26% (78) 
NASTASE 
28.12.2000 - 
28.12.2004 
OUG: 47% (680) 
NPL: 53% (767) 
OUG: 46% (627) 
NPL: 54% (725) 
TARICEANU I 
28.12.2004 - 
02.03.2007 
OUG: 51% (362) 
NPL: 49% (343) 
OUG: 51% (336) 
NPL: 49% (327) 
TARICEANU II 
03.03.2007 - 
19.12.2007  
OUG: 57% (145) 
NPL: 43% (109) 
OUG: 58% (143) 
NPL: 42% (103) 
TOTAL  
Romania: 1992-2007 
OUG: 48% (1874) 
NPL: 52% (2023) 
OUG: 46% (1636) 
NPL: 54% (1893) 
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observation (see row Total in Column I in Table 9 above) and the OUG success-rate of 46% (see 
row Total in Column II in Table 9 above) for the same period is insignificant. The difference is 
insignificant or inexistent when comparing the same ratio for each Executive coalition taken 
alone (compare Column I to Column II in Table 11 above). 
 
 
4. Conclusion: excessive Decree issuing and low Executive accountability 
 
 
The empirical information for the Romanian case study indicates a low Executive 
accountability in relation to Parliament: the OUG rejection and amending rates are low. 
The cause that explains the low accountability is the lax constitutional regulation of this 
valuable institutional veto-player power of the Executive. In the absence of any regulations 
regarding the conditions of its use and treatment, the legal status of a legislative proposal 
(although one with special status given its immediate effect) does not ensure a high 
accountability, as in the case of Italy. 
The status of a legislative proposal does not grant institutional veto power to the Parliament 
when not accompanied by other constitutional constraints, such as the Italian rule of tacit 
rejection given the 60 days constitutional deadline for decision in the Parliament. Furthermore, 
the Romanian political parties opted for the rule of tacit approval since the 2003 constitutional 
reform, instead of tacit rejection, formalizing an organization of the Executive-Legislature 
subsystem that favours the former. 
The OUG is used at will by the Romanian Executive, which is supported by either Type 1 
“weak” or Type 2 “dictatorial” coalitions. Given that an OUG can amend any legislation, 
including previously issued OUG or any Parliament amendments to OUG, it becomes a favourite 
resource of the Romanian Executive, insuring a strong but informal influence on the policy-
making process. The level of influence is so high that it allows the Executive to rule without 
stringent Parliamentary oversight, as proven by the ratio of the volume of approved OUG (46%) 
compared to approved NPL (54%) (see Column II in Table 11 on page 179 earlier). 
However, most of the policy relevant measures are promoted by OUG, while the bulk of 
NPL is of narrow policy importance. The relevance of this empirical finding is that most of the 
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important policies in place in Romania had been promoted by OUG, particularly since 1996, 
when the Executive engaged in serious economic and political reform for the first time after the 
collapse of the communist regime in 1989.  
The 1992-1996 Executive coalition of Prime-Minister Vacaroiu is the only unit of analysis in 
this thesis that meets the criteria of an Executive that cannot impose its policy views on the 
Parliament. The cause is its structure: the senior partner of the coalition cannot govern without 
the support of the junior partners, while it is ideologically close enough to them to be able to 
conclude negotiations. It issued a significantly low number of OUG.  
The institutional structure of accountability is organized in favour of the Parliament in 
Romania, which holds ample resources to control the Executive. However, the lax definition of 
the OUG allows the Executive to use it at will, making it very costly and inefficient for the 
Parliament to reject these acts: continuously reversing legislation in place for years can be 
politically costly, while rejecting legislation when it can be easily reinstated by the use of another 
OUG is highly inefficient. From an informal legislative practice standpoint, the Romanian 
Executive can easily prevail in the policy-making process through recourse to OUG. 
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Accountability across country cases: a comparative 
interpretation of empirical research findings  
 
 
The highest level of Executive accountability to the Legislature is found in Italy (only 57% 
DL are successful, while 77% are amended). The level of Executive accountability is inexistent 
in Argentina (99% of DNU are successful, while the amending rate is inexistent). The level of 
Executive accountability is generally low in Romania: the OUG success-rate is high (87%), 
while less than half of OUG are amended (41%) (see Table 1 below). 
 
Table 1: Level of Executive accountability function of Decree success and amending rates 
across country cases. 
Country cases I. Decrees issued II. Decrees success-rate 
III. Decrees 
amending rate 
Italy 1947-2006 
(High 
accountability) 
2879 DL 57% (1650) 77% (1268) 
Argentina 1983 – 
2006 
(Inexistent 
accountability) 
699 DNU 99% (693) 0% (0) 
Romania 1992 – 
2007 
(Low 
accountability) 
1874 OUG (aprox.) 87% (1636) 41% (663) 
 
The empirical information in Table 1 above reveals that the level of Executive accountability 
in Romania is closer to Argentina than to Italy in terms of Decree success-rate (only 12% less 
successful OUG than the successful DNU in Argentina, compared to 30% more successful OUG 
than successful DL in Italy). In terms of Decree amending rate, Romania ranks in between Italy 
and Argentina (41% difference to Argentina compared to 36% difference to Italy).  
As I have extensively explained in the literature and theoretical review chapter, the level of 
Executive accountability measured as a function of success and amending rates is determined by 
the constitutional definition of the Decree.  
The high level of Executive accountability to the Parliament in Italy is ensured by the strong 
institutional veto-player power of the latter granted by the clear definition of the rule of tacit 
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rejection and the specific constitutional provisions denying the Executive any veto power on the 
decision of the Parliament regarding a DL. The strong institutional veto-player power of the 
Parliament is reflected in the high amending rate and low success-rate of the Executive DL, even 
when the volume of Decree issuing is increasing over time, as I have shown in the country case 
chapter. The re-issuing of lapsed DL emerged as surrogate of veto power against the decision of 
the Parliament throughout the decades. As I have also shown, this peculiar legislative behaviour 
of the Italian Executive does not ensure the success of a DL, given that it cannot influence the 
decision of the Parliament in any way. 
The Argentine President governs without congressional oversight as far as the legislative 
treatment (amending and rejection) of the DNU is concerned. This is ensured by the strong 
institutional veto-player power of the President granted by the para-constitutional legal status of 
the DNU of full law and the formally strong presidential veto power on any piece of legislation 
passed in Congress, including laws initiated by Congress rejecting or amending a presidential 
DNU. The peculiar legal status of the Argentine DNU constitutes an informal rule of tacit 
approval. It is informal given the lack of constitutional provisions that would make the 
congressional decision on a DNU compulsory, while its tacit approval nature rests with the fact 
that a DNU is considered approved even when not decided on in Congress. 
The level of Executive accountability to the Legislature is rather low in Romania. It is closer 
to Argentina than to Italy in terms of success-rate and ranks in between the two other country 
cases in terms of amending rate, as I have already shown earlier. The low level of accountability 
is not inexistent, as in the case of Argentina but it is rather low because of the peculiar 
constitutional design which does not regulate the OUG approval and amending procedure or the 
strength of Executive veto power on the decision of the Parliament. The Romanian Constitution 
of 1991 does not formally prevent the amending or rejection of OUG through a strong Executive 
veto power, but it does not deny the Executive the possibility to use it in any way it deems 
necessary. The informal legislative practice permits an OUG to languish in Parliament for long 
periods of time, while generating legal effects (which constitutes a strong but informal 
institutional veto power of the Executive) and once rejected or amended, the decision of the 
Parliament can be easily changed through the issuing of another OUG. In the case of Romania, 
the low Executive accountability to the Parliament is not the outcome of formal constitutional 
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provisions, as in the case of Argentina, but arises informally out of legislative practice: the 
Executive uses the constitutional ambiguity in its favour.  
Significant for the large degree of freedom induced by the constitutional ambiguity, the 
Romanian Executive issues a substantially larger volume of OUG (48%) than the volume of 
DNU issued by the Presidents of Argentina since 1983 (23%) as shown in Table 1 on page 182 
earlier. Despite the higher volume of Decree issuing, the level of Executive accountability to the 
Legislature is higher in Romania than in Argentina (13% of OUG are rejected compared to only 
1% rejected DNU in Argentina, while 41% OUG are amended, compared to no DNU 
amendment at all). Simply put, Romania has a larger volume of Executive decrees than 
Argentina, but exhibits a higher level of Executive accountability, while the level of Executive 
accountability is inexistent in the case of Argentina, despite the comparatively lower volume of 
Executive decrees.  
The cause of Decree issuing is the same across country cases: the bargaining problems the 
Executive confronts in the Legislature. The Argentine political party system generates Type 1 
fragmented congressional coalitions, primarily because of its federal organization with a strong 
influence of local party leaders on the voting behaviour of legislators. The Italian and Romanian 
party systems generate either Type 1 fragmented and polarized legislative coalitions or Type 2 
“dictatorial” legislative coalitions. Type 1 coalitions issue Decrees to overcome legislative 
opposition to their NPL, while Type 2 coalitions issue Decrees because they can promote 
legislation through any kind of legislative resource and choose the one that is the most cost 
efficient. 
The only Type 3 “balanced” Executive coalition in the thesis is the Romanian Vacaroiu 
Cabinet (1992-1996). It did not issue a large volume of Decrees because its structure made 
policy negotiation necessary and possible. This coalition type had not been replicated through the 
years, given the fluid nature of the Romanian political party system, as I have shown in the 
country chapter.  
The mandate of President Alfonsin (1983-1989) of Argentina could also be a Type 3 
“balanced” congressional coalition, given the low volume of Decree issued. Further research is 
required into the relation between President Alfonsin and his own party, between the presidential 
party and the congressional opposition, before any further evaluation. This thesis does not 
explore the composition and the dynamic of the Argentine legislative coalitions that had been in 
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Congress during the mandate of President Alfonsin. Only this unit of analysis is not currently 
explained by the model of partisan and institutional veto-players. This is a shortcoming of this 
thesis, which can be improved by future research on the topic. 
However, the legislative behaviour of partisan coalitions defined in terms of partisan veto-
players does not explain the excessive recourse to Decrees, namely the issuing of more Decrees 
than necessary given the legislative opposition to Executive-initiated NPL.  
 
Table 2: Volume of Decrees and NPL according to the success-rate of NPL across country 
cases. 
Country cases I. Decrees issued II.NPL issued III.NPL success-rate 
Italy 1947 – 2006 18% (2,879) 82% (13,278) 83% (11,068) 
Argentina 1983 - 
2006 23% (699)  77%  (2,331) 62% (1,435) 
Romania 1992 – 2007 48% (1,874) 52% (2,023) (aprox.) 94% (1,893) 
 
Romania stands out in Table 2 above as compared to Italy and Argentina: its Executive 
initiates almost half of its legislation through Decree, at a rate that is more than double than the 
case of Argentina (48% Decrees in the case of Romania compared to only 23% in the case of 
Argentina), even when the success-rate of its NPL is the highest (94%) compared to Italy (83%) 
and Argentina (62%). 
The strongest negative correlation between the success-rate of Executive-initiated NPL and 
the volume of Decree issuing is found in the case of Italy (-,656), as I have already shown in the 
chapter exploring the causes of Decree issuing in this study case.  
However, the cases of Argentina and Romania do not exhibit the same correlation as the 
Italian study case. The negative correlation is inexistent in Argentina for the whole period under 
observation (1983 – 2006), despite the significantly lower NPL approval rate (62%) compared to 
Italy (83% successful NPL) and Romania (94% successful NPL). The correlation between the 
NPL success-rate and the volume of Decrees in Argentina increases to (-,232) after the 
elimination of the deviant units of analysis, as I have shown in the country case chapter. This 
degree of correlation does not indicate a strong causal relation.  
The case of Romania presents no correlation at all between the success-rate of Executive-
initiated NPL and the tendency to issue Decrees. The Romanian Executives issue almost half of 
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their legislative production through Decrees, despite the fact that the success-rate of Executive-
initiated NPL is 94%. The literature on democratic transition and consolidation reviewed earlier, 
particularly the strand placing explanatory power on political culture (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 
1999, 2003), would conclude that Romania comes closest to the “delegative” democracy model, 
since its Executive prefers to govern by Decree so extensively, even when the success-rate of its 
NPL is 94%.  
As I have already shown in the chapters focusing on each country case, the Argentine and 
Romanian Executives do confront bargaining problems in the Legislature. However, the same 
Executives do issue more Decrees than made necessary by the legislative opposition to their 
NPL. As I have already shown in the chapters focusing on Argentina and Romania, the legal 
status of the Executive decree (particularly the differences between the constitutional definition 
of the Decree and the constitutional definition of the NPL that grant institutional veto-player 
power to the Executive) can explain the excessive recourse to the Executive decree, namely the 
issuing of a volume of Decrees that is larger than required by the legislative opposition to 
Executive-initiated NPL (not the issuing as such). When the legal definition of the Decree allows 
the Executive to prevail over the Legislature formally or informally, then the Executive will 
issue more Decrees than required by the legislative opposition to its NPL.  
It becomes clear that the Decree power will be abused if the Executive enjoys stronger 
institutional veto-player powers when using this legislative resource compared to the institutional 
veto-player power that it enjoys when promoting its policy views by NPL. The stronger the 
institutional veto-player power of the Executive when using the Decree, the more likely is abuse 
of this potentially powerful resource through excessive issuing. 
In what follows, I will present in a comparative manner how the constitutional reforms 
illustrated in all three country cases influenced the tendency of the Executive to rule without 
legislative review by issuing a large volume of Decrees and most importantly the level of 
Executive accountability to the Legislature measured as a function of Decree success and 
amending rates. Table 3 below presents in a comparative manner, for each of the three country 
cases, the percentage change of each indicator used to measure the two dimensions of 
governance by Decree, namely the volume of issuing and the level accountability as success and 
rejection rates, before and after the constitutional reform. 
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Table 3: The effect of constitutional reforms on the tendency to issue Decrees and the 
Decree success and amending rates across country cases. 
Country case Difference in issuing Difference in success-rate Difference in amending 
Italy  - 1% + 31% + 6% 
Argentina +17% 0% 0% 
Romania -3% +12% +2% 
 
The Italian country case is based on the comparison between the legislative production of the 
Italian Executive during the most unstable period of legislative politics (the Pentapartito: 1980-
1992) and the legislative production of the Executive after the constitutional reform of October 
1996. The Pentapartito (1980-1992) is the coalitional period when Italy confronted the highest 
volume of Decree issuing since 1947 (except the Transition period, when exceptional 
circumstances led to governing by technical cabinets with parliamentary support). The Italian 
Supreme Court addressed the problem of Decree issuing and re-issuing after it reached 
significant proportions in the early 1990s, aiming to constrain the large volume of Decree issuing 
and the accompanying high re-issuing rates (as I have shown in the country case chapter). This is 
the reason why I chose to compare the effects of the constitutional reforms to the volume of 
Decrees and their success-rate under the Pentapartito. 
As empirical information indicates, the most substantial changes after the constitutional 
reform are the significant increase of 17% in the volume of Decree issuing in Argentina (from 
13% to 30%) and the success-rate of Decrees in the case of Italy (a 31% increase from 52% to 
83%) and Romania (a 12% increase from 83% to 95%). None of these changes translates into a 
substantial improvement of the level of Executive accountability to the Legislature in any of the 
three country cases. Argentina has formalized the previously para-constitutional strong 
institutional veto power of the President in 1994, when the DNU had been included in the 
Constitution. However, as I have explained extensively in the country case chapter, the 
constitutional reform did not grant the Argentine Congress any power that would allow it 
successfully to reject and amend the presidential DNU. To the contrary, the strong presidential 
veto on any piece of legislation passed in Congress has been maintained, insuring a low level of 
Executive accountability by making the congressional rejection or amending of a DNU very 
difficult, if not impossible.  
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Furthermore, the Argentine political parties delayed the setting up of a specialized 
congressional Committee that would deal with presidential policy promoted by DNU, according 
to the new constitutional requirements. This reticence on the part of the Argentine political 
parties to hold the President to account ensured that the DNU remained a full law (and not a 
special legislative proposal) until 2006, for almost 12 years after the constitutional reform, 
therefore denying the Congress even the possibility to consider it. The formalization of DNU 
power through the constitutional reform has led to an increased use of DNU, given the strong 
institutional veto-player powers that it grants to the President, but not to an accompanying 
increase in the level of Executive accountability. A further exploration of the nature of Argentine 
political parties, of their interests vested in the current institutional configuration of the country 
and the functioning of the party system in this country would explain this peculiar behaviour 
which lowers the quality of the Argentine democracy by subduing the Congress to presidential 
policy preference. 
The constitutional reform implemented in Italy in October 1996 has banned the re-issuing of 
unsuccessful DL, but it did not change the volume of issued DL as compared to the least stable 
period of legislative politics (the Pentapartito: 1980-1992). However, it had direct consequences 
for the success-rate of DL: it increased with 31% from 52% to 83%. The Italian Executive has 
issued only the DL it had been certain of approval in the Parliament after the constitutional 
reform given the impossibility of reissuing (Di Porto, 2006). The increase of the DL success-rate 
is accompanied by an increase in the amending rate (although not as ample), therefore 
maintaining the level of Executive accountability to the Parliament overall high. A high success-
rate of DL accompanied by a high amending rate indicates that the Italian Parliament is capable 
and willing to hold the Executive to account even when the success-rate of DL is increased, as 
long as the former closely controls the latter’s policies. 
The constitutional reform implemented by Romania in 2003 has formalized the otherwise 
strong Executive institutional veto-player power by introducing the rule of OUG tacit approval: 
if not decided within 30 days once forwarded to Parliament, the OUG is automatically 
considered approved. The informal institutional veto-player power has been formalized with the 
immediate outcome of a 12% increase in the OUG success-rate, which constitutes a decreased 
level of Executive accountability to the Parliament, particularly when more than 50% of OUG 
are not even amended, as opposed to the Italian case, where the amending rate is high (77% 
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between 1947 and 2006 and 83% after 1996). The constitutional reform had not been concerned 
with constraining the excessive use of OUG by constraining the issuing or by increasing the 
Parliament’s institutional veto-player power. It did not grant the Parliament increased resources 
that would enable it successfully to reject or amend the OUG. The Romanian political parties 
attempted to solve only the problem of policy promoted by OUG that remained in Parliament 
undecided for years, sometimes passing from one Legislature to the next, after elections.  
As I have shown separately for each country case in the respective chapters, at this point of 
the argument another comparison becomes more relevant: namely the ratio between the approved 
Decrees and the approved NPL. This ratio reveals the willingness of the Legislature in each of 
the three country cases to comply with the intentions of the Executive (see Table 4 below).  
Table 4: Level of legislative acquiescence to the governance through emergency Decree. 
Country cases I. DL issued/NPL issued II. Approved  DL/ Approved NPL 
Italy (1947 – 2006) DL: 18% (2879)  NPL: 82% (13278) 
DL: 13% (1650) 
NPL: 87% (11068) 
Argentina (1983 – 
2006) 
DNU: 23% (699) 
 NPL: 77% (2331) 
DNU:33% (693) 
NPL: 67% (1435) 
Romania (1992 – 2007) OUG: 48% (1874)  NPL: 52% (2023) 
OUG: 46% (1636) 
NPL: 54% (1893) 
 
In the case of Italy, the strong institutional veto-player power in favour of the Parliament 
leads to a situation where the intensions of the Executive to bypass the Parliament (18% issued 
DL/82% issued NPL) are curtailed through a reduced volume of approved DL in the body of 
total Executive-initiated legislation (13% approved DL/87% approved NPL). In a hypothetical 
scenario, if the Italian Executive would aim to rule Italy mainly by Decree, the institutional veto-
player structure of accountability in favour of the Parliament would constrain the “dictatorial” 
intentions of the Executive and would automatically diminish the volume of Decrees in the body 
of approved Executive-initiated legislation. 
In the case of Argentina, the institutional veto-player power exclusively in favour of the 
President distorts the intentions of the latter, as indicated by the difference between the 23% 
volume of Decree issuing and 33% volume of approved Decrees in the body of total approved 
President-initiated legislation. Argentina ends up with a higher volume of legislation promoted 
through Decrees than initially intended by the President. The institutional veto-player structure 
of Argentina makes the presidential legislative behaviour more “dictatorial” than it actually is by 
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automatically increasing the volume of DNU in the body of approved presidential-initiated 
legislation. 
In the case of Romania, the acquiescence of the Parliament to the will of the Executive when 
promoting legislation through Decree is reflected in the almost equal ratio of issued DL/NPL 
(48%/52%) compared to the ratio approved DL/approved NPL (46%/54%). From the perspective 
of this theoretically relevant comparison, the Romanian political parties organize the Legislature-
Executive arena by allowing the Executive to promote policy by Decrees extensively, as long as 
the Parliament has the institutional possibility to reject or amend them. The Romanian 
Parliament rejects and amends the OUG (although not as extensively as the Italian Parliament), 
unlike the Argentine Congress, which is unable to reject or amend presidential policy promoted 
by DNU. The empirical findings shown in Table 4 above indicate that a country may end up 
being ruled by Decree if the institutional veto-player structure excessively increases the success 
prospects of this Executive resource to the extent that it distorts the intentions of the latter.  
To sum up the comparative section of this chapter, it becomes obvious that the political 
parties play a fundamental role in setting the parameters of Executive accountability to the 
Legislature as explained in the literature (Strøm, Müller and Bergman, 2003). Firstly, the 
coalition types that the party system generate in the Legislature induce a trend towards low 
Executive accountability by making the recourse to Decree either necessary to overcome the 
legislative fragmentation and polarization, or a rational policy promotion strategy when the 
Executive is supported by Type 2 “dictatorial” coalitions, as I have argued earlier. Secondly and 
most importantly, the political parties craft Constitutions that define the conditions of issuing and 
treatment of a Decree, as well as the strength of the Executive reaction on the decision of the 
Legislature. They organize the Executive-Legislature arena by dispersing the institutional veto-
player power in favour of either one of the two branches of government.  
The continually high volume of Decree issuing after the constitutional reform indicate the 
persistence of the partisan veto-player structure of accountability. Political party systems are 
resilient parameters of the political systems of all three country cases, continuing to produce 
problematic legislative coalitions, which induce the trend towards a low Executive accountability 
by making the recourse to Decree necessary. However, the level of accountability itself is 
determined by how political parties define the legal status of the Decree, as well as the 
conditions of its issuing and treatment. 
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VI. FINAL CONCLUSIONS: NO LONGER 
ELECTED DICTATORS 
 
 
This thesis explored the capacity of the Argentine, Italian and Romanian Legislatures to hold 
the Executive branch of government accountable for its policy initiatives issued by emergency 
Executive decree, rather than normal procedure legislation (NPL).  
The major questions the thesis attempted to answer were: what makes Executives prefer to 
promote their policy views by Decree extensively, rather than NPL, even when the situation is 
not of emergency or necessity? What explains the capacity of the Legislatures to hold the 
Executive to account by amending or rejecting the Executive decrees that infringe with their 
primary legislative function?  
I have attempted to show that the issuing of Executive decrees is a rational policy promotion 
strategy when the Executive faces bargaining problems in Legislature, while the level of 
Executive accountability to the Legislature’s function of amending and rejection rates of Decrees 
is determined by the constitutional definition of these acts in favour of either one of the two 
branches of government. Furthermore, when the Decree is constitutionally defined to enable the 
Executive to prevail over the Legislature, the former will issue them excessively, namely at a 
rate that is higher than required by the bargaining problems confronted in the Legislature. 
The thesis offered an alternative explanation to the assumption that new democracies are 
ruled by Executive decree as an outcome of a specific “dictatorial” culture which perpetuates 
after the collapse of their authoritarian regime (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999). The disciplined 
comparison of three study cases with three different political systems and radically different 
experiences of democracy revealed the role of institutional and partisan structures in generating a 
peculiar style of governance and their capacity to keep it under control. 
This thesis has attempted to improve the findings of existing literature focusing on 
emergency Executive decrees from the perspective of democratic consolidation. I have 
conceptualized accountability according to its radial structure, I have attempted to explain 
causality through a better categorization of legislative coalitions according to their structure and 
bargaining problems they generate, I have measured the level of Executive accountability to the 
Legislature in all three country cases. The improvement of previous research findings required 
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the combination of different strands of literature, particularly given the need to compare different 
political systems.  
I have offered a conceptualized accountability by exploring its radial structure and revealing 
the importance of the “punishment” dimension (Schedler, 1999). Conceptualizing accountability 
according to its radial structure allows for operationalization and measurement, particularly when 
the concept is applied to the policy-making process between Executive and the Legislature. From 
this perspective, accountability is as much a dimension of institutional control, as it is of societal 
control in the policy-making process through the capacity of political parties to expose the 
legislative initiatives of the Executive to broad policy scrutiny.  
I have shown that the Executive decrees are policy-making resources and their rejection or 
amending in Legislature represents a form of policy control, in the framework of extended 
accountability, as defined in the concept formation chapter (Stark and Bruszt, 1998). As 
empirical information presented in this thesis revealed, the use of Decrees of urgency and 
necessity bypassing the Legislature in the process of policy-making, requiring ex post legislative 
scrutiny, are an attempt to evade policy scrutiny, but not necessarily an infringement with the 
principle of separation of powers within the State. The radial structure conceptualization of 
accountability facilitates the measuring of the capacity of the Legislature to hold the Executive to 
account as a function of Decree amending and rejection rates, as I have argued in the chapter 
focusing on conceptual definition. 
Another contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is the exploration of the cause of 
issuing a large number of emergency Executive decrees. Inspired by the important issues raised 
by the literature on democratic transition and consolidation regarding the large number of these 
acts (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 1999), the thesis has focused on the role of institutions and party 
systems in generating this peculiar governance practice (Carey and Shugart, 1998; Mainwaring, 
1990, 1991, 1992-1993; Jones, 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). This literature is pivotal to 
understanding causality: Executives use emergency Decrees when confronting legislative 
opposition to their policy views promoted using normal procedure legislation (NPL). The more 
fragmented and polarized the legislative coalitions supporting the Executive, the lower their 
capacity to agree on NPL, making the recourse to Decree necessary to overcome legislative 
deadlock. 
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I have also interpreted the Executive decrees as bargaining resources and I have argued for 
the necessity to compare the volume of Decree issuing to the volume of other bargaining 
resources (such as NPL), in order to establish empirical correlations between the success-rate of 
NPL and the issuing of Decrees. Such correlations can only be established by relating the volume 
of Decrees to the volume of NPL. It is assumed that the lower the success-rate of Executive-
initiated NPL, the higher the volume of Decrees. The simple number of Decrees does not allow 
for this theoretically relevant correlation. None of the existing literature attempted empirically to 
test this causally relevant correlation using as indicators the volumes of Decrees and NPL. 
I have offered a better categorization of legislative coalitions supporting the Executive 
according to their level of fragmentation and polarization by bringing in insights from the 
literature on how partisan veto-players interact with each other in determining how policy 
decisions are made (Tsebelis, 1995, 2000, 2002). I have argued that the bargaining strategies of 
the Executive and the capacity of the Executive decree to solve them arise equally in coalitions 
with fragmented and polarized veto-players and coalitions with one “dictatorial” partner which 
can impose its policy views on the numerically unimportant junior partners (Peleg, 1981). 
The definition of legislative coalitions in terms of partisan veto-players captures and explains 
the bargaining problems confronted by the Executive and the role of Executive decree as a 
specific bargaining solution across political systems. However, none of the existing literature 
defined a third type of legislative coalitions, which does not issue a large number of emergency 
Decrees. The definition of Type 3 “balanced” legislative coalitions is a contribution of this thesis 
to the existing literature. The structure and functioning of this type of coalition can be deducted 
logically from the comparison of Type 1 “weak” and Type 2 “dictatorial” coalitions. If the first is 
unable to conclude negotiations and reach policy decisions given its structure, while the second 
does need to negotiate given the capacity of the senior partner to impose its policy views, what is 
the type of coalition that can successfully conclude negotiations, while none of its partners is 
able to impose its policy views upon the others? The immediate answer is a coalition type in 
which the senior partner is dependent on the support of the junior partners, a coalition type in 
which the senior partner is not strong enough to impose its policy view upon the junior partners, 
while it is ideologically close enough to them successfully to conclude policy negotiations.  
Type 3 “balanced” legislative coalitions supporting the Executive reflect the essence of 
democratic policy-making: policy negotiation, accommodation and compromise, which in turn 
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represent the guarantee of a high level of policy inclusion of societal interests represented by the 
coalition supporting the Executive. The very structure of this type of legislative coalition 
constrains the Executive behaviour by conditioning its support for the policy measures that are 
closest to the interests of all coalition partners and the appropriate bargaining resources used to 
promote policy. The Decree as a formal constitutional resource is still available to the Executive, 
but the recourse to its use would immediately lead to legislative opposition. In parliamentary 
democracies, where the Cabinet can be easily removed by the legislative coalition it is a part of, 
Type 3 “balanced” legislative coalitions would lead to Executive downfall if the latter would use 
Decrees rather than NPL, as shown the country chapter focusing on Romania, particularly on the 
Vacaroiu Cabinet (1992 – 1996).  
Type 3 “balanced” legislative coalitions have diminished leverage on the Executive in 
presidential systems, where the presidential tenure cannot be ended before elections, given the 
popular vote directly electing the Executive. The capacity of legislative coalitions to force the 
President to negotiate policy in the absence of the threat of removal from office is determined by 
the relations between the President and the congressional majority, as well as by the 
constitutional resources that the legislative coalitions can use when dealing with this powerful 
bargaining resource of the Executive, as shown in the country case of Argentina.  
Another contribution of this thesis to the research on the topic is the actual measure of the 
level of Executive accountability function of success and amending rates of emergency 
Executive decrees in Legislature. Exploring the capacity of Legislatures to reject or at least 
amend Executive decrees can be more instrumental than taking simple notice of a large number 
of these acts in establishing if the former are indeed rubberstamp institutions. Such exploration 
provides a more solid basis for theoretical claims regarding the capacity of Legislatures to hold 
the Executive to account. I have compared the legal/constitutional definition of the emergency 
Decree to the legal/constitutional definition of the Executive-initiated NPL according to the 
literature on institutional veto-players (Tsebelis, 1995, 2000, 2002). Defining the two legislative 
resources of the Executive according to their respective veto-player power is instrumental in 
understanding the preference of the Executive for emergency Decrees.   
The radically different country cases of Argentina and Italy prove beyond any doubt that the 
rejection and amending capacity is influenced directly by the legal provisions defining the legal 
status of Decrees and the conditions of their treatment in Legislature (amending and rejection). 
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The Executive may end up issuing an increased volume of Decrees over time, preferring this 
particular bargaining resource if legally defined to ensure a higher success-rate than the NPL. 
The stronger the institutional veto-player power in favour of the Executive when using the 
Decree, the more likely the latter will prefer it to other resources. 
The institutional veto-player power of the Executive when using the emergency Decrees also 
explains the excessive issuing of these acts, namely the issuing of a higher volume of Decrees 
than made necessary by the legislative opposition to the Executive-initiated NPL. An Executive 
based on Type 1 “weak” coalitions will issue only as many Decrees as necessary, if the level of 
institutional veto-player power offered by the Decree constitutional definition is low. This is the 
case of Italian Executives supported by Type 1 “weak” legislative coalitions.  
However, Executives supported by the same Type 1 “weak” legislative coalitions will issue 
Decrees excessively if the constitutional definition of the Decree grants them strong (formal or 
informal) institutional veto-player power. The higher the institutional veto-player power of the 
Executive when using Decrees, the more excessive the volume of Decree issuing. This is the 
case of Argentine Presidents, who confront Type 1 congressional coalitions making the passage 
of NPL difficult and uncertain. It is also the case of Romanian Executives supported by Type 1 
“weak” legislative coalitions, as I explained extensively in the country case chapter and the 
chapter comparing across country cases. 
Executives supported by Type 2 “dictatorial” coalitions will issue a higher volume of 
Decrees than made necessary by the legislative opposition to their NPL, regardless how strong 
their institutional veto-player power is according to the constitutional definition of the Decree. 
These Executives issue Decrees rather than NPL simply because their structure ensures the 
passage of policy using any type of legislative resource. It is important to notice that this is the 
case of the Nastase Cabinet in Romania and all the Berlusconi Cabinets in Italy, despite the 
radically different institutional veto-player power of the Executive in the two countries 
(informally strong in the case of Romania, formally weak in the case of Italy).  
Executives supported by Type 3 “balanced” coalitions will not issue Decrees regardless of 
how strong their institutional veto-player power is when using this resource, as long as the 
legislative coalitions can remove the Executive from power, if the Legislature is bypassed 
through the use of Decrees. This is the case of the Vacaroiu Cabinet in Romania (1992-1996), as 
I have extensively explained in the country case chapter.  
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Comparing across political regimes legislative coalitions and legal/constitutional definitions 
of emergency Decree and NPL is made possible by the conceptualization of accountability 
according to its radial structure and the institutional and partisan veto-player model of policy-
making (Tsebelis, 1995, 2000, 2002).  
I have attempted to improve the literature that eloquently identified the two dimensions of 
accountability, namely institutional control (capacity to terminate the mandate of the Executive 
before elections) and policy control (capacity to expose the policy initiatives to broad 
institutional scrutiny through rejection and amending) (Strøm et al., 2003) by arguing that these 
important dimensions of accountability are present both in parliamentary and presidential 
systems, only with a difference in the mechanisms of imposition. The amending and rejection of 
Decrees is a form of political accountability in the framework of policy control function. 
I have argued that in presidential systems the institutional control function is reduced to a 
substantially diminished form: the impeachment procedure. However, the policy-making 
function is correspondingly enhanced, through increased policy scrutiny for the Presidential 
legislative initiatives sent to the Legislature for consideration and approval. This explains why 
the Argentine Congress is opposing the Executive-initiated NPL more than the Romanian and 
Italian Parliaments oppose the legislation initiated by the Cabinets that they support, as I have 
presented in the country case comparison chapter.  
In parliamentary systems, the institutional control function is substantially stronger, since the 
Parliament has a variety of means to remove an Executive that is made of members of the 
Parliament and is entirely dependent on its support. The policy-control function is 
correspondingly weaker than in presidential regimes, given the origin of the Executive in 
Parliament. It is assumed that a Parliament supporting an Executive has no incentive to amend 
the latter’s policies to the same extent as Congresses in presidential regimes, since the Parliament 
itself delegated the Executive to implement the program of the supporting legislative coalition. 
That is not to say amending or rejection of Executive policy initiatives are absent from 
parliamentary systems. To the contrary, the Executive is held accountable by Parliament with 
varying degrees of success, according to the legislative resources granted to the latter by 
Constitution.  
As I have extensively argued in the conceptual definition chapter, the amending and rejection 
of Executive decrees is a legitimate form of accountability understood as a policy control 
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function. I have further attempted to improve the literature focusing on delegation and 
accountability in parliamentary systems (Strøm et al., 2003) by using the partisan and 
institutional veto-player model that allows for comparing the level of Executive accountability 
across political regimes (Tsebelis, 1995, 2000, 2002). The capacity of the Legislature to hold the 
Executive to account is primarily determined by how political parties disperse institutional veto-
player power between the two branches of government when defining the legal status of the 
Decree and the conditions of its legislative amendment and rejection.  
Therefore, the different levels of Executive accountability function of Decree success and 
amending rates are explained by the differences and similarities among the different 
constitutional provisions defining the legal status of the Decree and treatment of Executive 
decrees in the Legislature. 
This thesis leaves unanswered a few questions that can be addressed by future research work 
on the topic. How does the typology of coalitions function in presidential systems and in 
parliamentary systems with minority Cabinets? The legislative coalitions have no capacity to 
remove the President from power in presidential systems, whereas minority Cabinets in 
parliamentary or semi-parliamentary systems should be constrained by their low number of 
legislative seats to negotiate with the Opposition and promote legislation exclusively by NPL as 
long as they could be removed from power at any moment when bypassing the Legislature. Do 
partisan veto-players interact differently in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems, or 
in the case of Cabinets which do not have more than 50% legislative support? What is their 
effect on the tendency of the Executive to issue Decrees, either excessively or proportionately to 
the legislative opposition to the NPL? 
The empirical information on which this thesis is based presents some shortcomings, 
preventing an accurate evaluation of how Presidents solve their bargaining problems when 
confronted with Type 3 “balanced” coalitions or when benefiting from the unconditional support 
of Type 2 “dictatorial” coalitions.  
The Argentine party system leads to the formation of only one type of legislative coalition, 
namely Type 1 “weak”, preventing a comparison to Type 2 “dictatorial” or Type 3 “balanced” 
coalitions within the same political system. Furthermore, the level of institutional veto-player 
power can be different across different presidential regimes when using the emergency Executive 
decree.  
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Therefore, the findings of this thesis do not warrant stronger claims regarding the interaction 
between congressional coalitions and a President’s function of issuing of Decrees across 
presidential systems in general. Nevertheless, the exploration of the Argentine study case 
revealed the importance of institutional veto-player power in determining the excessive issuing 
of Decrees and the incapacity of the Congress to hold the President to account by rejecting or at 
least amending these powerful legislative bargaining resources. Presidents who enjoy total 
institutional veto-player power through Decrees will make use of this powerful resource 
excessively, namely more is made necessary by the legislative opposition to presidential NPL.  
The Argentine case represents a relevant example of such a situation, explained extensively 
in the relevant chapter. The Argentine President need not negotiate policy when using the 
Decree. Therefore the coalition types in the Argentine Congress (Type 1 “weak”) explain only 
the necessity to issue Decrees, but the excessive issuing is explained the specific legal status of 
the Decree. It follows logically that the less institutional veto-player power the President enjoys 
when using Decrees, the more he or she has to negotiate policy with the congressional coalitions, 
while the negotiation itself will be influenced by the legislative coalitions types defined earlier.  
The findings of this thesis can be further improved by bringing into the analysis various 
presidential systems, where the Presidents confront different types of congressional coalitions 
(depending on the partisan systems present in different presidential systems), while possessing 
different levels of institutional veto-player power when using the Decrees of urgency and 
necessity (depending on the constitutional definition of the legal status and conditions of 
treatment of this legislative bargaining resource in different presidential systems). 
This thesis compared different coalition types in the country cases of Romania and Italy, 
defined in terms of bargaining problems the Executive confronts in the Legislature. All three 
coalition types are present in these two country cases. Furthermore, the Italian and the Romanian 
Cabinets have substantially different institutional veto-player power when using the Executive 
decree. This diversity in the nature of the units of analysis (coalition types) and the level of 
institutional veto-player power allows for theoretically relevant comparisons.  
The second issue that remains only partly explained by the coalition typology put forth in this 
thesis is that of minority Cabinets in political systems where the Executive mandate is entirely 
dependent on legislative support. According to the coalition typology extensively defined in the 
literature and theoretical review chapter, the minority Cabinets should promote most of their 
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policy initiatives through NPL rather than Decrees, given their low number of legislative seats 
and the need to negotiate policy with the Opposition.  
However, the theoretical expectation is contradicted by empirical information, as the units of 
analysis Tariceanu I and II indicate in the case of Romania. These two minority Cabinets issued 
more than half of their legislative production through Decree, given the incapacity and 
unwillingness of the legislative Opposition to remove them from power, as I have extensively 
explained in the country case chapter.  
The Tariceanu I Cabinet could not be removed from power given the impossibility of 
legislative collaboration between the social democratic PSD and the extremist party PRM. The 
Tariceanu II Cabinet had not been removed from power before elections, even after some parties 
deserted the coalition supporting the Executive, given the electoral calculations of all political 
parties in Parliament.  
The same situation is found in Italy between 1947 and 1993, when minority Cabinets had 
been put in place immediately after elections in order to govern the country while the political 
parties negotiated the coalition formula that would offer legislative support to the Executive.  
As I have extensively explained in the country case chapter, the Italian minority Cabinets 
governed sometimes for months if the political parties encountered difficulty in reaching a 
consensus regarding the composition of the legislative coalition to support the Executive. The 
protracted negotiations had been impossible to conclude at times, given the nature of the Italian 
party system.  
This situation has been recurrent throughout the decades, leading to so-called “crisi al buio”, 
literally meaning crisis in the dark, where minority Cabinets were not removed from power out 
of political calculations. If agreement on the coalition formula had been impossible, then 
Cabinets in “crisi al buio” were terminated by calling early elections.  
A more focused analysis on the legislative production of these units of analysis could 
improve this thesis in explaining the need to issue Decree even when the Executive is not 
supported by Type 1 “weak” and Type 2 “dictatorial” legislative coalitions. 
The tentative conclusion regarding the issuing of Decrees in the case of minority Cabinets is 
that the coalition typology offered earlier does not explain the necessity to issue Decrees either 
through a high level of fragmentation and polarization or through a “dictatorial” capacity to pass 
policy through the Legislature using any type of legislative resource.  
203 
 
When focusing on minority Cabinets, the relations among legislative Opposition parties must 
be considered, particularly how political and electoral calculations shape their legislative 
behaviour and the subsequent relation to the Executive. This thesis can be further improved by 
focusing on a larger sample of units of analysis (Executives) which have minority legislative 
support. 
The current research findings can also be further improved along two methodological 
dimensions. Firstly, the increase in the number of the units of analysis in the observation sample 
would allow for a more accurate correlation between the success-rate of Executive-initiated NPL 
and the tendency of the Executive to issue Decrees. This can be done by organizing empirical 
information on the volume of Decrees, volume and success-rate of NPL for shorter periods of 
time (i.e., weeks or months).  
Secondly, a content analysis of Decrees and Executive-initiated NPL would establish the 
importance of policy promoted by each one of the two constitutional resources of the Executive. 
It might turn out that the most relevant policy measures are indeed promoted by Decree, while 
the least important ones (such as international treaties) are promoted by NPL. As I have already 
shown in the case of Romania, it is expected that the stronger the institutional veto-player power 
of the Executive when using the Decree, the higher the tendency to promote the most important 
(and therefore more divisive) policies through Decree rather than NPL. 
The important role that political parties play in dispersing the institutional veto-player power 
between the two branches of government offers a different perspective on the theoretical claims 
of the “delegative” democracy argument. A causal link might be established between the 
political parties and the excessive issuing of Decrees, but that remains to be explored.  
The theoretical claims that could be derived from such a possible causal link might explain 
the excessive issuing of Decrees through a partisan and institutional culture, but not necessarily 
through popular political culture. The public approval for Executives bypassing Legislature 
might be strong occasionally, particularly in times of serious economic situations or political 
turmoil, but the partisan and institutional causes that ensure the perpetuation of such practice are 
clearly stronger, as this thesis has revealed. The role that political parties play in shaping the 
Executive-Legislature agenda is fundamental, as supported by the comparison between the 
Italian political parties, on the one hand and the Romanian and Argentine political parties, on the 
other.  
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The exploration of partisan life in the new democracies (party system and representation 
capacity of political parties) could reveal significantly more about the diminished capacity of 
Legislatures to hold the Executive to account, along the argument of literature already reviewed 
(Strøm, et al., 2003). Political parties appear to be pivotal in influencing the dynamic of 
delegation and accountability.  
As I have shown in the literature review chapter, the ability of political parties to capture and 
disperse the policy agenda is considered an indicator of their cohesiveness (Strøm, 2003: 651). 
This specific ability in turn is influenced by the institutional system and type of party system 
present in any country. The stronger the cohesion of political parties, the stronger is their 
capacity to activate the accountability mechanisms (Strøm, 2003: 652). Given that citizens are 
directly voting for political parties and trust them to control the Executive, the stronger the 
disconnection of parties from society, the weaker are their cohesiveness and capacity to hold the 
Executive to account. 
Therefore, a possible improvement of the “delegative” democracy argument would be the 
measuring of the cohesiveness of the political party system, in order to establish an accurate 
measure for the level of Executive accountability: electoral party strength, organizational party 
strength, party in government strength. The lower the scores along these three dimensions, the 
weaker the cohesiveness of political parties, the lower the accountability of the Executive in 
relation to the Legislature, as I have showed in the literature and theoretical review chapter. 
To sum up, governance by emergency Executive decree based on constitutional decree power 
(or at least endorsed by the Justice system) is induced by the type of legislative coalitions the 
Executive has to manage, while it is kept under control by the type of constitutional regulations 
that define the legal status of the Decree, as well as the conditions of its treatment in Legislature. 
The political parties have to be both willing and capable to hold the Executive to account by 
imposing policy negotiation as the only possible alternative for reaching policy decisions. Given 
that political parties can act only as part of legislative coalitions when influencing the policy 
initiatives of the Executive, I have shown that the actual capacity of the congressional coalitions 
to hold the President to account determine the bargaining strategies they use when dealing with 
Executive-initiated legislation (either through normal procedure or by Decree).  
The Executives which enjoy strong Decree powers, such as the Argentine Presidents, relegate 
the Legislatures to rubberstamp institutions when using this particular constitutional resource, 
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whereas the Executives which enjoy moderate Decree power use it as a bargaining tool, rather 
than a method of bypassing the Legislature. It can be concluded that the level of Executive 
accountability to the Legislature’s function of Decree success and amending rates is determined 
across country cases by the constitutional definition of the legal status of this legislative 
instrument of the Executive and the conditions of its treatment in Legislature.  
The bargaining power of the Executive when using the Decree should be understood across 
country cases as a matter of degree (more or less) rather than in a dichotomous manner 
(existent/inexistent). The Executive in some countries enjoys stronger institutional veto-player 
power when using the Decree than the Executive in other countries, while the Decree power 
itself is used differently within the same country, according to the structure of the legislative 
coalition supporting the Executive. The immediate consequence is that the level of accountability 
can be understood accordingly, as a matter of degree (more/less accountable). 
Despite all the institutional malfunctioning or their low quality, many of the new 
democracies have endured and did not return to authoritarianism. Comparing an established 
democracy (Italy) to two new democracies (Argentina and Romania) reveals that the quality of a 
democratic regime is first and foremost determined by its policy-making structures (partisan and 
institutional), which do not operate independent of each other, as I have shown.  
All three country cases are multi-party democracies and in all of them political parties have a 
major influence on how policy decisions are made. Authoritarian legacies might exist in the case 
of Romania and Argentina and they might have varying degrees of influence on how policy 
decisions are made. However, a causal mechanism needs to be established between such legacies 
and the policy-making process. The factor with causal explanatory power might be popular 
political culture, but it might as well be partisan life and/or institutional structures. This thesis 
has attempted to explore the latter, building on the insights of existing literature and combining 
different approaches to explain the complex interaction between the Executive and the 
Legislature as mediated by political parties. 
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